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INTRODUCTION
The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (the "Act")'
was born out of controversy about constitutional means for
achieving judicial accountability, preserving independent decision-
making powers for Article IIIjudges, and the practical ability of the
judicial branch to regulate itself.2 The Act embodies a compromise
of divergent viewpoints on these issues. As the debate evolved, the
primary alternatives considered by Congress were (1) establishing a
central body of judges with broad powers to discipline and even
remove federal judges3 and (2) formalizing or augmenting the
system of decentralized self-regulation already in place by virtue of
the general powers of the judicial councils of the respective
circuits.4 By enacting the 1980 Act, Congress chose the latter
option.
Given the magnitude of the values at stake-no less than judicial
independence and accountability to the public-it is not surprising
that the controversy continues.5 What is surprising is that these
debates have raged without any systematic empirical examination of
the experience of the judiciary in administering the 1980 Act. This
Article is intended to provide systematically collected and substan-
tively evaluated empirical data to inform the continuing debate
about decentralized judicial self-regulation.
In 1990, Congress created the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal ("NCJDR") "to investigate and study the
problems and issues involved in the tenure (including discipline and
removal) of an article IIIjudge" and "to evaluate the advisability of
proposing alternatives to current arrangements." 6 This congressio-
1 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
2 See Stephen B. Burbank, ProceduralRulemaking Under theJudicial Councils Reform
andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283,291-300 (1982);
Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative
Perspective, 76 KY. LJ. 763, 770-73 (1988).
See S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (the Nunn-DeConcini Bill).
4 See Burbank, supra note 2, at 291-300 (attributing this view to the Judicial
Conference of the United States as well as others).
5 See e.g., Carol T. Rieger, The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act: Will Judges Judge Judges, 37 EMORY L.J. 45 (1988); Comment,Judicial
Misconduct and Politics in the Federal System: A Proposalfor Revising theJudicial Councils
Act, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1987); Note, Unnecessary and Improper. TheJudicial Councils
Reform andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117 (1985).
6 judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. IV, § 410, 104 Stat.
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nal mandate served as the catalyst for the present Article. This
project was undertaken in June 1992 primarily to address research
questions that the NCJDR identified as important to its work.
Specifically, it pursues the questions of whether the Act is working
as intended to provide a structure for the filing and review of
complaints alleging judicial misconduct or disability and whether
sufficient information is available to the public and Congress to
permit meaningful oversight of the process.
Part I of the report consists of a description of the circuits'
processes for handling conduct and disability matters, including
both formal complaints under the Act and informal matters. It
begins with an overview of the administration of the Act, proceeds
to a statistical overview, and then moves to a discussion of the
treatment of complaints by chief judges, special committees, and
judicial councils, including both substantive and procedural aspects
of the process. Part I then proceeds to look at the extent to which
circuits' practices permit public and congressional oversight of the
circuits' administration of the complaint mechanism, concluding
with an analysis of informal actions taken regarding matters that fall
within the potential reach of the Act.
Part II focuses on the effects of the Act, discussing field study
data and presenting the views of current and former chief judges.
Part II also addresses the benefits the Act affords to complainants,
the courts, and the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment. The time burdens and other negative effects that the task of
administering the Act has imposed on the judiciary are also
examined in Part II. Part III assesses the relationships between
positive and negative effects, summarizes chief judges' assessments
of the value of the Act, and reports suggestions for change.
Data for this report were obtained from three primary sources.
First, we conducted interviews ("interview data") with chief judges
(in eight circuits), former chiefjudges (in five of the eight circuits),
circuit executives (in six of the eight circuits), and clerks of court (in
seven of the eight circuits). We selected circuits to represent a full
spectrum of the levels of complaint activity per judicial officer. We
also included all circuits that did not submit chiefjudge orders with
statements of reasons to the Federal Judicial Center pursuant to
Rule 17(b) of the Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints ofJudicial
Misconduct and Disability.7 Unless otherwise specified, references
5089, 5124.
7 Rule 17 requires that final orders and supporting documents from the chief
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to "chief judges" include responses of former chief judges. The
interviews were conducted in the District of Columbia, First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Second, we reviewed complaints and orders ("field study data")
in the eight circuits listed above. The documents reviewed
consisted of (a) all complaints that had not been dismissed by the
chief judge (primarily all complaint files in which corrective action
was taken or a special committee was appointed); (b) all complaints
filed by attorneys or by nonlitigants; and (c) a sample of litigant
complaints that had been dismissed by the chief judge.
Third, we reviewed statistical data submitted to the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts ("AO"). Various staff members in the
circuits and national courts submitted these data to the AO on AO
form 372,8 which does not identify the judge involved. Court staff
(generally a deputy clerk or secretary, not a staff attorney) complete
a portion of the form at the time the complaint is filed and another
portion at the time the complaint is terminated. We used these
data primarily as a source of relatively objective information about
the complaints filed in all circuits for calendar years 1980-1991.9
The Appendix presents the data in tables and graphs, describes the
process through which the AO collects the data, and discusses the
limits of the data.
The research was conducted with attention to the sensitive
nature of the material. Confidentiality was guaranteed to all part-
judge or the judicial council be placed in a publicly accessible file in the office of the
clerk of the court of appeals and be submitted to the Federal Judicial Center. See
Memorandum from the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability
Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States to the ChiefJudges of the
United States Courts ofAppeals, the United States Court of International Trade, and
the United States Claims Court 41 (Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE RULES]
(on file with authors). The memorandum is a revision of the original rules, drafted
in response to the passage of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 and circulated
to the courts covered by the Act as a guide to modification. See SPECIAL COMM. OF
THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUDGES OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL, ILLUSTRATIVE
RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DIsABILITY (1986)
(original version of the rules). The revised rules have been adopted, with local
modifications, in all of the jurisdictions covered by the Act.
8 A sample of AO 372 form is included in the Appendix.
9 For the eight circuits in the field study, we "corrected" the AO data to reflect
our information or judgment about the file. This produced eight subsets of corrected
data, one for each circuit visited. For the most part, however, these corrected data
were not used in this report because we had insufficient time to analyze them. Based
on our impressions in making those corrections, however, we have limited our use of
the AO data to the variables that appear to be objective and reliable.
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icipants.1' As a result, responses to the surveys and quotations of
judges cannot be attributed to their sources.
I. THE PROCESS OF REGULATING JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. Who Does What About the Complaints
in the Initial Stages?
To gain perspective on one of the central issues in this report,
namely, what burdens does the administration of the Act impose on
the judicial branch, we address a preliminary question: Who does
what to administer the Act? Because the Act defines a central role
for the chief judges of the circuit,11 the extent to which a chief
judge can delegate those duties becomes an important component
of assessing the burden the Act imposes on the judiciary. This
discussion relies on interviews conducted in eight circuits with eight
chief judges, five former chief judges, and the clerk and/or circuit
executive in those circuits. Before examining specific burdens
10 Form letters requesting the chiefjudges' participation in the research contained
the following acknowledgment:
To insure against any breach of confidentiality, we have incorporated
precautions into our research design. Employees of the judicial branch,
pledged to hold identifying information confidential, will examine files and
gather data about the complaints. Information that might identify the
judge, complainant, or any witnesses will be omitted. Aside from informa-
don that is contained on AO form 372, the data collection form will be
limited to extracting information about the nature of the allegations and
their logical and factual relationship to the disposition of the complaint.
Further precautions include reporting the data in statistical tables to reduce
further any danger that confidential information would be communicated
outside the judicial branch.... Prior examinations of this kind were
conducted with success by [Federal Judicial] Center staff in several circuits
to assist the Judicial Conference in preparing the Illustrative Rules, now
followed by many circuits.
Letter from William W Schwarzer, Director, FederalJudicial Center, to eight federal
circuit chiefjudges (July 14, 1992) (on file with authors).
11 Chiefjudges' dudes and responsibilities forjudicial administration are second
only to those of the ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that the Chiefjusdce is the presiding officer
of the Judicial Conference of the United States); § 332 (providing that the chiefjudge
of eachjudicial circuit is the presiding officer of the circuit'sjudicial council). See also
§ 291(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing that the ChiefJustice has the responsibility for
the temporary intracircuit assignment of circuit judges); § 292 (1988) (dividing
responsibility for temporary intercircuit and intracircuit assignment of district judges
between the Chief Justice and the chief judge of each circuit depending on the
circumstances).
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imposed on various actors, we sketch briefly the process for filing
and handling a complaint.
The Act provides as follows:
Any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or
a magistrate, has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or
alleging that such ajudge... is unable to discharge all the duties
of office by reason of mental or physical disability, may file with
the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint
containing a brief statement of the facts constituting such
conduct.
12
The Illustrative Rules elaborate on the formalities required for
filing complaints. For example, Rule 2 limits a statement of facts to
five pages and requires the complaint to be legible, signed, and
verified.13 The Act directs the clerk to "promptly transmit" the
complaint to the chief judge of the circuit and to the judge whose
conduct is the subject of the complaint. 14 The Act then directs the
chiefjudge to review the complaint "expeditiously" and take one of
three actions: (1) dismiss the complaint on a finding that it is "not
in conformity" with the statutory grounds, is "directly related to the
merits of a decision or procedural ruling," or is "frivolous," 15 or
(2) conclude the proceeding on a finding that "appropriate
corrective action has been taken or that action on the complaint is
no longer necessary because of intervening events," 16 or (3)
"appoint himself and equal numbers of circuit and districtjudges of
the circuit to a special committee to investigate the facts and
allegations contained in the complaint" and report their findings to
the judicial council of the circuit.17 Prior to taking one of the
above actions, the chiefjudge is generally seen as having the option
of offering the named judge an opportunity to respond to the
12 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).




17 § 372(c)(4). The judicial council of the circuit is the primary governing body
for the courts within the circuit and has statutory authority to "make all necessary and
appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration ofjustice within
its circuit." § 332(d)(1). The judicial council consists of an equal number of court
of appealsjudges and districtjudges plus the chiefjudge of the circuit, who presides.
See § 332(a)(1).
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complaint as a whole or to specified allegations and to otherwise
conduct a limited inquiry into the facts.
18
In this statutory and procedural context, a host of functions may
need to be performed. Someone may need to review a complaint
before filing to determine if it is in the format that complies with
the Act and local rules (including the Illustrative Rules); file and
docket the complaint; screen the complaint to see if there is any
intelligible, nonfrivolous claim of misconduct; decide whether
claims of misconduct arguably might be seen to interfere with the
effective and expeditious administration of court business; conduct
a preliminary inquiry into the accuracy of the facts alleged; decide
whether to seek a response from the judge; obtain and evaluate any
response from thejudge; discuss with the judge whether appropriate
action might be taken to correct any problem; and decide whether
to appoint a special investigative committee to examine the
allegations. Not the least of the functions is to prepare an order
communicating the outcome and "stating ... reasons" for the
conclusions, as required by § 372(c)(3). Any of these decisional
functions could be supported by a memorandum discussing the
options under the statute and analyzing any legal or factual issues
the complaint raises.
If a special committee is appointed, another set of functions
arises. The chief judge first needs to determine the appropriate
membership of the committee. The committee then must decide
how to investigate the factual allegations (for example, whether to
conduct the investigation in-house or hire outside counsel) and
determine procedures for obtaining information (for example,
conducting hearings, interviewing witnesses) and for permitting or
limiting participation by the judge and the complainant in the
proceedings. Arranging for facilities to conduct the special hearing,
which is generally confidential, may also demand considerable
resources. Finally, drafting a report is likely to demand a high level
of judicial effort, perhaps supported by staff.
1. Initial Screening
As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, 19 the
vast majority of complaints present frivolous allegations. These
allegations are also often directly related to the merits of underlying
18 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 4(b).
19 See infra part I.C.1.a.
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litigation that may itself be frivolous. One expects that economies
will flow from identifying frivolous complaints as early as possible
and delegating as many tasks as possible to nonjudges. This would
permit the courts to allocate judicial time to complaints that do not
warrant dismissal on their face. Although a majority of the circuits
studied followed this general model, there were several notable
exceptions.
Courts conduct screening as to form and substance. In all
circuits, the clerk of the court of appeals or the circuit executive
checks complaints for conformity with local rules. In one circuit,
the clerk estimates that strict enforcement of the Illustrative Rules
and an additional local variation has resulted in returning one
complaint for every complaint filed. 20 In all circuits, once a
complaint complies with the rules, the clerk's office or the circuit
executive's office stamps it as filed, assigns it a unique number,
opens a file, records activities on a docket sheet, and sends a copy
of the complaint to the chief judge and the judge named in the
complaint. Clerks may also identify any recusal problems that
appear on the face of the complaint or on the surface of the record
in the underlying proceedings. The clerk would then bring these
problems to the chief judge's attention. If the chief judge decides
to recuse, the matter would be passed to the active court of appeals
judge with the longest length of service.
2. Screening for Substance
None of the circuits has a formal system of separating the
frivolous or unfounded complaints from those that warrant greater
attention. 21 In three of the eight circuits, the chief judge does not
delegate any significant part of the process to staff. In three of the
other five circuits, the chief judge reads the complaint immediately
after filing. Thus, in six of the eight circuits, the chief judge
personally reads the complaints shortly after the clerk files them.
20 In that circuit, the clerk considers whether the complaint is verified and legible,
has the appropriate number of copies, and contains a statement of facts of less than
five pages, with references in the statement of facts to any attached documents.
Cf. JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DECIDING
CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (1987)
(determining that three screening procedures were used in the circuits studied);
DONNA STIENSTRA & JOE S. CECIL, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE ROLE OF STAFF
ATrrORNEYs AND FACE-TO-FACE CONFERENCING IN NON-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING
(1989) (stating that the Tenth Circuit designed an effective process for screening and
deciding nonargument cases by using staff attorneys).
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In the other two circuits, the chief judge waits for staff to
examine the complaint and the record in the underlying litigation
and recommend an order before personally reviewing most
complaints. In those circuits, staff are likely to flag those com-
plaints making an arguable claim of judicial misconduct for the
chief judge's immediate attention. Moreover, the complainants
filing serious complaints often generate media coverage, at least at
the local level, which also serves to bring these complaints more
quickly to the chief judge's attention. Less serious complaints are
first processed by staff prior to chief judge action.22 The three
chief judges who do not delegate any substantial part of the review
process to staff appear to believe that delegation may compromise
the confidentiality of the process.
The Act provides that "all papers, documents, and records of
proceedings relating to investigations conducted under this
subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed by any
person in any proceeding." 23 While this section by its terms
applies only to special committee investigations, most chief judges
have interpreted it to apply to all stages of the process, including
chiefjudge review of complaints. Indeed, former ChiefJudge Wald
concluded that the "confidentiality requirements of the Act demand
that the number of courthouse personnel who know of the filing of
such a complaint be kept to an absolute minimum, usually only the
Chief Judge's personal secretary . .. and Clerk of Court and his
personal secretary."24 She also stated that it is "not altogether
clear whether the Chief Judge may use a law clerk to research the
record."
25
In most circuits, however, experience with administering the Act
appears to have overtaken this view of confidentiality. In circuits
with large numbers of filings, use of staff and law clerks has a long
history. Some circuits with lesser filings have also found ways of
balancing confidentiality and efficient use of scarce judicial
resources. Others appear to be reexamining the issues. Clearly the
statutory prescription of confidentiality does not absolutely bar any
22 Although there is no rule requiring it, as a practical matter the chiefjudge has
an opportunity to expedite the normal process when the seriousness of the complaint
warrants special treatment.
23 § 372(c)(14).
24 Memorandum from ChiefJudge Patricia M. Wald to Judge Elmo B. Hunter,
Chairman, Court Administration Committee of theJudicial Conference of the United
States 3 (Sept. 25, 1987) [hereinafter Wald Memorandum] (on file with authors).25 Id.
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communication with staff about complaints. No one asserts that a
chief judge should have to type her own orders or search an entire
transcript to identify relevant information.
Professor Geyh addressed issues of delegation in his survey of
current and former chief judges.26 With few dissents, the twenty-
five chiefjudges surveyed believed that the Act permits a wide range
of delegation, including reviewing the complaint, obtaining the
record, investigating the facts, researching precedents, and
preparing a draft order. As to each practice, at least two out of
three chief judges reported that they had delegated that activity to
staff.
27
All three circuits in which the chief judge performs all of the
functions in administering the Act have expressed serious concerns
about confidentiality. In addition to limiting delegation, they have
evidenced this concern by limiting the circulation of information
about the complaints and orders among staff.28 In one of those
circuits, a relatively new chief judge has begun to rethink those
concerns in light of the Act's burdens. On hearing that another
circuit uses a full-time staff member to work on complaints, the
chief judge said, "That's a good idea. I could use that. Up to now
I've done it all myself because of the confidentiality rule .... Any
inquiry by the chiefjudge or investigation by a special committee is
confidential. I've got to rethink that." In another of the three
circuits in which the chief judge delegates little, the number of
complaints has been modest. This chief judge does not use staff
except in narrowly defined assignments because "I don't need it.
The complaints are not that big a deal. I dictate the order... I
briefly state what the complaint is about in a little opinion, just two
pages." One might thus speculate that the size of the circuit makes
a difference. In the larger circuits, the demands of the process
almost compel delegation. On the other hand, two circuits with a
relatively low level of complaints have also delegated extensively.
26 See Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods ofjudicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
243 app. (1993) (Question 16).
27 See id.
28 At the same time, one of the three circuits identifies the namedjudge in public
orders.
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3. Conducting Preliminary Inquiries
The nature and extent of preliminary inquiries into the validity
of complaints vary considerably among the circuits. The Act does
not clearly authorize or forbid any inquiry by the chiefjudge, but it
does direct the chief judge to review the complaint "expeditiously"
before making findings relevant to dismissing the complaint or
concluding the proceedings based on corrective action or moot-
ness.
29
To make the findings specified in § 372(c)(3), the chief judge
has to look beyond the four corners of the complaint. For example,
to determine whether an allegation is directly related to the merits
of a decision or procedural ruling, the chief judge may need to
examine the record in the underlying case. To determine whether
corrective action has been taken, the chief judge may need to take
two steps: decide whether there is any allegation serious enough to
warrant correction and, if so, discuss that matter with the named
judge.
The extent to which chief judges make inquiries beyond the
complaint varies widely among the eight circuits in the field study.
Table 1 reports our findings that one circuit conducted an inquiry
in 79% of the complaints for which data were available and another
circuit did so in only 8% of the complaints. Five of the circuits
cluster in a 32 to 48% band:
TABLE 1
Percentage of Field Study Complaints in Which a
Preliminary Inquiry was Conducted
3 0
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
% of Complaints 8% 33% 16% 48% 79% 32% 48% 42%
29 § 372(c)(3).
30 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits. These complaints were selected to include all potentially serious
matters and to sample the remaining complaints. We expect them to be skewed
toward including most of the complaints in which the seriousness of the charges
would call for a preliminary inquiry. We would expect, therefore, that the percentage
of complaints in which an inquiry was undertaken would be much smaller if one were
to look at the entire universe of complaints.
Other modes of inquiry might include seeking additional information from the
complainant, contacting witnesses identified in the complaint, or attempting to
corroborate objective allegations in the complaint. We did not undertake to
document the frequency of these specific types of inquiry.
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The mode of the inquiry also varies considerably. Table 2 shows
the percentage of complaints in which the file showed that the
record in the underlying case had been examined. As documented
below, this task is one that is likely to be delegated to a staff
attorney or law clerk who in turn receives assistance from the clerk's
office in obtaining the records. Again, the circuits varied widely in
their practices, ranging from 0 to 62%.
TABLE 2
Percentage of Field Study Complaints in Which the
Record was Examined"1
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
% of Complaints 0% 16% 3% 24% 62% 8% 30% 39%
Our interviews showed that even in the three circuits in which
the chief judge delegates little, he or she obtains support from the
clerk's office. Either the clerk or a senior deputy clerk obtains
copies of the docket sheet in the underlying litigation and informa-
tion about related matters, such as mandamus petitions filed by the
complainant or previous complaints filed by the same complainant.
These clerks stand ready to respond to further questions about the
record. In a circuit with overriding concerns about confidentiality,
the clerk sends the request for a fax copy of the docket sheet with
other similar requests to avoid alerting the clerk of the district court
that a complaint has been filed in relation to that case.
In two of the circuits, attorneys in the circuit executive's office
routinely receive a copy of the complaint and examine the record
to check its allegations. In one of these circuits, every complaint
appears to have been treated this way. In the other, the attorney
estimates that for 90% of the complaints, he requests the docket
sheet and a transcript of any hearing that may have been involved.
He also looks at the district court file. He finds that "after going
through dozens of frivolous complaints it would be easy to assume
that there's nothing there," but he continues to check because "it is
31 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits.
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easier and more convincing to dismiss a complaint if the complain-
ant has misstated the record." At the other extreme, two circuits
use staff in the process and report that 85 to 95% of the complaints
are dismissed on the face of the complaint without additional
inquiry into the record. In one of these circuits, the orders exhibit
careful attention to each allegation in the complaint. The differ-
ence is that the orders in this circuit assume the validity of allega-
tions and primarily address the logical relationship of the allegations
to the terms of the Act.
4. Obtaining Responses from Judges
Most chief judges do not expect a response from the judge
named in the complaint. In some circuits, the form memo
transmitting the complaint from the chief judge includes a state-
ment indicating that a response is not necessary unless the chief
judge specifically requests one. This practice eases the burden of
responding to complaints that are dismissible on their face as
frivolous, directly related to the merits, or not in conformance with
the statute. The percentage of complaints in which the chiefjudge
requested a response from the named judge is shown by Table 3.
TABLE 3
Percentage of Field Study Complaints in Which the
ChiefJudge Requested a Response from the
Named Judge"2
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
% of Complaints 14% 19% 9% 32% 19% 10% 18% 17%
5. Burden
How does the delegation of tasks relate to the burdens imposed
on a chief judge's time? In discussing this question in interviews
with the chiefjudges, we did not obtain clear estimates of the time
burdens the Act imposes. We were able, however, to conclude that
32 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits.
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there is not always a direct relationship between delegation and
relief from the time burdens of complaints. Qualitative factors
relating to the type of order issued and quantitative factors relating
to the number of formal and informal matters to be handled also
influenced the burden.33 For example, the former chief judge who
reported the highest time burdenM4 did not delegate any facet of
the process, was from a circuit with a relatively light load of
complaints, and always used form orders to dispose of largely
frivolous complaints. In that circuit, the burdens of informal
complaints and monitoring information about patterns of delay
appeared to outweigh the burdens imposed by the formal process.
The second highest burden was also reported by a former chief
judge who examined the records carefully and concluded that all
matters relating to the administration of the Act, including rule
making, consumed about eleven to fifteen hours per month. This
chiefjudge delegated heavily and appeared to review thoroughly the
resulting draft orders and memoranda. Final orders were thorough
and the number of complaints in this circuit was high. Another
former chief judge reported spending about six to ten hours per
month on the process.
In contrast, current chief judges generally did not indicate that
the § 372(c) process imposes an undue burden. For example, a
chief judge in a circuit with a high number of complaints reported
that there is "not much of a burden because of the way I handle it.
I delegate the work-up part to excellent people so that I can get
through complaints very quickly. Only very few require my further
attention." Our interviews suggest that the burden on the chief
judge's time may be diminishing as familiarity with the process leads
to more routine delegation of supporting tasks.
The relationship between delegation and burden may best be
seen by comparing the answers of a former chief judge who
delegated only narrowly limited matters and a current chief judge
in the same circuit who delegates extensively. The former chief
judge spent six to ten hours a month on the process, including
" One chiefjudge, who delegates most other facets of the initial review of the
complaints, states flatly that "I don't delegate the function of contacting the judge."
We rarely encountered delegation of this function, but in one circuit with a large
number of complaints, the chief judge had expressly directed staff to contact the
judge for a response in two matters that we reviewed. It appeared that the burden
of the large number of complaints was the reason for delegating this function in these
matters.
3 Ten percent of that judge's time was spent handling complaints.
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inquiries ofjudges and drafting individualized orders. The current
chief judge spends one or two hours, primarily reviewing the work
of an attorney. This is not to suggest that one system is better than
the other, but simply to observe one quantitative effect of delega-
tion. Qualitative facts like drawing on the experience and wisdom
of a chief judge or limiting the opportunities for gossip about
complaints may well be worth the additional chief judge time. We
return to this issue in Part II.B.1.
B. How Many Complaints Are Filed, Who Files Them,
Against What -Types ofJudges Are They Filed,
and What Type of Misconduct Is Alleged?
1. How Many Complaints Are Filed?
AO data show a total of 2405 complaints filed in the calendar
years 1980 through 1991 in the twelve circuit coufts of appeals and
in the three national courts covered by the Act.a5 The number of
filings declined in 1987 and 1988 before increasing dramatically in
1989 and continuing to increase in 1990 and 1991.6
15 See infra app., tbl. A-1. The three national courts are the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Claims Court, and the U.S. Court of International
Trade. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(18).
6 The reader should exercise caution when reading these figures because they
may simply represent increased awareness among litigants about opportunities to file
complaints. As is discussed in Part II.B.4, a number of the circuits have experienced
multiple filings by individual litigants and have taken steps to curb such filings. Table
A-i, in the Appendix, traces the patterns of annual filings in each circuit and enables
one to see whether changes in annual filings represent national or local changes. See
infra app., tbl. A-1. For example, six circuits (the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh) reported an increase in filings of at least ten complaints from 1988 to
1989. Only two circuits (the Fifth and Seventh) reported decreases in filings for that
year. See infra app., tbl. A-1. This suggests that the increase was a national phenome-
non, not a local blip. In contrast, the increase in filings from 1990 to 1991 is
composed almost entirely of increases in the Third Circuit (32 additional filings) and
the Eleventh Circuit (17 additional filings). See infra app., tbl. A-1.
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FIGURE 1
Total Number of Reported § 372(c) Filings, 1980-1991,
Reported by Statistical Year (N=2405)
3 7
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Year
37 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the AO. The data is organized by statistical year ("SY"), which runs from July
I toJune 30. SY 1992 data are incomplete, based on partial returns fromJuly I to
December 31, 1991.
As of Spring 1992, the AO's Court Directory listed 1489 nonsenior bankruptcy,
magistrate, national court, district, and circuit judges in the judicial branch. See
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, United States Court Directory
(1992). In SY 1991, the 346 complaints shown in Figure 1 represent one complaint
for every 4.3 nonseniorjudicial officers.
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of filings among the circuits.
FIGURE 2
Total Number of Reported § 372(c) Filings for Calendar Years 1980-1991,
by Circuit or Court (N=2405)1
8
Circuit or Court
38 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the AO. Data for 1991 consist of reports filed with the AO on or before
December 31, 1991. The Third Circuit indicates that their records show 204
complaints filed during the period.
To account for variations in the size of the circuits, we looked at the ratio of
complaints to the number ofjudicial officers in the circuit and found considerable
variation. For example, the Ninth Circuit has by far the largest number of complaints
but also has the largest number ofjudicial officers subject to the Act (266 as of Spring
1992). In 1991, the 52 complaints filed in the Ninth Circuit represented one
complaint for every 5.1 judicial officers. In 1991, the Second Circuit had an equal
number of complaints, but a smaller number ofjudicial officers (112 as of Spring
1992). In 1991, the 52 complaints filed in the Second Circuit represented one
complaint for every 2.2judicial officers. For a table showing the ratio of complaints
to judicial officers, see Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Administration of the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 477 app. E, tbl. 2 at 708 (1993)
[hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS].
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2. Who Files the Complaints?
Nationally, attorneys filed 135 (6%) of the 2389 complaints that
had not been withdrawn and for which information was avail-
able.39 Litigants and nonlitigants filed the remaining 2254 com-
plaints (94%). Filings by attorneys varied considerably among the
circuits, representing 10% of filings in the First and Fifth Circuits,
9% in the Second Circuit, 2% in the Third and Fourth Circuits, and
4% in the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits.
40
How did the outcomes for attorneys' complaints compare to
outcomes for non-attorneys' complaints? For example, were
attorneys more likely than litigants to present complaints that led to
corrective actions or special committee investigations? The short
answer is "yes." Table 4 compares the number of corrective actions
that would be expected for attorneys' complaints, based on their
proportion of the total population of complaints, with the actual
number reported to the AO.
TABLE 4
Expected and Actual Corrective Actions Taken in Response to Complaints
Filed by Attorneys and Non-Attorneys, 1980-1991 (N=73)
Attorney Non-Attorney Total
Expected 4 69 73
Actual 18 55 73
Attorneys' complaints resulted in corrective actions four and
one-half times more frequently than would be expected based on
their proportion of filings. Attorneys were also far more likely than
non-attorneys to succeed in having a special committee appointed
to investigate a complaint. Table 5 compares the expected and
actual number of special committee investigations (for which data
were available) that led to judicial council dispositions.
" See infra app., tbl. A-3.
40 See infra app., tbl. A-3.
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TABLE 5
Expected and Actual Special Committee Investigations Undertaken
in Response to Complaints Filed by Attorneys
and Non-Attorneys, 1980-1991 (N=36)
Attorney Non-Attorney Total
Expected 2 34 36
Actual 10 26 36
As Table 5 shows, the actual number of special committee
investigations that resulted from complaints filed by attorneys was
five times greater than would be expected based on the proportion
of complaints filed by attorneys. It is important to note, however,
that one does not have to be an attorney to persuade a chief judge
to appoint a special committee; twenty-six complaints that led to
special committee investigations were filed by non-attorneys.
As for dismissals, Table 6 shows that one would expect about
twenty-two more dismissals of attorneys' complaints than were
actually found.
TABLE 6
Expected and Actual Dismissals of Complaints Filed by
Attorneys and Non-Attorneys, 1980-1991 (N=2143)
Attorney Non-Attorney Total
Expected 120 2023 2143
Actual 98 2045 2143
Although attorneys are more likely than other complainants to
present complaints that lead to corrective actions or special
committee investigations, the vast majority of their complaints, 77%,
result in dismissals by the chief judge. In contrast, 95% of all
complaints filed by non-attorneys are dismissed. Nonetheless, non-
attorneys filed twenty-six (76%) of the thirty-four complaints that led
to special committee investigations.
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3. Against What Types of Judges Are Complaints Filed?
Table 7 shows the types ofjudges against whom complaints were
filed. Of the 2405 complaints reported, 1913 were filed against
individual judges. Of these, the vast majority (69%) were filed
against districtjudges; 13% were filed against magistrate judges; 9%
against bankruptcy judges; 9% against circuit judges; and less than
1% were filed against U.S. Court of Federal Claims judges.
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TABLE 7
Types of Respondents Named in Reported § 372(c)
Filings, 1980-1991 (N=2405)
41
Complaints Against Individual Judges Other Complaints
Ct.
Bank- Cl. Dist. Magis- Int'l
ruptcy Ct. Circuit Ct. trate Trade



































0 7 33 4 0
0 41 185 16 0
0 32 130 34 0
1 4 148 27 0
0 11 85 19 0
0 14 137 24 0
0 5 66 7 0
0 10 130 32 0
0 13 187 52 0
0 1 73 17 0
0 12 121 16 0
0 4 31 1 0
0 9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
2 2 0
Total 164 10 163 1326 249 1 32 447 13
41 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the AO. The First Circuit's records show that eleven complaints named
bankruptcyjudges, eight named circuitjudges, thirty-five named districtjudges, four
named magistrate judges, forty-six named a combination ofjudges, and two named
nonjudicial personnel.
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4. Types of Allegations
After comparing the observations and judgments made during
the field study with data filed with the AO on the nature of the
allegations in the complaints, we concluded that field study data
allow us to speak more precisely about this variable than AO data
would permit. The field study data, however, represent only a small
subset of all complaints and should not be viewed as representative
of all § 372(c) complaints. In the field study, we focused on
arguably meritorious allegations of misconduct. For every claim of
judicial misconduct or disability that was arguably nonfrivolous,
subject to the Act, and not directly related to the merits of decision
or procedural ruling, we identified the nature of the allegation.
Table 8 indicates the different kinds of allegations of misconduct
that we labeled "arguably meritorious."
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TABLE 8
Types of Allegations in Arguably Meritorious Sampled Complaints
in Field Study of Eight Circuits, 1980-1991 (N=144)
42
Circuit
Allegation A B C D E F G H Total
Mental Disability 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
Physical Disability 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Demeanor 0 0 0 5 2 1 1 1 10
Abuse ofJudicial Power 1 7 4 10 10 8 2 9 51
Prejudice/Bias 1 1 2 6 3 1 6 8 28
Conflict of Interest 1 3 0 2 1 0 1 1 9
Bribery or Corruption 1 2 0 1 3 1 4 0 12
Undue Decisional Delay 0 3 0 8 1 7 3 2 24
Incompetence/Neglect 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 6
Other 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 6
Total 4 18 10 37 24 18 18 22 151
By far the most common type of allegation was for abuse of
judicial power, which accounted for about one-third of the arguably
meritorious allegations. Examples of this type of allegation include
a complaint that a judge gave a political speech promoting a
partisan position or that a judge ordered the marshals to take a
lawyer into custody for failure to appear at a hearing. Complaints
regarding prejudice or bias and undue decisional delay were the
only other sizable categories of complaints. Complaints of undue
decisional delay tended to cluster in two circuits, both of which had
chief judges who indicated in their interview responses that they
place great importance on resolving problems involving patterns of
delay.
43
42 Information obtained from field study of complaint files and orders in eight
circuits. Some complaints contained more than one type of allegation.
43 It may be that the number of serious complaints on the subject was a product
of complainants' knowledge that the chiefjudge in that circuit would respond to that
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C. What Are the Results of the ChiefJudges'
Review of Complaints?
This Part analyzes the disposition of § 372(c) complaints,
identifying problems that relate to the current structure of the Act
and problems that appear to relate to questionable interpretations
and applications. Ultimately, we found twelve problem matters that
appear to be potentially erroneous applications of the Act.44 The
analysis begins with a look at the dismissal of complaints by chief
judges, then at petitions for judicial council review of such dismiss-
als, next at the conclusion of complaints by chief judges on the
grounds that appropriate corrective action had been taken, and
finally, at special committee and judicial council proceedings which
deal with complaints that were not dismissed or concluded by the
chief judge.
Table 9 shows the flow of the 2405 complaints through the
system. Starting with the total number of complaints, the first
column shows the number of complaints that ended in the manner
of the outcomes listed. The second column shows the number of
complaints remaining after each type of outcome.
type of allegation. We have no data, however, to test this speculation.
44 The above data put those problem matters into context, showing that they
represent 12 of 469 complaints we reviewed in the field study, or about 2.5%.
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TABLE 9
Reported § 3 72(c) Filings and Outcomes of Complaints, All Circuits
and National Courts, 1980-1991 (N=2405)
45
Outcome Number Balance
Complaint Filed 2405 2405
Withdrawn Before Chief Judge Action 16 2389
Unknown or Incomplete Data 129 2260
Dismissed by ChiefJudge 2143 117
Corrective Action Taken 73 44
Action No Longer Necessary 4 40
Judicial Council Dismissal 27 13
Incomplete Data (Judicial Council Level) 4 9
Judge Reprimanded 46  5 4
Judge Impeached 1 3
Voluntary Retirement 1 2
Voluntary Retirement & Certification of 2 0
Disability
41 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuit and national courts
with the AO.
46 In addition to the reprimands listed, we are aware of a public reprimand in the
Eleventh Circuit in October, 1990; a public reprimand in the Fifth Circuit in May,
1992 (after the cut-off date for this table); and a private reprimand in the Ninth
Circuit in 1982. Four of the five reprimands reported in this table were private (one
of which had been converted from public to private by the Judicial Conference
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders). The remaining
reprimand was reported to the AO as both public and private.
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1. Dismissals of Complaints
Our analysis of a central issue in this report-what beneficial
effects have flowed from the operation of the Act?-is influenced
heavily by our study of the dismissals of complaints by chief judges.
Because the Act assigns to the chief judge of the circuit the task of
determining which complaints will be dismissed and which will be
investigated, performing that task well is a crucial step in realizing
the benefits of the Act. If chief judges dismiss complaints that
should be investigated further, sanctionable misconduct and
opportunities for fruitful corrective action might be overlooked. In
that event, one might ask to what extent has the judicial council
exercised its power to grant a petition for review in order to remedy
chiefjudges' errors in dismissing complaints? If, on the other hand,
chief judges appoint special committees to investigate complaints
that do not require investigation, the burdens of the Act for the
judicial branch could be greatly increased.
A look at the provisions of the Act and the Illustrative Rules
relating to the chief judge's authority will provide a framework for
that analysis. The Act, as amended in 1990, provides:
After expeditiously reviewing a complaint, the chiefjudge, by
written order stating his reasons, may-
(A) dismiss the complaint, if he finds it to be (i) not in
conformity with paragraph (1) of this subsection, (ii)
directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling, or (iii) frivolous; or
(B) conclude the proceeding if he finds that appropriate
corrective action has been taken or that action on the
complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening
events.
47
The only statutory alternative to dismissal is the appointment of
a special committee under § 372(c)(4), which provides:
If the chiefjudge does not enter an order under paragraph (3)
of this subsection, such judge shall promptly-
(A) appoint himself and equal numbers of circuit and
district judges of the circuit to a special committee to
investigate the facts and allegations contained in the
complaint;
(B) certify the complaint and any other documents
pertaining thereto to each member of such committee;
and
17 § 372(c)(3).
54 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:25
(C) provide written notice to the complainant and the
judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the
complaint of the action taken under this paragraph.
4 8
The Illustrative Rules elaborate on these provisions by making
it explicit that the chief judge may undertake a limited factual
inquiry into the allegations of the complaint before choosing one of
the statutory options. 49 The rules also provide a modest amount
of interpretation of the substantive content of the statutory
grounds for dismissal.5 0
Rule 1(a) explains that "[t]he law's purpose is essentially
forward-looking and not punitive. The emphasis is on correction of
conditions that interfere with the proper administration of justice
in the courts." 51 Rule l(b) explains further that the statutory
definition of misconduct within the scope of the Act, "conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts,"
5 2
is not a precise term. It includes such things as use of the judge's
office to obtain special treatment for friends and relatives,
acceptance of bribes, improperly engaging in discussions with
lawyers or parties to cases in the absence of representatives of
opposing parties, and other abuses ofjudicial office. It does not
include making wrong decisions-even very wrong decisions-in
cases.
53
48 § 372(c)(4). Under Rule 4(e), 'ajudge will ordinarily be invited to respond to
the complaint before a special committee is appointed." ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra
note 7, commentary at 16.
49 Under Rule 4(b),
In determining what action to take, the chief judge may conduct a
limited inquiry for the purpose of determining (1) whether appropriate
corrective action has been or can be taken without the necessity for a formal
investigation, (2) whether intervening events have made action on the
complaint unnecessary, and (3) whether the facts stated in the complaint are
either plainly untrue or are incapable of being established through
investigation. For this purpose, the chief judge may request the judge
whose conduct is complained of to file a written response to the complaint.
The chief judge may also communicate orally or in writing with the
complainant, the judge whose conduct is complained of, and other people
who may have knowledge of the matter, and may review any transcripts or
other relevant documents. The chief judge will not undertake to make
findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute.
ILLUSTRATWE RULES, supra note 7.
50 Rule 4(c)(3) specifies that a complaint may be dismissed as "frivolous," which
"includes making charges that are wholly unsupported." Id.
51 Id.
52 § 372(c)(1).
53 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
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Finally, Rule l(e) cautions that the Act has only limited
application in recusal and delay situations, stating:
The complaint procedure may not be used to have a judge
disqualified from sitting on a particular case. A motion for
disqualification should be made in the case.
Also, the complaint procedure may not be used to force a
ruling on a particular motion or other matter that has been before
the judge too long. A petition for mandamus can sometimes be
used for that purpose.
54
The commentary to Rule 1 adds:,
The use of the complaint procedure is not limited to cases in
which a judge has committed an impropriety. The [statutory
definition of misconduct] is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1),
and we do not understand the phrase to be limited to conduct that
is unethical or corrupt. While we have not made an effort to
define the phrase with any precision, we note that habitual failure
to decide matters in a timely fashion is widely regarded as the
proper subject of a complaint.55
a. The Frequency and Bases of Dismissal: A Critical Analysis
The overwhelming majority of complaints are dismissed by the
chief judge without any oral or written response by the judge
complained against. Several chief judges and former chief judges
have said that over 90%, even up to 99%, of the complaints are
merits-related, frivolous, pro forma, or attempts at an appeal.
56
These estimates are confirmed by our data, which indicate that 95%
of all complaints for which data are available result in dismissal
under § 372(c)(3)(A), that is, dismissal because the complaint is
either not in conformity with the Act, merits-related, or frivo-
lous. 57 Figure 3 shows the number of dismissals of each type for
each circuit and national court. As Figure 3 shows, dismissal orders
have invoked all three statutory grounds with a fair degree of
frequency, often relying on more than one ground. The single most
common ground for dismissal is merits-relatedness.
54 Id.
5 5 Id. commentary at 4.
16 One chiefjudge cautions against jumping to incorrect conclusions from the
bare numbers: "When such a high percentage of complaints is frivolous, some
onlookers are bound to assume that we're just not taking complaints seriously."
57 Complaints dismissed under § 372(c)(3)(a) represented 2143 of 2260 complaints
for which information was available and which were not withdrawn before the chief
judge took action.
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FIGURE 3
Number of § 372(c) Filings Dismissed as Related to the Merits, Frivolous, Not in
















58 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office.
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In the course of the field study, we encountered what we termed
"problem dispositions" under each of§ 372(c)(3)(A)'s three grounds
for dismissal. These "problem dispositions" exemplify or illuminate
issues about the interpretation of the statutory dismissal standards.
We classified as "problems" actions that do not appear to comport
with the statutory standards as augmented by the Illustrative Rules
and commentary, published decisions, and other sources, such as
the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.
These varied sources of substantive content for the statutory
standards do not, of course, clearly dictate only one obvious course
of action in response to all complaints. The sources provide
guidance that is much too vague or unelaborated for that. It is left
for chief judges to supply content for the statutory standards.
Where the sources do suggest a course of action, we identified as a
"problem" any matter in which a chief judge chose a different
course. In the more common situation where these sources do not
clearly point the way, ourjudgments were based on the accumulated
common law throughout the circuits, as we discovered it in the
process of poring through hundreds of complaints and orders.
59
Thus, we also applied our "problem" tag to a disposition whenever
we concluded that it was substantially likely that a majority of
circuits would have taken a different tack.60
With these standards in mind, we will now look at the various
grounds for dismissal of a complaint under the Act. For each
ground we will look at the typical sorts of matters dismissed, discuss
points of interest, and identify all problem dispositions that we
encountered in the field study.
'9 Our understanding of the common law in this context differs from that
discussed below in the context of our analysis of whether chiefjudges and judicial
councils have created a common law to which they have collective access. See infra
part I.C.l.d.
60 We should present a caveat to prevent misinterpretations of our evaluations.
Our test was an objective one: was there a substantial likelihood that an outside
observer reviewing the complaint and the order of dismissal would disagree that the
chiefjudge's dismissal of an allegation at that stage was warranted by the Act and the
record? If we thought that disagreement was substantially likely, we identified the
matter as a "problem" disposition. Our conclusion that others would disagree with
a chiefjudge's order does not mean that we thought the judicial council should have
imposed discipline. In no event could we make ajudgment of that magnitude based
solely on the written material before us. Nor could we take into account any
subjective knowledge or intuitions that might inform the actions of a chiefjudge or
judicial council.
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i. Dismissals for Frivolousness
Section 372(c)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act supplies no explanation for
the concept of "frivolousness." In practice, a complaint generally
has been dismissed as frivolous when, on its face, it lacks adequate
factual specification in support of its allegations, or when a limited
factual inquiry by the chief judge reveals that its allegations cannot
be proven.
Some typical examples of dismissals for frivolousness follow:
* A prison inmate complained that a judge joined in a conspiracy
with other judges to issue a host of incorrect rulings and to
commit and cover up a host of serious crimes. The complaint
provided no factual support. The chief judge dismissed the
complaint as frivolous and merits-related.
" A citizen filed a complaint, rambling and partially unintelligible,
alleging that a judge had issued incorrect rulings in a number of
cases involving Native American parties (none of which apparently
involved the complainant) and that these rulings reflected the
judge's bias against Native Americans. The chiefjudge dismissed
the complaint as frivolous because it was "vague and conclusory"
and did not "contain factual allegations of precise misconduct."
Although these examples are, perhaps, archetypes for dismissal
under § 372(c)(3)(A)(iii), there has been some confusion about the
application of the Act's frivolousness standard. Occasionally chief
judges, apparently uncertain about the precise boundaries of the
three statutory grounds for dismissal, will dismiss frivolous com-
plaints on other, seemingly inapplicable, grounds or will dismiss as
frivolous complaints that perhaps should have been dismissed on
other grounds. This misstep is relatively unimportant when it is
clear that dismissal was warranted and the chief judge was merely
careless about accurately specifying the ground for dismissal. 61 It
would be more important when the finding of frivolousness is the
only basis for dismissal.
61 Use of the term frivolous, however, may be important in the message it conveys.
We return to this issue in our discussion of the other grounds for dismissal. See infra
part I.C.l.a.i.(C).
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(A) Precipitous Dismissal Without Inquiry
One common issue in the application of the frivolousness
standard involves determining whether the factual allegations in the
complaint are sufficiently specific and detailed so as to require a
response from the judge complained against or the appointment of
a special committee. In the following instances, chiefjudges did not
find adequate factual allegations that we believe others might well
have found adequate. Thus, these chief judges made what appear
to be credibility determinations in dismissing these complaints
without first making any factual inquiry into the complaint's
allegations. In most of these matters it seems highly likely that the
credibility determination was accurate, but it is at least arguable that
some factual inquiry should have been made before dismissal.
" The complainant, a black defendant in a criminal trial, alleged that
his attorney had quoted the judge as stating that the judge would
never give bail to a black man and was tired of having a black man
interrupt the judge's court. The chief judge dismissed the
complaint, finding that it had provided only conclusory allegations
and "opinions" of the complainant's attorney in support of the
charge of racial bias, and that the record in the case did not
support the allegations of racially prejudicial statements. In light
of the complainant's allegation that his attorney had heard the
judge make specific racist statements, it is hard to agree with the
chiefjudge's conclusion that the complainant's allegations were so
unsupported as to be dismissible as frivolous. Dismissal seems
inappropriate without first questioning the complainant's attorney,
and perhaps of the judge as well. After the complainant filed a
petition for review, the judicial council did obtain a response from
the complainant's attorney, who denied making the alleged
statements to the complainant and denied hearing the judge make
any racially biased remarks. The council then affirmed the chief
judge's dismissal of the complaint, noting that it had made its own
inquiry into the matter.
* The complainants, two attorneys, alleged that the judge had
engaged in an improper ex parte contact with opposing counsel
concerning some discovery matters. Complainants' primary
evidence in support of the complaint was the judge's order
denying the complainants' motion to recuse. Complainants had
raised the matter in the motion to recuse, and the judge's order
did not affirmatively deny the ex parte charge, although it could
be read to do so implicitly. The chief judge dismissed the
allegation as frivolous on the ground that the complainants had
failed to provide any affirmative factual support for their charge.
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One could argue, however, that the judge's failure to expressly
deny the charge when raised was sufficient evidence to preclude
dismissal of the complaint without at least some response from the
judge.
Once again, the judicial council took a hand in the matter.
After some members of the council62 suggested that it would be
desirable to question the judge, the chief judge sent the judge a
letter stating that it would be helpful if the judge would state
directly whether or not any ex parte contact had occurred. The
judge then entered a supplemental order in the case expressly
stating that there had been no ex parte contact of any nature at
any time with opposing counsel. The judge also sent the chief
judge a response stating the same. The council then summarily
denied the petition for review.
0 Case D-1. The complainant, an attorney, alleged, inter alia, that a
district judge's "alertness, [stability], and ability to attend to the
case [had] deteriorated noticeably" in a complex case that had
lasted many years. As an example of the judge's instability, the
complainant cited an incident in which the judge became enraged
when counsel gave the name of a case to co-counsel who was
engaged in a colloquy with the judge. The chiefjudge dismissed
this allegation as frivolous because it did not allege a pattern of
conduct evidencing incapacity, arbitrariness, or neglect of office.
It seems, however, that the complainant did allege a pattern of
unstable and inattentive conduct suggesting disability, although the
complainant cited only one specific example.
There is a strong argument that the chief judge erred in
dismissing this allegation as frivolous without at least some inquiry
into the matter. It should be noted that the chief judge, after
discussion with the district judge, concluded an unrelated
allegation of the complaint on the basis of corrective action taken.
It may be, therefore, that the dismissal should be viewed as part of
an informal, behind-the-scenes process by which the chief judge
obtained the judge's agreement to undertake corrective action.
The chiefjudge might have felt-based on personal observation-
that the allegation of disability was plainly unfounded, and that
calling the allegation of abusive behavior to the judge's attention
was adequate to prevent any recurrence of that type of behavior.
The above three complaints notwithstanding, our study does not
suggest that assessing the amount of factual support necessary to
preclude dismissal for frivolousness has been overly troublesome
under the Act. Of the 469 complaints, the above examples were the
62 For a description of the judicial council function, see infra part I.C.l.e.
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only ones dismissed as frivolous which were arguably decided
incorrectly. In the first two instances, the judicial council cured any
possible error of the chiefjudge. Thus only the third represents a
true "problem."
(B) The Problem of the Unidentified Source
A related problem arises when the complaint's allegations are
supported only by an unidentified source who refuses to come
forward:
The complainant, an attorney, alleged that an unidentified
attorney had overheard the judge at a dinner function talking
about ex parte contacts with the prosecutor in a case in which the
complainant was defense counsel. The judge allegedly described
advice he had given to the prosecutor on how to handle the case.
The chief judge sent a letter to the complainant asking him to
identify the source of this serious allegation and to submit an
affidavit from that source. The complainant responded in a letter
that the source was unwilling to come forward "because he is a
practicing lawyer" and requested that the chiefjudge ask the judge
and the prosecutor about the alleged ex parte contacts. Both the
judge and the prosecutor categorically denied the allegations. The
judge stated that complainant's case had come up in conversation
in a general way at the dinner function, suggesting the possibility
of some kind of misunderstanding. The chiefjudge then advised
the complainant that without further evidence, the chief judge
might decide to dismiss the complaint. Complainant responded
that the source remained unwilling to come forward, and that he
had no other evidence. The complainant stated, "I can understand
why the chief judge may find that the matter should proceed no
further. It is regrettable that the allegation must remain in this
uncomfortable posture, but the realities of the law business all too
often deter lawyers from publicly coming forward with informa-
tion critical ofjudges." The chiefjudge dismissed the complaint.
Since the source refused to come forward, it seems that the chief
judge had no alternative.
Another matter, which occurred very early in the life of the Act,
is more troubling.
* The complainant, a litigant, alleged, inter alia, that the judge had
accepted free trips from the government agency that was the
defendant in complainant's case before the judge. The chief
judge, without any inquiry into the complaint, appointed a special
committee, which sent a letter to the complainant asking for
clarification and additional information about this and other
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charges. The complainant responded that she was unwilling to
reveal her sources of information about this charge unless she
could do it in closed session before the special committee without
the judge present. The special committee did not accept the com-
plainant's offer, nor did it hold further proceedings. Following
receipt of the special committee report, the judicial council
dismissed the complaint in a conclusory, three-paragraph form
order as "not cognizable under the Act."
The rationale for the council's order is not clear. If the judge
had a right to be present at any committee proceeding, then the
committee could not have agreed to complainant's offered proce-
dure without violating the judge's rights. The stronger position,
however, is that the judge had no right to be present at purely
investigative interviews conducted by the committee. 63 Thus, the
committee may have erred in not agreeing to hear whatever
evidence the complainant could marshal in a closed session without
the judge present.
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(C) Dismissal as Frivolous After Inquiry
Another interesting category consists of complaints dismissed as
frivolous following some factual inquiry by the chief judge in
instances when the complaint's allegations were not frivolous on
their face, but were not verified in the record or were conclusively
refuted by the judge in question. Examples of such complaints
include an allegation that a judge seemed confused during a
sentencing proceeding which was found unsupported by the
transcript of the proceeding; an allegation that a judge used a
racially derogatory term, which was found unsupported when it was
not corroborated by any others present, when no others present
were familiar with the term, and when the complainant admitted he
may have misheard the judge; and an allegation that a judge had
treated a black attorney in a discourteous and discriminatory
manner, which was found unsupported by the transcript of the
proceedings.
63 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 12 commentary at 31 (stating that,
although the Act requires that judges be permitted to attend certain proceedings
conducted by the investigative panel, this requirement does not apply to "meetings
at which the committee is engaged in investigative activity").
" The Illustrative Rules recognize this issue. Rule 4(b) authorizes the chiefjudge
to "conduct a limited inquiry for the purpose of determining... whether the facts
stated in the complaint... are incapable of being established through investigation."
ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
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Because our review of complaints showed that "frivolous" under
§ 372(c)(3)(A)(iii) has generally been construed to include allega-
tions found factually unsupported after some inquiry, there is
nothing inappropriate about any of these rulings. Unfortunately,
complainants may more commonly understand the term "frivolous"
to refer to complaints that contain insufficient factual allegations to
warrant inquiry. A dismissal for frivolousness, therefore, could
readily be misunderstood as an indication that the chief judge did
not take the complaint's allegations seriously. This kind of
misperception might prove particularly unfortunate when a
complaint raises sensitive, facially nonfrivolous allegations that are
found unsupported after inquiry. An example of such a situation
might be a complaint alleging ethnic or gender bias. A dismissal as
"frivolous" might leave the unseemly impression that allegations of
that kind do not concern the judiciary.
It may be desirable to amend the Act to recognize expressly the
power of the chiefjudge to conduct a limited inquiry, and to create
a corresponding fourth ground for dismissal, namely, that the chief
judge's limited inquiry demonstrates that the allegations lacked any
factual foundation.
(D) Excessive ChiefJudge Inquiry
As noted earlier, Rule 4(b) discusses the power of the chief
judge to conduct a limited inquiry, a matter about which the Act is
silent.65 We found no complaint in which we concluded that the
chiefjudge may have arguably exceeded the permissible bounds of
his or her inquiry power.
ii. Dismissals for Merits-Relatedness
Under § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii), a complaint may be dismissed if it is
"directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural rul-
ing."66 Complaints alleging that a judge issued incorrect rulings
as to which the complainant may seek appellate review are very
common. Some typical dismissals for merits-relatedness follow:
0 The complainant, a pro se litigant, alleged that the judge violated
the complainant's due process rights by dismissing his lawsuit.
65 See id. (discussing the purposes and processes of inquiries by the chiefjudge).
61 § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii).
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" The complainant, a litigant, alleged that the judge, considering the
case on appeal, failed to redress clear errors committed by the
district court.
* The complainants, two prison inmates, alleged that the judge made
various errors at their criminal trial and delayed ruling on their
habeas petition for more than a year. The complainants had
already filed a mandamus petition which had been denied.
(A) Confusion Between Merits-Relatedness and Frivolousness
In many circuits, courts dismiss complaints solely as merits-
related when dismissal for frivolousness, in whole or in part, seems
more appropriate. For example, one litigant filed a conclusory and
nearly incomprehensible complaint against nine circuit judges
alleging that the judges had issued incorrect rulings as part of a
racketeering conspiracy. The chief judge dismissed the complaint
as merits-related. Insofar as the complaint alleged a conspiracy,
however, the complaint was simply frivolous.
Another example is that of the two inmates who alleged error in
the handling of their case, discussed in the previous section. This
complaint, though dismissed as merits-related, contained an
allegation of racial bias which was not merits-related but was instead
factually unsupported. Where dismissal under some other ground
is clearly warranted, then of course this error is merely one of
labeling and thus an inconsequential lack of precision. 67 Accord-
ingly, complaints that were clearly subject to dismissal but may have
been dismissed on the wrong grounds were not considered problem
matters.
Nonetheless, does confusion between these two grounds for
dismissal have any important substantive consequences? That is,
does this confusion ever result in the dismissal of complaints that
arguably ought not to be dismissed? One might fear, for example,
that an overly expansive interpretation of merits-relatedness might
cause that judge to erroneously dismiss a factually supported
complaint as merits-related. Our research data do not permit us to
make that causal link.
Although we can only speculate as to the causes of any pitfalls in
applying the merits-related standard, we can assess whether there
have been pitfalls. The following discussion does this by looking at
67 It appears that this mistake is less common in those circuits where the chief
judge delegates a substantial part of the responsibility for drafting dismissal orders.
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problem matters where it is at least arguable that a potentially
meritorious complaint was dismissed as merits-related.
(B) Problematic Dismissals Because of Availability of Appellate Remedy
One source of confusion in applying the merits-relatedness
standard is the interplay between a "direct relationship" to the
merits and the availability of an appellate remedy. Many chief
judges have recognized that the availability of some appellate
remedy may not, ipso facto, render a complaint dismissible under
the Act. Former ChiefJudge Wald made the following statement in
a report to the Judicial Conference:
One substantive question is not altogether clear from the Act
or the Illustrative Rules. If a judge is accused of conduct "prejudi-
cial to the effective and expeditious administration of the courts,"
which he has allegedly committed in the course of a judicial
proceeding, may it nonetheless be a legitimate subject of a
complaint, even though it might have been asserted as the subject
of an appeal under the broad rubric of lack of due process? So
far, we have operated on the assumption that if a complainant had
requested and been denied recusal of ajudge, that decision could
have been appealed in the regular judicial process and so could
not form the basis of a complaint. But I gather by reading some
decisions in other Circuits, there may indeed be conduct by a
judge in the course of proceedings, that while possibly appealable,
is still considered a legitimate subject of complaint. Since the vast
majority of complaints we receive come out of judicial proceed-
ings, some clarification in this area would be most helpful. Is
anything that arose in the course of a proceeding out of bounds
for a complaint, or is behavior that might have been appealed as
a fundamental deprivation of due process (i.e., the lack of an
unbiased judge) still a permissible subject of a complaint?
68
Another chief judge made a similar statement to us:
[T]here can be matters raised on appeal that are appropriate
subjects for discipline. An allegation that a judge's decision was
the result of a bribe could come up in both contexts .... Suppose
a judge gave an appearance of impropriety. Both instances raise
issues appropriate for appeal on the merits, but the bribe and
probably also the appearance of impropriety in some cases could
also be a discipline case.
68 Wald Memorandum, supra note 24, at 6-7.
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Despite these concerns, we found a number of arguably
meritorious complaints that were dismissed as merits-related on the
ground that some appellate remedy did, or might, exist. In these
matters some inquiry by the chiefjudge into the factual support for
the complaint might have been more appropriate than a merits-
related dismissal.
0 Case D-2. The complainants, an attorney and a private citizen not
involved in the litigation, complained of remarks the judge had
made in a case where plaintiffs sought damages related to coerced
homosexual activity in a prison. The judge referred to the
perpetrators of this activity as "queers." Although the choice of
this term did not seem to relate to the merits or to any legal
analysis, the chiefjudge dismissed the complaint as merits-related.
The chief judge ruled that the judge "was expressing strong
personal views regarding the propriety of the [prison] guideline"
on the subject, and that "the comments expressed antipathy
toward permitting homosexual conduct in ajail and total disagree-
ment with" prison policy. The judge's remarks thus were "com-
ments on the evidence which the parties to the action could have
challenged before [the judge] and subjected to appellate review."
In other circuits, complaints that a judge used terms that the
complainant viewed as pejorative appear to have been treated
more seriously. The complaints have resulted in corrective
actions, such as an apology and a promise to be more sensitive in
the future, even where the alleged pejorative statements were
arguably less offensive than the term "queers." In one matter that
came to our attention, publicity about ajudge's use of a pejorative
term for homosexuals during a case resulted in informal corrective
action, including a public apology by the judge, without any need
for a complaint.
* Case D-3. The complainant was an attorney who alleged that the
judge had appointed as an expert an attorney who was divorced
from the judge's secretary and who owed the secretary alimony
payments. The complaint asserted that this appointment, which
the complainant considered unnecessary, created, at the very least,
an appearance of impropriety. The chief judge summarily
dismissed the complaint as merits-related, pointing out that
"[a]ppeal, not complaint, is the remedy for such actions if they
were improper." One could argue, however, that although the
appointment was challengeable on appeal on conflict of interest
grounds, such an allegation of ethical violations is nevertheless
cognizable under the Act. If both an appeal and a complaint were
filed, the chief judge might well decide to stay his or her hand
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pending the outcome of the appeal, but that does not necessarily
mean that the complaint should be dismissed as merits-related.
* Case D-4. The complainant, a pro se litigant, alleged that at least
six of the docket entries in complainant's case had been falsified.
The chief judge summarily dismissed the complaint as merits-
related. This ground for dismissal seems clearly incorrect, since
a well-documented claim that ajudge had falsified records surely
would be cognizable under the Act even if an appellate remedy
existed. The real question was whether the allegations had any
factual support. Some inquiry by the chiefjudge may have been
appropriate.
* Case D-5. Three complaints-two by the same attorney and one by
a person on the attorney's staff-were filed against a district judge.
The attorney's two complaints alleged that the judge had treated
the attorney's application for admission to the bar of the district
court differently than other applications. The judge allegedly
required personal appearances and issued an order that the
attorney show cause why she should be admitted to the bar, or, if
admitted, why she should not be suspended or disbarred for (1)
filing a civil complaint in the district court before admission, (2)
permitting a member of her election campaign staff to publish a
political cartoon ridiculing another judge, thereby violating
disciplinary rules, (3) making public accusations that a judge and
a court reporter had tampered with transcripts, and (4) making
false accusations regarding the filing of the political cartoon in the
record of a case. The judge followed this extraordinary proce-
dure, the attorney alleged, out of personal animus toward the
attorney resulting from the publication of the political cartoon
lampooning the judge's colleague.
The chief judge, without seeking a response from the judge,
found that the order to show cause was a pending procedural
ruling and dismissed the complaints as directly related to the
merits of that ruling. Even assuming, as the chiefjudge did, that
an order relating to bar admission is the kind of ruling intended
to be included within the merits-related standard, the dismissal for
merits-relatedness ignored the central allegation: that the judge
followed an extraordinary application procedure for illicit reasons.
Since the factual circumstances detailed in these complaints do
provide a potential factual foundation for the allegation of illicit
motive, dismissal of these complaints without at least a response
from the judge seems inappropriate.
The third complaint, filed by a person on the attorney's staff,
alleged that the judge, in court, had threatened the attorney and
her clients with indictments and had said, "I am going to recuse
myself from this case and become your prosecutor." The chief
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judge, again without requesting a response from the judge,
observed that the case in question had since been remanded to a
different district judge and dismissed the complaint as directly
related to that remand ruling. Insofar as the complaint did allege
conduct arguably constituting at least an appearance of impropri-
ety, however, it is hard to see why the complaint was not cogniza-
ble.
One common subset of this category of complaints involves
complaints of an improper ex parte contact, which in a few
instances have been dismissed, arguably inappropriately, as merits-
related. We did find that most complaints of ex parte contacts were
investigated, inquired into, and/or dismissed on appropriate
grounds other than merits-relatedness. The problem matters follow:
* Case D-6. The complainant, a prison inmate, alleged, inter alia,
that the judge engaged in an improper ex parte contact in complai-
nant's case before the judge. The judge allegedly communicated
with the opposition in the case before the judge, and with
complainant's counsel in a state criminal matter not before the
judge. Both communications were allegedly outside complainant's
presence. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the judge's
order in the case, which corroborated complainant's allegation. In
this order, the judge expressly stated, as a ground for denying
complainant's motion for injunctive relief against prison officials,
that the judge had held a telephone conference with opposing
counsel and complainant's state counsel which revealed that the
complainant had been transferred to a different prison.
The chief judge, in a boilerplate form order, dismissed the
complaint as merits-related and for failure to allege misconduct to
the extent it "involve[d the] demeanor of the magistrate judge and
the procedures of the court." Since the complainant provided
evidence of a possible ex parte contact, the chief judge arguably
should have conducted further inquiry even though the incident
seemed relatively harmless.
" Case D-7. The complainant, a non-litigant, alleged that a bankrupt-
cy judge had engaged in numerous improper ex parte contacts
with debtor's counsel. The chief judge requested that the
complainant supply the source of information. No response from
complainant appears in the file, and no subsequent documents
refer to a response. The judge, asked to respond, explained that
all ex parte contacts occurred in the context of negotiations among
the parties with the full knowledge and consent of the parties.
The chiefjudge dismissed the allegation as frivolous, since it was
based on no more than newspaper accounts, and as merits-related,
because parties could raise objections to ex parte contacts during
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bankruptcy proceedings. The latter ground for dismissal appears
dubious: even if the matter were raised on appeal, an improper
ex parte contact would violate a specific, non-hortatory provision
of the Code ofJudicial Conduct.
69
Five of the above-listed six "problem" dismissals for merits-
relatedness arose in two circuits. Although one or two other circuits
occasionally have been imprecise in dismissing as merits-related
complaints that arguably could more appropriately have been
dismissed on other grounds, only these two circuits have applied an
arguably over-expansive view of merits-relatedness to dismiss
allegations prematurely. Both circuits have a long history of limited
delegation by the chief judge of tasks necessary to the disposition
of a complaint and of heavy reliance on standard chief judges'
orders for dismissing complaints.
(C) Where Complainant Lacks Standing to Seek an Appellate Remedy
Another interesting category of complaints consists of com-
plaints dismissed as merits-related even though the complainant had
no other recourse, since the complainant lacked standing to seek
appellate review of the challenged action. This situation is always
presented, of course, when the complainant is a non-litigant private
citizen, and is often presented when the complainant is an attorney.
The issue also arises in complaints brought by actual or putative
expert witnesses, who complained that in the course of denying
expert status or reviewing a fee award the judge damaged their
professional standing by allegedly making unfair, disparaging
remarks about them.
Dismissal in such situations may be appropriate. The statute,
after all, speaks of relation to the merits and does not mention the
availability of appellate review.70 The core reason for excluding
merits-related complaints is to protect the independence of the
judicial officer in making decisions, not to promote or protect the
appellate process. There is no obvious reason why the relationship
69 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon (3)(A)(4) (1972). Dismissal for
frivolousness may have been warranted in light of the judge's explanation, to which
the chief judge's order did not refer, and the complaint's lack of contradictory
evidence.
70 See § 372(c)(3)(A)(ii). It may be that appellate review is available in most merits-
related situations, and this availability is one reason merits-related complaints are not
cognizable. This need not mean, however, that the occasional allegation that cannot
be raised on appeal is thereby any less merits-related.
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of the challenged conduct to the merits of the case should depend
in any way upon the standing of the particular complainant to seek
appellate review. Under this view, it would be nonsensical for the
very same conduct to be merits-related, or not, depending on who
filed the particular complaint. Indeed, such an approach would
encourage litigants to attempt to circumvent the merits-related
ground for dismissal by using friends or relatives to file a complaint.
(D) Complaints of Delay
The Illustrative Rules chart a course for dealing with complaints
of undue decisional delay. Rule 1(e) limits the Act's application in
delay situations, stating, "[T]he complaint procedure may not be
used to force a ruling on a particular motion or other matter that
has been before the judge too long. A petition for mandamus can
sometimes be used for that purpose."7 1 The commentary to Rule
1, however, adds, "we note that habitual failure to decide matters in
a timely fashion is widely regarded as the proper subject of a
complaint."
72
Seven of the eight circuits sampled follow this standard. In
these circuits, following the policy of the Illustrative Rules, a
complaint of delay is dismissed as merits-related unless it complains
of a habitual pattern of delay in several cases. The complainant is
generally told that mandamus is the available remedy for allegations
of delay falling short of this standard. Few complainants do in fact
allege a habitual pattern of delay. Most complainants who raise
issues of delay are litigants or attorneys who are in a poor position
to know whether the judge is behind in other cases as well.
In one of the seven circuits that follow this standard, the chief
judge customarily responds to a complaint of delay in a single case
by asking the circuit executive to check the judge's case statistics for
any pattern of delay. The chief judge's order then informs the
complainant that this has been done and that the judge has
exhibited no unreasonable pattern of delay. There were no
complaints in which the chiefjudge stated that he or she attempted
to correct an overall pattern of delay discovered when investigating
a complaint about delay in a single case. All the circuits, of course,
have other administrative methods for dealing with the problem.
71 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
72 Id. at 4.
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In the one circuit which follows a different policy, the chief
judge apparently inquires into every complaint alleging delay, even
if it is brought up in a single case. All of the complaints of delay
discovered in this circuit were dismissed, not as merits-related or for
failure to allege a habitual pattern of delay, but on the basis of
corrective action taken, the judge having acted on the matter
alleged to have been delayed.
iii. Dismissals as Not in Conformity with § 372(c)(1) of the Act
Complaints also may be dismissed under § 372(c)(3)(A)(i) as
"not in conformity with paragraph (1) of this subsection." That
paragraph, § 372(c)(1), sets out the types of officers and misconduct
subject to the Act:
Any person alleging that a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or
a magistrate, has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or
alleging that such a judge or magistrate is unable to discharge all
the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability, may
file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written
complaint containing a brief statement of the facts constituting
such conduct.
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(A) Confusion with Frivolousness
Chiefjudges' orders dismissing complaints betray an occasional
and understandable confusion about precisely what the contours of
this rather broad ground for dismissal may be. In particular, this
confusion appears to reflect uncertainty about the distinction
between frivolousness and nonconformity within paragraph (1).
For example, one complaint filed by a prison inmate alleged that
the judge had committed treason by aiding, abetting, and giving
information to the enemy during war. The complaint set out no
factual support for this bald allegation. The chief judge dismissed
the complaint as not in conformity, even though it alleged conduct
that, if factually supported, would be very serious. In a similar
instance, a litigant complainant alleged that the judge had deliber-
ately concealed crimes of perjury. The chief judge dismissed the
allegation as not in conformity because of the absence of factual
allegations to support the charge.
78 § 372(c)(1).
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Another complaint, filed by a nonlitigant private citizen, alleged
that the judge had appeared in a nonfundraising capacity at an
ACLU dinner at which the judge was honored for contributions to
civil liberties. The chiefjudge dismissed the complaint as frivolous
on the ground that the judge's appearance at the dinner was
proper.
The more common approach among the circuits-and arguably
the better approach-is to dismiss as frivolous a complaint that fails
to provide any factual foundation for allegations which, if true,
would constitute misconduct under § 372(c)(1). Under this
approach, a complaint would be dismissed as not in conformity with
paragraph (1) if it raised allegations that, even if true, would not
constitute misconduct under that paragraph. Acceptance of this
interpretation of the two dismissal standards would mean that the
wrong dismissal standard was used in each of the matters mentioned
above.
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(B) Typical Dismissals for Nonconformity
Typical instances of dismissal for nonconformity fall into two
broad categories: (1) complaints which are not in conformity
because they are brought against persons not subject to the Act
(commonly clerks of court, opposing attorneys or prosecutors, or
prison officials) 75 and (2) complaints which are not in conformity
because they allege conduct that does not meet the statutory
definition of misconduct. 76 The following are some common
examples in the latter category:
The complainant, an attorney, alleged that the judge "made a
comment clearly derogatory in tone" about the complainant to the
effect that the complainant "is always difficult to understand."
The chiefjudge dismissed the complaint on the ground that even
if the allegation were true, it did not rise to the level of miscon-
duct under the statutory definition. The chiefjudge added that if
the complainant felt that the judge harbored any bias against the
complainant, the complainant had the option of filing a motion to
recuse.
74 Such an error, however, makes no more than a formal difference.
75 See § 372(c)(1) (noting that complaints can be brought against a "circuit,
district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate").
76 See § 372(c)(7)(B) (noting that if the judicial council determines that ajudge has
engaged in impeachable conduct, it will certify its finding to the Judicial Conference
of the United States).
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" The complainant, a spectator at ajudicia proceeding, alleged that
the judge had cleared the courtroom without informing the
spectators why this was being done. The judge responded to the
complaint by explaining that the judge held a settlement confer-
ence in the courtroom involving confidential and proprietary
information. The chief judge dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the allegation did not amount to misconduct. The
chiefjudge also directed the clerk to send the judge's response to
the complainant to explain the judge's actions.
" The complainant, a litigant, alleged, inter alia, that two judges had
been apprised of delays in ruling by two other judges (who were
also subjects of the complaint) and had failed to act to remedy the
situation. The chiefjudge dismissed the allegation of inaction as
not in conformity on the ground that these judges (not chief
judges) were under no obligation to act to remedy delays in the
rulings of other judges. The chief judge reasoned that a judge's
failure to act, where no action was legally required of the judge,
did not constitute misconduct under the Act.
Most of the noteworthy matters under this ground for dismissal,
as would be expected, involve ajudgment as to whether or not the
conduct alleged is the sort that meets the statutory definition of
misconduct under the Act. With so vague and unelaborated a
standard of misconduct, uncertainty about its contours is probably
inevitable.
(C) Allegations of Extra-Judicial Perjuiy
Two circuits have held, in roughly similar matters, that the Act
does not apply to allegations that a federal judge, while acting as a
private citizen, committed perjury in testimony about matters
occurring before the judge's appointment to the bench. In the first
example of this, the chief judge issued a lengthy order which
canvassed the legislative history of the Act and concluded that
Congress
intended to limit jurisdiction under the Act to conduct adversely
affecting judicial performance in some concrete manner ....
Taken as a whole, the legislative history of both chambers can be
harmonized only by interpreting the phrase "prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts" according to its plain meaning and requiring complaints
to allege conduct affecting the functioning of the courts.
Thus, the chief judge reasoned, conduct that brings the judicial
office into disrepute does not fall within the statutory definition of
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misconduct in the absence of allegations that the functioning of the
courts was adversely affected. Conduct engaged in before the
judge's appointment to the federal bench, and unrelated to the
effective functioning of the judge's court, was not cognizable under
the Act. Also not cognizable were allegations of perjury committed
by the judge in testimony, given as a private citizen, concerning
alleged criminal misconduct committed before the judge took the
bench. Evidence that the alleged perjury currently affected the
effective and expeditious administration of the courts' business was
necessary to render the allegations cognizable under the Act.
Some years later, another circuit reached precisely the same
conclusion in response to a very similar complaint. As in the first
case, the complaint alleged that the judge had committed perjury in
testimony occurring during the judge's tenure as a judge but
relating to matters that had taken place prior to appointment. The
judicial council, adopting the recommendation of a special commit-
tee, found that the allegations were outside the purview of the Act
because "the testimony alleged to be false does not concern any
aspect of the judge's judicial duties or any aspect of his conduct
during his tenure as a judge. It concerns solely matters occurring
before he became a judge." The council cited the chief judge's
opinion in the matter discussed above as persuasive authority.
Two other complaints, though factually different, raised similar
issues. One was filed by an individual who had been a litigant in a
state court proceeding before the judge prior to the judge's
elevation to the federal bench. The complainant alleged various
misdeeds by the judge in connection with those state proceedings.
The chiefjudge dismissed the allegations as not cognizable because
the Act "would not ordinarily seem to apply to conduct of a federal
judge before he attained that position. A review of the legislative
history of the Act does not support the view that Congress intended
it to apply to conduct that occurred before an individual's appoint-
ment as a federal judicial officer."
The remaining complaint was dismissed on similar grounds, but
involved conduct that occurred while the judge was on the federal
bench, albeit many years earlier. A friend of a prison inmate filed
the complaint two years after discovering a newspaper article in
which the prisoner's lawyer stated that he had lost his idealism in
his first federal case when, in the course of a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence, the judge said that the judge did not care that
the police had lied. The complaint was filed over ten years after the
judge's alleged statement, which occurred five years before the Act
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went into effect. The chief judge dismissed the complaint without
inquiry, primarily because "there is no indication the alleged
misconduct has any present effect on the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts," and also because "the
lengthy lapse of time would hamper the Council's ability to
investigate the complaint, even if there were reason to do so."
(D) Problem Matters
The following five examples represent dismissals under the
nonconformity standard which we found troublesome for one
reason or another. In general, we had doubts about the judgments
made in these matters that the alleged misconduct could be said,
without further inquiry, to fall outside the statutory definition of
misconduct.
S Case D-8. The complainant, a public interest group, alleged that
the judge engaged in an improper ex parte contact with the mayor
of a city that was the defendant in a voting rights case before the
judge. The judge responded that the mayor had initiated the
contact and that the judge had spoken to the mayor only after
receiving the consent of all parties. The chiefjudge dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the judge had not initiated the
contact and he "did not consider such ex parte communication in
deciding the merits or conducting procedures affecting the merits
of any matter pending before him." The chief judge then noted
the factual difference between the judge's statement that he had
received all the parties' approval, and affidavits from the mayor
and city attorney stating that the judge had only sought and
received plaintiffs' approval. Curiously, the chiefjudge passed by
this factual conflict without further inquiry, concluding that "the
filing of the complaint and the affidavits of the mayor and city
attorney, together with the publication of this order, constitute
appropriate corrective action."
Subsequently, the same complainant filed another complaint
against the same judge, alleging, inter alia, that the judge's
response to the previous complaint had been a fabrication and
cover-up. The complainant reiterated the conflict between the
judge's statement and the affidavits of the mayor and city attorney.
The chiefjudge dismissed the complaint, summarily ruling that the
judge's response to the prior complaint-now alleged to be at least
partly a fabrication-did not constitute misconduct under the
statutory definition. The second complaint appears to allege facts
that, if supported, would arguably constitute misconduct under the
Act.
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* Case D-9. The complainant, an attorney, alleged that the district
judge ordered sanctions against the complainant, including the
removal of the complainant from the court's criminal defense
panel, upon finding that the complainant had disregarded the
direction of a court security officer to keep a future trial witness
out of the courtroom during trial. According to the complainant,
the judge's order was factually incorrect, unfair, and a reflection
of bias in favor of the court security officer's version of events,
since the judge knew the court security officer. The complainant
alleged further that the entire incident was racially motivated
"based on conversations [complainant has] had with others" about
the judge and the court security officer, and the judge's discourte-
ous and disrespectful behavior toward the complainant personally.
The chief judge summarily dismissed the complaint, without any
inquiry or explanation except for the following statement:
"([H]aving reviewed the complaint, [I] find.., that to the extent
this complaint involves demeanor of the judge, the facts as alleged
do not constitute 'conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts.'"
The complaint arguably called for at least some factual
inquiry, and even if not, one wonders about the wisdom and
sensitivity of dismissing a sanctioned attorney's complaint of racial
bias without mentioning the racism allegation and without stating
reasons for the conclusion that the complaint's allegations do not
constitute misconduct.
" Case D-10. The complaint alleged that the judge made statements
in an interview aired on 60 Minutes that violated ethical canons.
Specifically, the judge allegedly expressed fear of the President,
indicated that he could not be impartial in certain disputes, and
criticized the ChiefJustice of the United States as one who would
issue ex parte orders instructing chiefjudges to discipline certain
judges. The chief judge dismissed the complaint on the ground
that these comments could reasonably be construed as mere
individual disagreements with other public officials which did not
constitute misconduct under the Act. Upon review, the judicial
council affirmed the chiefjudge's dismissal by a seven-to-six vote,
with the dissenters expressing the view that the allegations were
cognizable under the Act and merited further investigation.
* Case D-11. The complainant, a litigant, alleged that the judge had
accepted a bribe from the opposition, and that the opposition had
bribed complainant's attorneys as well. Such litigant complaints
of bribery are common and are usually dismissed as frivolous
because they are without any proffered factual support. In this
matter, however, the complainant provided some factual support,
stating that he overheard his attorney, in a phone conversation
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with the opposition, say, "[b]ring forty thousand dollars and you've
got the deal." The next day, trial began, and the judge allegedly
"suddenly and for ill reason" recessed the trial. The complainant
suspected that the recess was ordered for the purpose of working
out and receiving the bribe. After the recess, according to the
complainant, complainant's attorneys lied and misrepresented the
facts, and the judge condoned this and issued erroneous rulings.
The chiefjudge stated that the allegations, if proven, should result
in drastic sanctions beyond anything that could be ordered under
the Act, and that further § 372(c) proceedings should await the
outcome of any criminal proceedings that might be brought. The
complaint was dismissed "without prejudice to its renewal in the
event the outcome of other proceedings indicates a basis for
further action."
Nothing in the file or in the chiefjudge's order indicated that
any criminal investigation was underway. If one were, then a
common procedure would be to hold the complaint in abeyance
pending resolution of criminal proceedings." But it may be a
very different proposition-and entirely inappropriate-to dismiss
altogether a complaint of criminal activity merely because criminal
proceedings are hypothetically possible. Even if, in this particular
matter, the chiefjudge doubted the complainant's veracity, further
inquiry into the complaint's allegations would seem necessary to
confirm those doubts.
Case D-12. The complainant, an attorney, alleged, inter alia, that
a district judge had developed a "lack of mental stability and
maturity," as evidenced by the fact that the judge "did unbecom-
ingly abuse me as a person, as a member of the bar and as a man
.. [by] hit[ting] [my] face with some evidence he threw at [me]
in open court." The complainant further stated that anotherjudge
who was sitting on the bench with the judge named in the
complaint had witnessed the incident. The chiefjudge dismissed
the complaint as frivolous, noting the lack of an allegation that the
incident was not isolated or that the judge had intentionally
thrown evidence at the complainant. Given the specificity of the
complaint's allegation and the mention of a witness, the dismissal
amounted to a dismissal for nonconformity, not frivolousness, on
the ground that an isolated, unintentional incident of this nature
did not rise to the level of misconduct. One wonders, however,
whether the complainant alleged enough facts to warrant at least
a request for a response from the judge complained against, and
77 As one chiefjudge stated, "If there's a complaint of criminal activity, we're not
prosecutors, that's for the Department ofJustice. You let the criminal prosecution
run its course, and deal with the § 372(c) complaint after that."
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perhaps some inquiry of the judge who allegedly witnessed the
incident.
Two of these five matters are from the same two circuits (one
each) that produced all but one of the questionable merits-related
dismissals.
iv. Mootness Due to Intervening Events
The 1990 amendments to the Act added a provision that
complaints could be concluded if "action on the complaint is no
longer necessary because of intervening events." 78 Even before
this change, complaints were dismissed or concluded on essentially
the same basis, that is, as moot. Complaints were commonly
dismissed on the ground that the judge had left the bench because
of death, retirement, or, in the case of a magistrate judge or
bankruptcy judge, failure to be Teappointed.
The only interesting matter that has arisen under the rubric of
mootness or intervening events concerned the question whether a
vote of articles of impeachment against a judge rendered a
complaint against that judge moot. In this matter, the complainant,
an attorney, alleged that the judge had made a partisan political
speech just before the 1984 presidential election urging a vote for
Walter Mondale. The chief judge appointed a special committee to
consider the matter. After holding a one-day hearing, the special
committee apparently recommended taking no action on the
complaint because prior proceedings against the same judge,
involving entirely different allegations, had resulted in a certifica-
tion by the judicial council that grounds for impeachment might
exist. A letter in the file from ajudge on the special committee to
the chiefjudge notes that a vote of impeachment would render the
complaint moot. Ultimately, the judge was impeached, and then
convicted by the Senate. No action was ever taken on the com-
plaint.
Although removal of a judge by the Senate certainly moots a
misconduct complaint, a mere vote of impeachment may not render
moot a complaint raising allegations different from those leading to
impeachment. Surely, a judicial council under § 372(c)(6) could
reprimand an impeached judge, or temporarily suspend the
assignment of cases to an impeached judge, based on such a
complaint.7 9 By refraining from taking any action on grounds of
78 § 372(c)(3)(B).
71 See § 372(c)(6) (listing the actions that may be taken by the judicial councils so
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mootness, ajudicial council gives up an opportunity to develop and
pass along relevant evidence about that new complaint that might
aid the House and Senate proceedings.
v. Summary
In sum, we found twelve problem dispositions among the 469
complaints we sampled in the field study. One of the problem
dispositions involved a possibly precipitous dismissal for frivolous-
ness, without inquiry; six involved possibly erroneous dismissals for
merits-relatedness; and five involved possibly erroneous dismissals
on the ground that the conduct alleged did not constitute miscon-
duct under the Act.
Of the twelve problem matters identified, seven were concentrat-
ed in two circuits. In contrast, no problem matters at all were
found in one circuit, and there was only one problem matter in each
of the other five circuits. Thus six of the eight circuits visited have
had no more than one dismissal that we think an outside observer
would fairly question. The difference could be that in the two
circuits in which the problems were concentrated, the chief judge
traditionally did not delegate the review of complaints, and
frequently relied on form dismissals that did not articulate the
reasons for the conclusions reached therein. On the other hand, a
third circuit which did not delegate and which used form orders had
only one problem disposition.
To be sure, the suggestion of a causal relationship between the
practices of nondelegation and reliance on form dismissals, and the
presence of an unusually large number of troublesome dismissals is
largely impressionistic. One can readily imagine, nevertheless,
reasons why such a causal relationship could exist. Much less time
is likely to be spent on each complaint if the judge does not
delegate the tasks of reviewing insubstantial complaints and
preparing draft orders disposing of those complaints. Put simply,
overburdened chiefjudges are unlikely to invest the amount of time
in such matters that their staff could. Moreover, the absence of
collaboration with staff, coupled with vesting sole responsibility for
decisions in a single judge, limits the opportunity for informal
review of a draft order by another person to detect potential error.
Without fully detailed rationales, there may tend to be less disci-
as to "assure the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts").
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pline in the chief judge's private formulation of the bases for
dismissal. The very process of spelling out nonconclusory respons-
es, in writing, to each allegation may serve to hone a judge's
reasoning on the issues and point out subtleties that may not be
apparent upon a more cursory examination of the complaint.
b. Statements of Reasons in ChiefJudge Dismissal Orders
Although the Act states that the chief judge may dismiss a
complaint "by written order stating his reasons,"80 not all chief
judges' orders of dismissal have provided a statement of the
allegations of the complaint and the reasons, as opposed to the
conclusions, supporting its dismissal. Table 10 shows the numbers
and percentages of chiefjudge dismissal orders in the eight circuits
sampled that we deemed nonconclusory, that is, those that stated
reasons to support the conclusions reached. If an order provided
at least some summary of the complaint's allegations and at least
some explanation of the reasons for dismissal, even if the order may
have failed to discuss one or more of the complaint's allegations, it
was deemed nonconclusory.
TABLE 10
Percentage of ChiefJudges' Orders in Field Study That Respond
to Allegations in a Nonconclusory Fashion8 l
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
% Nonconclusory 67% 29% 83% 98% 99% 42% 84% 26%
As Table 10 shows, while four of the eight circuits have a long
and solid record of providing full and generous reasons for
dismissal, one has a spotty record, and three have had long-standing
practices of issuing conclusory form orders to dispose of insubstan-
tial complaints.
In general, a correlation exists between a chief judge's delega-
tion of some meaningful portion of the tasks involved in preparing
an order of dismissal and the fullness and nonconclusory character
80 § 372(c)(3).
81 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits.
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of those orders. The three circuits (B, F & H) that have commonly
used conclusory form orders are the same three circuits in which
chiefjudges have not delegated some or all of the complaint process
to their staff. One can appreciate that overburdened chief judges
who do not delegate § 372(c) tasks even in insubstantial matters
would be less able to devote the time necessary to draft non-
conclusory orders in those matters.
8 2
In those circuits, the practice of issuing form orders did not go
entirely unnoticed by complainants. In one instance, the complain-
ant filed a petition for review that complained, inter alia, that the
chief judge "totally failed and neglected to perform [the judge's]
judicial duty" to prepare a memorandum of dismissal setting forth
the complaint's allegations and the reasons for disposition, as
required by local rules. The judicial council in turn issued a
conclusory form order affirming the chief judge's dismissal, which
was indisputably correct on the merits.
In circuits that used staff to prepare an initial draft of orders, we
were far more likely to find that the chief judge's orders responded
to the allegations of the complaints by stating reasons. Table 11
uses data reported in Table 10, adding our assessment of the
delegation practices in each of the eight circuits in the field study.
Once again, the pattern seems clear: Circuits that generally
delegate the drafting of orders generally produce the highest
percentages of nonconclusory orders; circuits that generally do not
delegate produce the lowest percentages of such orders; and circuits
that have varied their systems over time are in the middle of the
range.
82 See supra part I.C.l.a.iii.(D).
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TABLE 11
Percentage of Field Study ChiefJudges' Orders that Respond to Allegations
in a Nonconclusory Fashion as a Function of
Delegation of Drafting to StaffP
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
Delegation Mixed No Yes Yes Yes No Mixed No
% Nonconclusory 67% 29% 83% 98% 99% 42% 84% 26%
Looking only at arguably meritorious allegations, we examined
the extent to which the orders responded to each such allegation in
the complaint. This measure differs from the measure of conclusor-
iness in two ways. First, in looking for responsiveness, we examined
each serious allegation separately. The unit of analysis was the
allegation. Second, we looked for whether the chiefjudge restated
that allegation and responded to it and whether the chief judge
stated conclusions or specific reasons for the conclusions.
TABLE 12
Percentage of Field Study ChiefJudges' Orders that Respond to all
Arguably Meritorious Allegations as a Function of
Delegation of Drafting to Staff
4
Circuit
A B C D E F G H
Delegation Mixed No Yes Yes Yes No Mixed No
% Responsive 67% 67% 82% 92% 91% 100% 88% 68%
Table 12 shows that all of the courts responded to all arguably
meritorious allegations in the complaints at least two-thirds of the
time, and most courts did so 82% of the time or more. With one
85 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits.
84 Information obtained from field study review of complaint files and orders in
eight circuits.
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exception, courts that responded less frequently tended to be courts
that relied less on staff for drafting orders. In the one circuit that
responded to every significant allegation of every complaint, Circuit
F, the chief judges assumed primary responsibility for drafting
orders. Note that Table 12 shows Circuit F responding to all
arguably meritorious allegations, but Table 11 indicates that chief
judges' orders in that circuit often fail to state reasons. Thus, the
form of the response in that circuit was likely to be conclusory.
Despite these differences among the circuits, the current chief
judges in the eight circuits surveyed seem to agree on the need for
a full statement of the reasons for dismissal. As explained by one
chief judge whose circuit has long given ample reasons,
[t]he whole point of the process is for the public to understand
that you will look at a meritorious complaint. So, if a complaint
is not meritorious, you have to explain why you dismiss it, here are
the reasons, boom, boom, boom. If you don't do that, then why
have the process?
Thus, the present chief judge in one of the three circuits has
abandoned the usual practice of issuing conclusory form orders,
although the chief judge still does not delegate to a substantial
extent. The judge stated,
[t]he former chiefjudge used a form order, but I don't. I briefly
state what the complaint is about in a little opinion, just two pages
.... We owe it to a citizen/taxpayer to give more than a mere
conclusion. That provides a benefit to both the complainant and
the judiciary. That's what makes the judiciary different from the
other branches: we give reasons.
The clerk in that circuit stated that under the former practice, the
clerk would receive informal complaints that the § 372(c) complaints
were not being considered, but that under the current chief's
practice, these informal complaints had stopped.
A chief judge in another of the three circuits indicated a similar
change in approach, at least in some cases. Even in the circuit that
had the most consistent record of conclusory dismissals, the chief
judge is rethinking that circuit's long-standing practice of nondeleg-
ation. Greater delegation may well result in fuller articulation of
the reasons for dismissal.
It seems then that a new model is emerging. This model might
be called a "dual track system," under which staff members review
all complaints in the first instance. When a complaint arguably
raises a serious allegation, the staff brings that complaint to the
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chiefjudge's attention immediately. Complaints that do not appear
to raise any substantial issues remain delegated to the staff for the
preparation of a draft order for the chief judge's review. The
growing convergence of the circuits in this respect may be a result
of the continuing efforts at cross-pollination of ideas between the
circuits in administering the Act. Thus, one former chief judge
decided to abandon the circuit's former practice of conclusory form
orders because the judge "had read the Illustrative Rules carefully
and had talked to other chief judges at the Judicial Conference of
the U.S."
c. Sources Cited
The overwhelming majority of dismissal orders reviewed
(approximately three out of four) cited no authority in support of
dismissal except the statute and applicable local rules, which
generally reiterated the statute's dismissal standards. As one chief
judge said, "[u]sually, the disposition is done just from the papers
themselves; you don't have to consult very much. I've had no
complaints of substance since becoming chief judge." Another
agreed: "ninety-eight percent of complaints are easily disposed of,
fit right within the statute."
Still, approximately one in four chief judges' orders did cite at
least one precedent under the Act. Most of the precedents cited
consisted of a handful of Ninth Circuit dismissal orders published
during the early years of the Act for the purpose of laying out some
precedent. As one chief judge explained,
[P]ublishing opinions ... provides something to cite for boiler-
plate things, that come up over and over again. An opinion
without citations is somewhat suspect. And when new people
come on board, they can see the published opinions .... This
gives guidance; it's not just ad hoc judgments .... It's like the
whole function of stare decisis; it gives the appearance and reality
of regularity and uniformity, deciding the same case the same way.
Another chief judge noted, "It's easier for a lay complainant to
accept dismissal if you cite authority in a reasoned disposition."
Only thirteen (3%) of the chief judges' orders sampled have
cited the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.8 5 By way of compari-
85 An amended version of the Code of Conduct for U.S.Judges was adopted by
theJudicial Conference of the United States on September 22, 1992. SeeADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNTED STATES 62 (1992). The code, modeled on the American
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son, thirty-four (7.5%) of the complaints sampled cited the Code.
One chief judge explains the lack of frequent reliance on the Code
as follows: "I don't recall that I have ever looked at the Code of
Conduct or the advisory opinions for § 372(c). I might do so if it
was appropriate. The complaints are so merits-related, I haven't
had the need to do so."
None of the chief judges spoken to ever had occasion to consult
the Committee on the Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference
of the United States.8 6 One chief judge said, "I would in a case
where it would be helpful." But another voiced a very different
view: "I've never gone to the ethics committee about a complaint;
I don't see that connection. They're giving advisory opinions, I'm
implementing a statutory grant of power. I'd like to keep them
advisory, not get them involved in § 372(c)." Only two chiefjudges'
orders in the sample cited published advisory opinions of the
committee.
d. Creation of a Common Law Under the Act?
Rule 17 of the Illustrative Rules calls for circuits and national
courts to make orders public both within the circuit and on a
national basis.87 The chief judges who drafted those rules appar-
ently intended to facilitate the creation of a common law. They
included this commentary:
For the most part, the fifteen chief judges with responsibility
under this statute have been making decisions about issues under
the statute quite unaware of how the same or similar issues have
been treated in other circuits and without the benefit that flows
from scholarly critique. A body of published precedent can only
be helpful to us all.
88
Bar Associations's Code of Judicial Conduct, provides guidance to federal judges
regarding their ethical duties. See id.
86 The Judicial Conference of the United States has appointed a Committee on the
Codes of Conduct and vested authority in that committee to render informal opinions
on the application of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges to specific situations.
During the period from March 1992 to September 1992, the committee received 48
new written inquiries and issued 38 advisory responses. See id. The chairman
received and responded to 55 telephonic inquiries and individual members of the
committee responded to 61 informal inquiries from other judges. See id.
87 ILLUST E RULES, supra note 7; see also infra part I.D.
88 ILLUSTRATIE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 17 commentary at 44.
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This commentary recognizes that disseminating decisions to other
decision-makers is a central feature of the development of a
common law.
89
Nonetheless, as the data noted in the previous section sug-
gest,90 national publication of orders in official reporters has been
limited. A search of the electronic data bases for published orders
produced a total of fifteen chief judge or judicial council orders
during the period from 1980 to 1992.91 Most of these were
89 See id.
90 See supra part I.C.l.c.
91 This total does not include the considerable number of reported cases
concerning the constitutionality of the Act and the legality and constitutionality of
procedures relating to the complaints filed against former District Judge Alcee
Hastings. These cases were decided by courts, not chiefjudges or judicial councils,
and are outside the scope of this section. See, e.g., Hastings v.Judicial Conference of
the United States, 829 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); In
re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial
Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904
(1986); Hastings v.Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); In re Petition to Inspect and Copy GrandJury
Materials, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1984).
The United States Claims Court, as it was then named, published three chief
judge orders and one order dismissing a petition for review between 1983 and 1987.
The chiefjudge's orders gave reasons for dismissing complaints and articulated basic
propositions under the Act. For example, one case dealt with the applicability of the
Act to judicial disqualification and elaborated on the meaning of the statutory terms
"frivolous" and "directly relate[d] to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling."
See In re Complaint ofJudicial Misconduct, 2 Cl. Ct. 255, 257-58 (1983). Two Claims
Court orders, filed in 1983 and reproduced on the same page of the reporter,
consisted of one paragraph each concluding that a petition for review was "without
merit." In re Complaint ofJudicial Misconduct, 2 Cl. Ct. 517 (1983).
A Westlaw search of the ALLFEDS database, using the query "(28 +4 372) &
Judicial/s Misconduct," uncovered two federal circuit cases. One was a brief denial
of authority to entertain a petition for review of an order entered by the chiefjudge
of the Claims Court. See In re Complaint of'Judicial Misconduct by Gleason, 707 F.2d
1583, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The other was a summary affirmance of an order of the
chief judge of the Federal Circuit. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct of
Orpinuk, 871 F.2d 1096 (mem.) (Fed. Cir. 1989); 1989 WL 13744 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(text of unpublished disposition).
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits each reported one chiefjudge dismissal order. See
In re Complaint ofJudicial Misconduct, 858 F.2d 331 (6th Cir.Jud. Council 1988); In
re Petition of Lauer, 788 F.2d 135, 138 (8th Cir.Jud. Council 1985).
In 1992, the Fifth Circuit published an order of thejudicial council of the circuit
accepting the recommendation of a special investigative committee that the council
dismiss a complaint because it sought disqualification of a district judge, a matter
deemed to be directly related to the merits of the underlying litigation. See In re
Complaint of Latimer, 955 F.2d 1036, 1037 (5th Cir.Jud. Council 1992). That order
in turn cited three Ninth Circuit chiefjudge dismissal orders published between 1979
and 1982 to support the proposition that "[a]n administrative complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 3 7 2(c) is not a substitute for judicial processes." Id. (citing In re Charge of
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decided between 1980 and 1985,92 and only six of the circuits are
represented. In fact, of the fifteen orders, six were decided in the
Ninth Circuit between 1980 and 1986.93 Only one § 372(c)
opinion has been published since 1990.94 Even when they are
published, however, the orders do no more than establish the most
basic propositions under the Act. For example, one order defined
frivolous claims as those "not supported by factual allegations."
95
With the notable exception of the Lauer matter,9 6 published
orders have been limited to those that establish basic propositions
under the Act and thereby provide a convenient source of reference
for future orders. No conflicting interpretations of the Act have
been apparent in the published orders. Difficult issues, such as
those addressed earlier in this Section, have not been the subject of
published orders. For example, differences in the chief judges'
treatment of delay do not appear to have been subject to the cross-
fertilization that common law development facilitates. 97 Another
example relates to the troublesome issue of whether the Act applies
to an allegation of perjury committed by a federal judge in
testimony concerning events that occurred before the federal
judge's appointment to the bench. 98 This issue was the subject of
two chief judge dismissal orders in different circuits, both of which
were unpublished. The later one cited the earlier one, we learned,
Judicial Misconduct, 691 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1982); In re Charge of
Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1980); In re Charge of
Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1979)).
12 All but three of the orders were published in the 1980-1987 period, and ten of
the fifteen were published in the 1980-1985 period.
93 See In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, 782 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
1986); In re Charge of'Judicial Misconduct, 691 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.Jud. Council 1982);
In re Charge ofJudidal Misconduct, 691 F.2d 923 (9th Cir.Jud. Council 1982); In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 685 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1982); In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1980); In re
Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 595 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 1979).
9 Latimer is the only § 372(c) order to be published during the years 1990, 1991,
and 1992. See In re Complaint of Latimer, 955 F.2d 1036, 1037 (5th Cir.Jud. Council
1992).95 In re Charge ofJudidal Misconduct, 691 F.2d 924, 925 (9th CinJud. Council
1982).
96 See In re Lauer, 788 F.2d 135, 138 (8th Cir. Jud. Council 1985). The Eighth
Circuit's order consisted of an analysis of the tension betweenjudicial independence
under Article III of the Constitution andjudicial accountability for impartial decision-
making. See id.97 See supra part I.C.l.b.
98 See supra part I.C.1.a.iii.(C) (discussing other problems arising out of allegations
of extrajudicial perjury).
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because the existence of the first order had become known by word-
of-mouth, and staff had obtained a copy directly from the prior
circuit.
By itself, filing chief judge orders with the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) does not significantly advance the goal of creating a
common law under the Act. Indeed, the purpose of filing such
orders on a national basis appears to be to enhance the circuits'
accountability to the public, not to make orders accessible to chief
judges and judicial councils. Absent a system of indexing or some
means of disseminating the contents of the orders, chiefjudges have
no practical access to orders from other circuits or courts.
Research into orders filed with the FJC and publication of the
results, as in the instant report and the report of Professor Richard
Marcus to the NCJDR g9 might advance the development of a
common law. These reports afford chief judges and members of
their staffs an opportunity to learn about decisions in other circuits
or courts. However, publications that occur with such limited
frequency, occasioned by the relatively rare occurrence of Cong-
ress's perceived need to create a national commission to study
judicial conduct, hardly seem sufficient to nurture the growth of a
common law of judicial conduct.
In sum, little evidence of the development of a common law
under the Act exists. Dissemination of information about interpre-
tations of the Act, a key ingredient of a common law, seems notably
absent. Other than the traditional publication of opinions in
established case reporters, no structure exists to disseminate such
information to the circuits and courts. After a brief start, this effort
appears to have waned.
e. Petitions for Review
Section 372(c)(10) of the Act provides, "A complainant, judge,
or magistrate aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge under
paragraph (3) of this subsection may petition the judicial council for
review thereof."10 0 Reported data on the number of petitions for
review appear to be unreliable, perhaps because circuits or national
courts fail to report the second stage of a two-step process.
10 1
AO data show a total of 510 petitions for review during the history
99 See Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149
F.R.D. 375 (1993).
100 § 372(c)(10).
101 See infra app.
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of the Act, an average of about forty-two petitions per circuit, or
less than four per circuit per year. This would appear to underesti-
mate the number of petitions actually filed. In response to a table
included in a preliminary draft of this report, three circuits reported
that they were aware of a total of approximately 152 more petitions
than indicated on the table summarizing the AO reports.1 0 2 Both
sources nonetheless agree that at least 510 petitions for review have
in fact been filed. It also appears safe to estimate that at least 152
additional petitions have been filed, and that a systematic survey of
the records of the other twelve circuits and courts would increase
the total by some amount.
In the course of the field study, we found only two petitions for
review which were granted by the judicial council. In each case, the
petitions raised extremely strong grounds for questioning at least
some aspect of the chief judge's order. In one matter, the com-
plaint, filed by a litigant, alleged that the judge (1) called one of the
complainant's attorneys a "dumb Jew" for filing a motion to recuse
the judge [the judge himself was Jewish], (2) stated in open court
that complainant's affidavit in support of the recusal motion was
perjured, (3) engaged in ex parte conversations with individuals
named in the recusal motion, (4) told complainant's attorneys that
the judge would put them in jail if they did any further investigation
to support the allegations of the recusal motion, and (5) called the
complainant's attorneys the day after the recusal hearing to
threaten them by saying he would have them disbarred and
criminally investigated. An acting chief judge dismissed the
complaint as merits-related on the ground that it challenged the
judge's denial of a motion to recuse, an issue more appropriately
raised on appeal. The acting chiefjudge's order also noted that the
complainant had filed a mandamus against the judge which raised
some of the same allegations.
After the complainant filed a petition for review, the judge who
was the subject of the complaint submitted a response which denied
allegations 1 and 4, admitted 2, and explained 3 and 5. Thejudicial
council granted the petition, and vacated and remanded the acting
chief judge's dismissal, on the ground that the allegations were not
merits-related. The acting chief judge then appointed a special
102 Due to wide discrepancies among these reports, that table is not included
herein.
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committee. Ultimately, the judicial council adopted the committee's
recommendation that the complaint be dismissed.
In the other matter, a complaint was filed against ajudge by five
female employees of the court clerk's office. The complainants
alleged that the judge had, in a number of specific incidents,
engaged in sexual and nonsexual harassment of the complainants,
creating intolerable working conditions and disrupting clerk's office
functions. The complainants also alleged that the judge had
engaged in improper ex parte contacts, mistreated attorneys, and
unduly delayed rulings in cases. After a response from the judge
denying most, but not all, of the allegations, and an extensive
inquiry by the chiefjudge, the chief judge issued an order dismiss-
ing the complaint on the basis of corrective action taken. The
corrective action essentially involved giving temporary control of the
clerk's office to the clerk of another court. The chief judge made
no findings regarding, and did not discuss, the sexual harassment
allegations or the charges of ex parte contacts, abuse toward
attorneys, and excessive delays. The complainants filed a petition
for review on this basis, stating, "[t]he Order fails to address the
allegations in the complaint" because it "completely fails to address
the sexual harassment the female employees of the.., court have
been forced to tolerate." The judicial council granted the petition
for review in a two-paragraph order which stated, rather opaquely,
that the council requested the chief judge to inquire into the
"operation and effectiveness" of the chief judge's prior order and
that the chief judge was authorized to amend or withdraw the prior
order. The chief judge then withdrew the prior order of dismissal
and appointed a special committee. Ultimately, the judicial council
issued a private reprimand to the judge and undertook monitoring
of clerk's office operations.
10 3
In several other matters in which the judicial council felt that a
chiefjudge's factual inquiry had been too limited, it has undertaken
additional factual inquiry at the petition for review stage. 10 4 In
these matters, the council sought responses to the complaint from
the judge and/or witnesses in order to assure itself that the
complaint was indeed, as the chief judge had ruled, without factual
foundation. In one matter, the council conducted a limited factual
105 For a more complete description of this case and its effects, see infra part
I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-12).
104 The judicial council is authorized to conduct additional investigation by
§ 372(c)(6)(a).
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inquiry into an allegation that the chief judge's order had over-
looked. The council ultimately affirmed the chief judge's decision
in each of these matters.
The overwhelming record of affirmances may suggest that
judicial council consideration of a petition for review is largely a
meaningless, pro forma exercise. Nothing in this study will permit
us to confirm or reject that conclusion. Although we have been told
that the amount of time spent by council members on these
petitions is generally very small, we have no data to accurately gauge
the level of sophisticated attention actually paid to them. The level
of affirmances may simply reflect the insubstantial nature of the vast
majority of complaints, as well as the relative eagerness of pro se
complainants to file petitions for review. Indeed, of the twelve
"problem" dismissals identified above,10 5 petitions for review were
filed in only four. Although this matter was not discussed with most
of the chief judges, one chief judge did advocate support for the
petition for review process:
It's a good idea to have review. The chief judge could exercise
poor judgment. Judges are used to disagreeing with each other;
it's not a rubber stamp. The typical complaint is frivolous, so of
course dismissal is affirmed. But one can imagine a situation in
which that would not be true. And, the review process conveys a
greater sense of fairness.
It remains an open question whether the infrequency of judicial
council action on review reflects councils' inattentiveness, or a
paucity of meritorious petitions for review, or both.
Another source of concern is the apparent lack of citation in the
judicial council orders. Of the 127judicial council orders disposing
of petitions for review, only a handful cited any formal authority at
all. 10 6 Moreover, only sixteen of these orders stated reasons for
the conclusions reached. The typical order in most of the circuits
is a conclusory form order affirming the chief judge's dismissal.
Indeed, in six of the circuits, no draft order is circulated to the
council members for their review. It is understood, instead, that a
council member's vote to affirm is automatically a vote to issue the
usual form order.
105 See supra part I.C.L.a.v.
106 Eight cited local rules; two cited prior orders under § 372(c); one cited the
Code of'Judicial Conduct; and none cited advisory opinions of the ethics committee.
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f. Summary
Although the statutory dismissal standards are poorly defined
and leave open many questions of interpretation, the overwhelming
majority of complaints-more than 90%-are clearly subject to
dismissal. Generally, we found a certain lack of precision in most
of the circuits concerning the statutory basis cited for dismissal of
insubstantial complaints. Five of the eight circuits, however, had
addressed only a single complaint in which the dismissal appeared
to be even arguably precipitous or incorrect. One circuit had no
problem matters. The remaining two circuits produced most of the
"problem" matters. Both were circuits with long-standing histories
of conclusory form dismissals issued by chief judges who declined
to delegate any substantial portion of the task of preparing orders
of dismissal.
10 7
In Part III, we assess the virtues of the "dual track system,"
represented by this model, under which complaints raising serious
allegations are brought immediately to the chief judge's attention,
but insubstantial complaints are initially prepared by staff for the
chief judge's review.
2. Corrective Actions
The Act provides that a chief judge may conclude proceedings
on a complaint filed pursuant to the Act on a finding that "appro-
priate corrective action has been taken."I0 8  How have chief
judges used this opportunity to correct alleged misconduct? What
types of corrective actions have chief judges and judicial councils
viewed as appropriate? How are such actions documented and
communicated to complainants, other judges, and the general
public? What benefits have complainants received? What lasting
effects may be attributable to corrective actions? This section
addresses those questions, using interview responses of chiefjudges,
107 Four of the eight circuits, by contrast, have long-standing practices of issuing
dismissal orders with generous statements of the grounds for dismissal. All of these
four circuits, again, have produced few "problem" matters. Recently there has been
an apparent gradual move toward this model. This shift is evidenced by some
circuits' modification or reconsideration of their practices regarding non-delegation
and the issuance of form orders.
108 § 372(c)(3)(B). Illustrative Rule 4(d) elaborates slightly on this standard by
referring to an action taken "to remedy the problem raised by the complaint."
ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7. The commentary encourages chief judges to
"make every effort to determine whether it is possible to fashion a remedy without
the necessity of appointing a special committee." Id. Rule 4 commentary at 14.
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data from the review of complaint files in eight circuits, and public
orders applying corrective action principles in response to specific
misconduct complaints.
I0 9
Several experienced chief judges and former chief judges point
to the opportunity for corrective action as a central feature of the
Act. They view the Act as remedial legislation, designed primarily
to correct aberrant behavior, not to punishjudges. Illustrative Rule
1(a) states that the Act's purpose "is essentially forward-looking and
not punitive. The emphasis is on correction of conditions that
interfere with the proper administration of justice in the
courts."1 1 0 After noting that, in the absence of the Act, a chief
judge has no supervisory or monitoring authority over an individual
judge, Judge John C. Godbold, former chiefjudge of the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, emphasized that the Act "create[s] a channel of
communication between judges about nonadjudicatory mat-
ters.""' Judge James R. Browning asserted that corrective actions
play a central role in the administration of the Act.1 1 2 One chief
judge noted in an interview that the Act "gives chief judges an
excuse to look into any circumstances where a judge is acting in a
high-handed way." Another chief judge indicated that the psycho-
logical process works this way: "Where the judge has been a little
too insensitive about something, or imprudent, the judge usually
recognizes it. The judge says, 'I don't know what I was thinking.'"
In one circuit, the self-corrective process is sometimes augment-
ed by an evaluative questionnaire to be administered by the judge
and completed by attorneys and litigants. The judge who created
this innovation describes it as follows:
If there was a complaint that ajudge was mistreating witnesses or
lawyers, I'd have the judge come to my chambers and sit and talk.
We have a useful device, the self-evaluation questionnaire. Judges
often have a perception of things; they think that everyone loves
them. We'd say, "Try this, hand out this questionnaire." Our
better judges do it every several years. The individual judge does
109 To the extent that the long-term effects of corrective actions are capable of
evaluation within the limits of this study, Part II considers them more fully.
110 ILLUSTATrVE RULES, supra note 7.
11 Transcript of Hearings Before the National Commission onjudicial Discipline
and Removal 57 (May 1, 1992) [hereinafter NCJDR Hearings] (testimony ofJohn C.
Godbold, Senior CircuitJudge, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals) (on file with the
authors).
112 See id. at 129-30 (May 15, 1992) (testimony of James R. Browning, Circuit
Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
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it for himself; the completed questionnaire doesn't go to anyone
else. Almost all judges think they gain something from it. Most
responses are laudatory, a positive ego feedback. Butjudges learn
that they're covering their mouth with their hand or picking their
nose, and they're glad to learn of it. But the incorrigible judges
haven't used the questionnaire. They know better. A number of
times the self-evaluation questionnaire was the corrective action.
It's very useful, specific, an easy out for the judge. I can't remem-
ber the subsequent feedback from those judges in specific
complaint cases, but in general the vast majority thought it was
useful.1 1 s
Similarly, another chiefjudge said that the most important thing
about the Act is that it "allows me to teach." This chief judge uses
the Act to "improve a judge, not punish a judge."
In reviewing complaints, we found at least one significant
corrective action matter in each of the eight circuits. The use of
corrective action ranged from rare, occasional use in the First and
Second Circuits to more frequent use in the Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits. Figure 4 shows the percentage of complaints that
resulted in corrective action in all circuits up to 1991.
118 The above quote comes from a chiefjudge whose circuit is one of the four that
have used corrective actions in response to at least five per cent of complaints. See
infra fig. 4.
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FIGURE 4
Percentage of Total Reported § 372(c) Filings in Which Corrective
Action was Taken, Calendar Years 1980-1991 (N=73)
114
1st 2d 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th Sth 9th 10th 11th D.C. Fe. It'l CLCL
Circuit or Court Tra
These variations seem to represent differences in chief judges'
approaches to the process as well as differences in opportunities
presented for corrective action. A formal, legal analysis of the
complaint at the initial stages of the process seems likely to produce
a higher rate of dismissals and a lower rate of corrective actions. A
less formal approach would involve seeking a response from the
named judge whenever a complaint reasonably questions the
wisdom of that judge's practices, without regard to whether the
complaint states a claim under the Act. When a complaint is only
arguably covered by the Act, such as a complaint alleging delay,
some chief judges may look at it as an opportunity to discuss the
general pattern with the judge. These conversations seem likely to
114 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the AO.
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lead to dismissals on the basis of corrective action, sometimes with
the chief judge's explicit reservation of the question whether the
named judge's conduct constituted misconduct under the Act.
As we saw in Part I.B.1, chief judges typically have multiple
options in complaint scenarios. Often, complaints can be dismissed
as frivolous, directly related to the merits of the litigation, or as not
meeting the statutory requirement that the complaint allege
misconduct. For example, a complaint alleging a single instance of
delay may be viewed as frivolous and not in conformity with the
statute because it does not allege behavior that is "misconduct"
within the meaning of the Act and the Illustrative Rules. 11 5 It is
hard to imagine a situation in which the matter delayed does not
directly relate to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling. In
addition, if the judge rules on the underlying matter, the chiefjudge
may conclude the proceeding based on corrective action or on
mootness grounds.
In this context, it may seem unnecessary to examine corrective
actions separately. Because the outcome-termination of the
complaint-remains the same regardless of the chiefjudge's choice
among various applicable grounds, the chief judge's selection may
seem unimportant. Reference to the appropriate corrective action
grounds, however, generally signals that a complainant received the
relief sought, that the judge modified problematic behavior, and
that the complaint was a causal factor in producing the outcome.
For these reasons, each application of the corrective action
approach was deemed important and was included in the study.
a. Benefit to Complainant
Given the Act's emphasis on correction, education, and
rehabilitation, one might expect that the benefits of corrective
actions would be forward-looking and would not necessarily remedy
the specific act that led to the complaint. Accordingly, we asked
115 Generally, a single instance of delay is not considered to be misconduct under
the Act. See In re Charge ofJudicial Misconduct, 691 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1982)
(concluding that "[a] petition for writ of mandamus provides an adequate remedy if
ajudge fails or refuses to act when circumstances require a ruling.... Disciplinary
procedures are unavailable when a litigant declines to utilize existing avenues of
relief'); ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1 ("[T]he complaint procedure may
not be used to force a ruling on a particular motion or other matter that has been
before the judge too long."). But see NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 62
(testimony ofJudgeJohn C. Godbold statinghis "minority view, that failure of ajudge
to act in some circumstances" amounts to a denial of access to the courts that should
be considered misconduct under the Act).
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after reading the file, "Did the complainant receive any benefit of
the corrective action?" We found that complainants received
benefits in forty of the fifty-two complaints (77%) for which there
was sufficient information to answer that question. These benefits
were generally in the form of an apology, a ruling on a delayed
matter, or a correction of the record.
Of course, there were some corrective actions which did not
benefit the complainant directly.116 The thrust of the corrective
action in these situations was to learn from the situation and
prevent its recurrence. Frequently this was done not by focusing on
whether there was impropriety in a strict legal sense, but by
stressing the need to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. By
explaining to the named judge how thejudge's actions might appear
to an objective viewer, the chief judge could help the judge avoid
similar problems in the future.
To illustrate as concretely as possible the various roles that
corrective action plays in the administration of the Act, we present
capsule summaries of three types of corrective actions: the typical,
routine complaint; the systemic complaint, involving issues that may
have an impact beyond the individual matter; and the troublesome
disposition based on corrective action. The three categories, of
course, are not mutually exclusive.
b. Routine Corrective Action
A typical corrective action matter concerns delays in ruling. As
noted above, a delay in ruling on an individual case is not generally
considered misconduct.1 1 7 Nonetheless, if the judge rules on the
matter, the chiefjudge has the option of concluding the proceeding
on the grounds of corrective action or changed circumstances, or of
dismissing the complaint on the grounds of merits-relatedness,
frivolousness, or nonconformance with the Act.
116 Two examples of this were related matters dealing with ajudge's behavior after
drinking. One incident allegedly occurred ten years before the complaint was filed,
and the other complaint was unrelated to litigation. Thejudge's promise to abstain
from alcohol did not appear to provide any distinct benefit to either of these
complainants. Another matter involved the misuse of a judge's statement on the
record as a political endorsement. The election was over and the precise subject of
the complaint could not be remedied. In another matter, a judge reexamined his
recusal policy after the litigation that gave rise to the complaint had proceeded
beyond the point at which recusal would serve any purpose.
117 See supra note 115.
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Other typical corrective actions involve judicial demeanor. A
judge may have made an intemperate remark or one that is subject
to an unintended interpretation. The chief judge and the implicat-
ed judge discuss the matter. As a result of this conversation, the
judge recognizes the impact of the remark and pledges not to make
the same or similar comments again. An apology to the complain-
ant may or may not be included in the correction.
Some typical situations in which the chief judge terminated the
proceedings based on corrective action follow:
* Case CA-1. A prison inmate complained that a district judge had
seriously delayed deciding motions in a case and that the delay
would affect the ability of witnesses to recall facts. The chiefjudge
requested that the judge respond. The judge responded that the
clerk had mistakenly marked the case closed and that the judge
would order it reopened and promptly decide all pending matters.
" Case CA-2. A prison inmate complained that a district judge had
delayed five months in acting on a mandate from the court of
appeals to appoint counsel to assist in pursuing complainant's
habeas corpus case and to schedule an evidentiary hearing. In
response to the complaint, the district judge appointed counsel
and scheduled a hearing on complainant's claim for injunctive
relief. The chiefjudge concluded that "[e]ven if the judge's delay
was conduct prejudicial to the effective and efficient administra-
tion of the business of the courts, this presents a record of
corrective action taken."
* Case CA-3. An attorney complained that in a discrimination trial
a judge stated that if one touches "one's breast" the harm was of
only a philosophical nature. According to complainant, this
remark offended complainant's female client. After the chief
judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was too
ambiguous (presumably because of the reference to "one's [own]
breast" rather than "another's breast") and too isolated to
constitute misconduct, the named judge responded in writing that
he meant to say "psychological," and not "philosophical," in the
context of discussing physical versus psychological injury. The
judge, apparently interpreting the complaint to mean "another's
breast," indicated that he had been less careful in his language
than he should have been, and apologized to complainant's client
for any dismay his remark may have caused her, saying he had not
intended to cause her any distress. On a petition for review, the
judicial council found that the judge's apology, which occurred
after the chiefjudge's dismissal, constituted corrective action.
* Case CA-4. A female attorney complained that a male districtjudge
had exhibited gender-based bias against her and her client,
evidenced by rulings against her client and sanctions imposed on
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her for allegedly disobeying court orders. The only clear gender-
related content of any of the judge's statements on the record
occurred when discussing the reasonableness of the $500 fine he
had assessed against her personally. She argued that before she
would pay, the judge would have to "show that I ha[ve] the ability
to pay." He said, "I think that you're a practicing lawyer,... that
you give every appearance of having at least some funds. You're
able to live, exist. You comport yourself in an attractive fashion.
I don't think the fine is so unreasonable." The attorney pointed
to the "attractive fashion" language as being gender-based. The
chiefjudge, in a public order, reported
discuss[ing] this with the judge. He assures me that he
was trying to describe the common-sense evidence avail-
able to him as to complainant's ability to pay the sanction;
it was not intended as an expression of sexual stereotyp-
ing. Of course, the judge appreciates the need for the
judiciary to avoid such stereotyping. If the comment by
the judge was prejudicial to the effective and efficient
administration of the courts, my discussion with the judge
presents a record of corrective action taken.
After reviewing the record in the underlying litigation, the chief
judge dismissed the balance of the complaint on the grounds that
the record did not support the allegations of discriminatory
treatment of the complainant or her client.
There are also several examples of routine corrective action
administered informally in the absence of a complaint under the
Act. One might consider such activity to be enforcement in the
shadow of the Act or to be the kind of routine housekeeping that
the judiciary has always conducted. 118 In either event, the exam-
ples of informal activity are essential to a complete picture of the
administration of the Act.
1 1 9
c. Systemic Corrective Action
In a significant number of matters the corrective action seemed
to have direct implications that reached beyond the immediate
litigant or the judge named in the complaint. Many or most of the
matters classified as routine may also have had systemic effects by
coming to the attention of other judges and serving as guides for
118 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 121-24 (May 15, 1992) (testimony of
JudgeJames R. Browning) (asserting that during the 40 years following the creation
ofjudicial councils in 1939, these councils have exercised their statutory authority
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) to promote the expeditious
administration ofjustice through an informal, simple, yet generally effective process).
119 These examples are discussed below. See infra part I.E.
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their conduct in similar situations. In the following examples, the
complainant, the chiefjudge, or the judicial council sought a change
in the practices of a judge's chambers or a clerk's office and,
perhaps, of a district, circuit, or the entire judicial branch. Many of
the complaints in this group were brought by public interest groups
or were disposed of in a public order, increasing the likelihood that
they were brought to the attention of a wider audience.
" Case CA-5. The Bar Association in the jurisdiction in which a
federal district court is located filed a complaint against a district
judge alleging that the judge publicly advocated a partisan political
position on a highly contested local political issue. One of the
speeches was given during a naturalization ceremony over which
the judge presided, wearing judicial robes. In response to the
complaint, the judge indicated to the chiefjudge that he had not
intended to make a political statement in the speeches and that
they were intended simply as patriotic remarks. He responded
that he now saw how they could be construed as political state-
ments, and pledged in a letter to the chief judge that he would
"refrain from making any public statements that might objectively
be construed as advocating [a position on the political issue in
question]." To "avoid future misunderstandings," the judge also
tendered his resignation as the chair of the committee that
sponsored the Fourth of July celebration at which he first made
the controversial statements. The chief judge dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that the letter constituted corrective
action and, with the judge's consent, attached a copy of the letter
to the public order.
* Case CA-6. A public interest group complained that a judge's
activities as the chair of a committee of a national bar group
constituted partisan political activity and that the judge's activities
to solicit lawyers to join that committee amounted to fund-raising
on behalf of the organization, both in violation of the Code of
Conduct for U.S. Judges. 120 After researching the ethical issues,
the chiefjudge discussed the complaint with the judge. The judge
then submitted a request for an advisory opinion to the Commit-
tee on the Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the
U.S. and agreed to abide by the result. That committee advised
that the judge's involvement with recruiting efforts should cease,
and the judge terminated his involvement with those efforts. The
committee also advised the judge to consider specific ethical
standards in deciding whether or not to continue as chair of the
bar committee.
120 See supra note 85.
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The judge's term as chair expired within weeks of the chief
judge's order dismissing the complaint on the grounds that
appropriate corrective action had been taken. The complainant
filed a petition for the judicial council to review the matter,
asserting in part that the judge should have been reprimanded for
engaging in partisan political activity. The judicial council denied
the petition for review.
0 Case CA-7. A statewide coalition of at least eight public interest
organizations complained that a district judge made statements in
imposing a sentence that a female defendant must have been
under the hypnotic spell of her male companion and that drugs
must have been involved because they lived in a predominantly
black city. After communicating with the district judge, the chief
judge dismissed the complaint, stating that the judge:
recognizes that certain comments, made while searching
for grounds that could justify departure from a sentence
he believed to be harsh, are troubling. Thejudge appreci-
ates the problems his general comments created and
assures me that he will avoid such statements in perform-
ing his judicial functions. On the basis of the judge's
assurance, and upon the basis of his outstanding record
over many years of distinguished service on the court, I
find that corrective action has been taken.
This matter was likely to be disseminated widely among the bar
and the public interest-civil rights community as a natural result of
sending copies of the order to the organizational complainants
who represented a large number of lawyers and active community
representatives. Because the judge's comments were made in the
context of a sentencing ruling, this matter raises an issue of
interference with judicial independence.
121
* Case CA-8. A personal acquaintance of a judge filed a complaint
alleging that the judge was mentally disabled and drank to excess.
The judge consulted a physician who indicated that the combina-
tion of prescribed medication and alcohol could cause the judge
to be more irritable and impulsive than usual. The doctor
reported that the judge had abstained from alcohol for many
months and recommended that he continue to do so. The judge
sent a letter to the chiefjudge indicating his intent to follow the
doctor's advice. The judicial council of the circuit dismissed the
allegations on the basis of corrective action, concluding that
"[b]ased on the judge's physician's representations, coupled with
the judge's assurance that he will follow the physician's advice and
121 See infra part H.B.5. (discussing this issue).
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his recent record of service to the Court, we conclude that it is
unlikely that the conduct leading to this complaint will recur."
" Case CA-9. A pro se litigant complained that a judge was verbally
abusive to the complainant during a hearing and that the judge
referred to members of several occupational groups, including
deputy sheriffs and attorneys, as "idiots." The chiefjudge conclud-
ed the proceedings on the basis of corrective action and wrote in
a public order that the judge "concedes he was verbally abusive.
He states he sincerely regrets the occurrence and that it will not
occur again. He has volunteered to utilize a judicial evaluation
questionnaire to assist him in identifying and correcting any other
problem he may have in this area." This is a typical use of the
judicial evaluation questionnaire in this circuit. The questionnaire
is designed to provide a systemic means of identifying and
remedying related problems for a particular judge.
* Case CA-IO. A bankruptcy judge accepted waivers of disqualifica-
tion from creditors in a case involving the judge's spouse's
financial interest in the creditor. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) expressly
prohibits a waiver of disqualification based on a financial interest
of the judge's spouse.122 After the complainant raised a ques-
tion about the scope of the waiver, the judge ordered his recusal.
The chief judge dismissed this portion of the complaint on the
grounds that "the judge corrected the problem of the parties'
remittal of disqualification. Thejudge has considered the problem
of remittal in this case. I have talked with the judge and we have
carefully examined what, if anything, can be done to prevent a
recurrence of such difficulties in the future."
* Case CA-11. The chiefjudge received an anonymous letter from "a
fellow lawyer." The lawyer alleged that a judge was sitting on a
case involving partisan political interests. Any ruling in that case
would be likely to affect the outcome in a related case and possibly
benefit a close relative of the judge who was counsel in the related
case. The chiefjudge invoked § 372(c)(1), identified the letter as
a complaint, and presented it to the judge for a response. 12 The
122 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (e) (1988) (forbidding waivers of disqualification when
ajudge knows that "his spouse... has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding").
125 See § 372(c)(1). The section provides:
In the interests of the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts and on the basis of information available to the chief
judge of the circuit, the chiefjudge may, by written order stating reasons
therefor, identify a complaint for purposes of this subsection and thereby
dispense with filing of a written complaint.
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judge responded by recusing himself in the litigation that was the
subject of the complaint and by instructing his clerk to notify the
judge immediately about any case in the district in which a
member of the judge's family appeared as counsel.
0 Case CA-12. Five female employees of a bankruptcy court's clerk's
office filed a complaint against a bankruptcy judge, alleging a
number of incidents of sexual and nonsexual harassment.
124
After obtaining a response from the bankruptcy judge and having
the circuit executive interview the complainants and study the
operation of the clerk's office, the chief judge issued an order
giving the clerk of the district court temporary control over the
bankruptcy clerk's office, directing the clerk to file monthly
progress reports with the circuit executive, and ordering the
establishment of a grievance procedure. The order did not
address the allegations of sexual harassment or of other impropri-
eties.
The judicial council granted the complainants' petition for
review and issued a brief order directing that the chief judge
inquire into the operation and effectiveness of the chief judge's
prior order. The chief judge withdrew the prior order and
appointed a special committee, which hired an attorney-investiga-
tor who conducted a five-day investigative evidentiary hearing.
The committee's report concluded, and the judicial council found,
that:
the judge has been deficient in the manner in which he
administered the clerk's office ... and supervised its
employees, and has engaged in undignified and inappro-
priate behavior by employing vulgar language and re-
counting off-color stories to court employees and that the
judge's behavior contributed to poor morale, inefficiency
and low productivity in the clerk's office, and constituted
conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts.
125
The council also found, based on the report, that the allegations
of overt sexual misconduct and other allegations of improprieties
in handling cases and dealing with attorneys were "unproven."
The council directed that the chief judge administer a private
reprimand by letter, that the council monitor the functioning of
Id.
124 For a discussion of this case as an example of judidal council action on a
petition for review, see supra part I.C.l.e.
125 This complaint was filed approximately ten years ago. Some of the above
"inappropriate behavior" might now be termed "sexual harassment" that resulted in
a hostile work environment.
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the office for twelve months, and that the chief judge of the
district "take appropriate action on behalf of the council to
provide supervision" of the office and make quarterly reports to
the council. The term of the order was not specified. The
bankruptcy judge's term of office expired after the above orders
were entered, and the judge withdrew his application for reap-
pointment. There is good reason to believe that the complaint
and orders had a major impact on that decision.
26
9 Case CA-13. In a set of complaints that received national publicity,
a judge ordered a female attorney to use her married name in
proceedings before him. The first complaint came from an ad hoc
group of female members of the local bar and was resolved on the
basis of corrective action after the judge called a conference of
counsel, stated that he was wrong, and offered to declare a mistrial
in the litigation (which the parties declined). The second com-
plaint was filed by the female attorney after the judge apologized.
She alleged additional instances of sexual harassment and asserted
that "[s]ince the judge's conduct may be the result of a mental or
physical disability, I am filing this complaint on both grounds
available under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)." The chief judge asked the
judge to respond. He did so by stating that he had ceased
participating in any judicial work and that he would vacate his
chambers within a month (apparently as a result of the two
complaints). On that basis the chiefjudge concluded the second
complaint on the basis of corrective action.
127
Other systemic corrective actions included the following:
• A chief judge instituted a practice of reviewing reports on the
timeliness of rulings in the bankruptcy courts, and recommended
to the judicial council of the circuit and the AO that procedures
be established to supervise the bankruptcy courts' dockets and to
set standards for deciding cases within a designated time period.
* A chief district judge promised to discipline a clerk's office
employee and otherwise remedy a situation in which the clerk of
court failed to call a motion to the attention of a district judge.
• A chiefjudge called for a district judge to implement "revised staff
procedures" to correct a situation in which a law clerk was
permitted to postpone hearings until the law clerk's legal research
on the matter was completed.
126 For further discussion of problematic aspects of this case, see infra part I.C.l.e.
127 For further discussion of problematic aspects of this case, see infra part I.C.2.d.
1993] JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 105
* Court reporting services were changed after the chief judge and
judicial council had difficulty obtaining a transcript relating to a
complaint.
d. Problem Matters
While matters CA-12 and CA-13 had a significant impact on the
administration of justice in their respective circuits and, at least in
the case of CA-13, on a national basis, there are aspects of those
complaints that might give pause to an objective outside observer.
Both were originally concluded on the basis of corrective action
taken. Yet in both cases, the chief judge's method of avoiding a
more drawn out investigatory process resulted in incomplete
assessments of the complaints, and masked more serious, underlying
problems.
In CA-13, for example, the original corrective action was an
apology on the record from the named judge to those affected.
Ordinarily, that might seem sufficient. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
that a chief judge would deem a public apology insufficient and
convene a special committee to pursue a public or private repri-
mand in response to a single incident of such misconduct. In this
situation, however, the apology was in response to a collective
complaint filed by five female attorneys, not by the actual victim.
This collective effort apparently dissipated any threat of intimida-
tion or retaliation, 128 allowing the true victim to file a complaint
on her own behalf, it having become clear that her grievances would
be taken seriously and that she had the support of other members
of the legal community. The second complaint apparently led to
permanent change: the retirement of the judge. Only the presence
of an assertive complainant kept the chief judge from concluding
that the apology was sufficient.
In CA-12, the chief judge issued strong affirmative orders to
take control of the administrative apparatus and correct the
employment conditions for the future. In the context of that
complaint, however, the corrective action appears to have been too
prospective and rehabilitative (as opposed to remedial or punitive)
128 Lawyers and judges speculate that it is this threat that contributes to the
paucity of complaints from lawyers. See NATIONAL COMM'N ONJUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
& REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
REMOVAL 100-01 (1993) (reporting the Commission's views on the problems and
issues regarding the Act and relating to disciplining and removing federaljudges); see
also infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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to satisfy the complainants. The chief judge's actions did not
provide a direct remedy for the sexual harassment charges, other
than to reduce the opportunity for the judge to control the
operation of the clerk's office. The chief judge's order also failed
to address other charges: specifically, that the named judge had
improperly engaged in ex parte contacts, verbally abused attorneys,
and unreasonably delayed rulings in cases. After an investigation
and five days of hearings, the special committee and the judicial
council concluded that these charges were "unproven." That
finding may be more palatable to the outside observer than the
chief judge's order simply because the process showed that serious
attention was given to these charges.
129
In hindsight, the chiefjudge's efforts in CA-12 to avoid the time-
consuming and expensive special committee/judicial council process
may not have resolved the underlying issues as fully as the judicial
council subsequently did. This may be due to the fact that the
judicial council's powers differ from those of the chief judge. The
Act expressly empowers the council to issue direct orders including
reprimands. °3 0  The final order of the judicial council added a
private reprimand to the corrective action that the chief judge had
imposed. The approaches to administering and monitoring the
clerk's office, however, were similar in both orders, as each called
for more judicial council involvement. Nonetheless, because of its
express powers under 28 U.S.C. § 332(d),13 1 the orders of the
judicial council may prove more effective than the informal
corrective action approach. In addition, the collective acts of the
entire council are likely to have more credibility with complainants,
the judge, and the public than the individual acts of a chief
judge.
32
Additional questions about corrective actions need to be
addressed. How well documented is the action? Would an outside
129 The complainants were given the opportunity to testify and were represented
by counsel throughout the five days. Complainants' counsel was given the
opportunity to suggest avenues of questioning to the investigator. Thejudge was also
allowed to participate filly, with counsel, during the hearings.
Iso See § 372(c)(6)(B).
131 See 28 U.S.C. § 382(d)(1) (1988) ("Each Judicial Council shall make all
necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of
justice within its circuit.").
132 It is worth noting, however, that neither side in CA-12 was satisfied with the
judicial council's order; each filed petitions for review with the Judicial Conference's
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders, which denied
both petitions.
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observer know what action the judge has taken or plans to take?
Does the corrective action provide any benefit to the complainant?
Documentation allows the complainant, the public, and the judges
to understand the basis for terminating the complaint and to gauge
whether the terms were satisfied. An added benefit from documen-
tation is that the corrective action orders may be passed along in a
redacted format for the education of other judges. The above
examples of corrective action generally specified the action taken or
to be taken in a written order, and those actions generally benefit-
ted the complainant. For example, the complaints dealing with
delay generally produced a decision or a specific pledge to issue a
decision immediately;l 3 the complaints dealing with demeanor
generated either a written apology contained in thejudge's response
to the complaint,13 4 an apology to the complainant on the re-
cord,1 3 5 or an apology stated clearly to the chief judge and com-
municated to the complainant via the chief judge's order.
i3 6
Other orders specified the behavior to be followed, such as avoiding
expression of specific partisan political views,13 7 clarifying a
recusal policy,1 3 8 or abstaining from alcohol.
1 3 9
A few dismissals for corrective action, however, did not appear
to satisfy the criteria of documenting specific conduct to be
corrected. The following is a summary of those problem com-
plaints:
0 Case CA-14. An attorney complained that a judge engaged in an
improper ex parte communication with opposing counsel regard-
ing an award of attorneys' fees. At a hearing at which the com-
plainant and opposing counsel were present, the judge awarded
$750 in fees over the objection of opposing counsel that the award
was too low. After the hearing and after the complainant had left
the courthouse, opposing counsel appeared before the same judge
on another matter. Thejudge informed opposing counsel that the
judge had decided to increase the award to $1000 and, after a
brief discussion in which counsel protested the $1000 award as too
low, directed opposing counsel to inform the complainant of the
change. Opposing counsel communicated the gist of this exchange
1s3 See supra part I.C.2.b. (discussing cases CA-1 and CA-2).
134 See supra part I.C.2.b. (discussing case CA-3).
135 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-13).
136 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-9).
137 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-5).
138 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing cases CA-10 and CA-11).
139 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-8).
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to the complainant and apologized for his role. The chief judge
concluded the proceedings based on corrective action and stated:
I have discussed this matter with the judge. I invited the
judge to explore how such actions, taken with an under-
standable desire to speed proceedings, could appear to
constitute an improper ex parte discussion of the merits
of the motion and how a better method of proceeding
might have been followed. Although the judge was clear
in his own mind that the matter was settled, the brief
discussion ... outside the complainant's hearing could
lead a person to believe the exchange concerned a matter
still under determination.
The problem in this complaint arises from the named judge's lack
of recognition that the exchange was improper. It appears to have
been an ex parte communication that might have persuaded a
judge to change his mind. According to the order, the judge did
not concede or recognize any impropriety and thus was concerned
only with the appearance of impropriety. Hopefully, the avoid-
ance of the appearance of impropriety will encompass all instances
of impropriety, but that conclusion rests on an assurance that the
judge understands the impropriety itself. The order does not give
the outside observer confidence that the judge recognizes the
problem and will attempt to change his practices.
* Case CA-15. An attorney in a bankruptcy proceeding complained
that the judge initiated an improper ex parte communication with
the debtor. According to the chiefjudge's order, the bankruptcy
judge responded that he instructed his law clerk to contact counsel
for both parties to ascertain the status of a discovery request.
After the debtor's counsel informed the clerk that a previous
settlement had been rescinded, the clerk apparently did not
contact the complainant. The chiefjudge dismissed the complaint
as both frivolous and resolved by corrective action. The corrective
aspects of the bankruptcy judge's response are not set out in the
chief judge's order, and the order does not explain what feature
of the judge's response constituted corrective action.
Here, the primary problem is simply the failure to document
the response of the judge and specify the actions to be taken or
avoided in implementing the corrective action. The corrective
action was presumably appropriate, but the complainant, judges,
and outside observers have no way of knowing that from reading
the order. In addition, combining the dismissal for frivolousness
with the corrective action may send a signal that the matter is, at
bottom, frivolous and therefore unimportant.
* Case CA-16. A police officer filed a complaint about a magistrate
judge's demeanor in demanding, in a peremptory tone, that an
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eighty-year-old man in a wheelchair remove his cap by saying,
"Don't you know you're in a courtroom?" The chief judge
concluded the proceeding because appropriate corrective action
had been taken, but did not document either the communications
that led to any corrective action or any specific action that the
magistrate judge had taken to correct the matter or to avoid a
repetition of it.
0 Case CA-1 Z A public interest organization complained that ajudge
at a sentencing hearing praised the political movement with which
defendants' activities were associated and gave defendants a
lenient sentence. The complaint asserted that the judge abused
the power of the judicial office by using the sentencing proceeding
as a forum to praise and encourage a political movement. The
complaint further alleged that the judge said to the defendants, "I
don't agree with the fact that you both should be facing a felony,"
and that this statement gave the blessing of the judiciary to illegal
activities and fomented disrespect for the law.
The chief judge reviewed the transcript and spoke to the
judge. In the order concluding the proceedings, the chiefjudge
said that the transcript made it clear that the judge praised the
political movement itself and not the illegal activities. The judge
made it clear that the defendants had broken the law and had to
be held accountable for their acts despite their charitable motives.
The chief judge also indicated that the judge acknowledged that
some people equated this particular political and social movement
with illegal activity and that the judge should avoid using the name
of the movement because of this ambiguity. The judge did not,
however, agree to refrain from praising the movement in less
ambiguous terms or to refrain from making political statements of
approval or disapproval of the movement while on the bench.
Perhaps in an effort to strike a compromise, the order fails to
address the core allegation that judicial endorsement of a partisan
political effort, particularly in official communications, may
represent an abuse of the judicial office, as in CA-9 above. At the
same time, the complaint raises core concerns about judicial
independence because the statements were made in the course of
imposing a sentence and communicating reasons for that sentence
to the defendants and the public. These concerns are addressed
further in Part II.B.
Case CA-18. A public interest group complained that a district
judge had ex parte contact with a public official who was a
defendant in a civil rights complaint. The chiefjudge found that
the alleged behavior did not amount to misconduct because the
judge simply repeated to the public official what he had already
stated to counsel in a pretrial conference. The judge "did not
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consider such ex parte communication in deciding the merits or
conducting procedures affecting the merits of any action pending
before him." The chiefjudge also found that the record showed
corrective action to be evidenced by "the filing of the complaint
and the affidavits of the mayor and city attorney, together with
publication of this order." The chiefjudge's order stated that "the
judge's communications with Mayor... can be seen in retrospect
to have been ill advised." The complainant filed a subsequent
complaint alleging that the judge had dissembled in responding to
the original complaint by asserting that the parties had agreed to
the ex parte communication. The chief judge recused himself
from deciding that complaint and the acting chiefjudge dismissed
on the grounds that the complaint did not allege misconduct
covered by the Act. The complainant expressed dissatisfaction
with these rulings and judicial council affirmances of them in
testimony before the Commission.
140
We note parenthetically one additional corrective action matter
that appears problematic for different reasons.
In that matter, an attorney filed a complaint alleging that the
judge had conducted a personal vendetta against the attorney, and
that the judge had engaged "special counsel" to investigate the
attorney's practice and to assist in any proceeding against the
attorney in any other forum. The chief judge, after finding "no
warrant in statute or proper practice for the action of [the judge]
in appointing an attorney to investigate [complainant's] conduct,"
directed the judge to rescind the order appointing the "special
counsel." The chiefjudge noted that this was done in the exercise
of the power conferred by § 372(c)(2)-(3).' 41 The chief judge
then dismissed the complaint on the basis of corrective action
taken.
We question whether the Act conferred any power on the
chief judge to direct the judge to rescind the judge's order. On
the theory that this matter involved a complained-against judge's
administrative directive regarding bar discipline and not an
exercise of the judge's judicial powers under Article III, the
judicial council might have had power under § 372(c)(6), following
the report of a special committee, to direct the judge to rescind
this order.142 Whether or not the judicial council could have
done so, however, the chiefjudge clearly lacked such power. All
140 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 155-59 (May 1, 1992) (testimony of
Paul D. Kamenar, Executive Legal Director, Washington Legal Foundation).
141 § 372(c)(2)-(3) (establishing the procedures to be followed by the chiefjudge
in handling complaints).
142 See § 372(c)(6) (describing generally the powers of the judicial councils).
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that the chiefjudge could do was attempt to persuade the judge-
with the threat of a special committee in the background-to
voluntarily rescind the order.
e. Summary
The vast majority of corrective actions studied documented
specific remedies that benefitted the complainants. These actions
were documented in a form that could be disseminated to other
judges for educational purposes. Some orders sowed the seeds for
what could be deep-rooted changes in practices, perhaps on a
district-wide, circuit-wide, or even on a national level. Part II
considers these long-term effects more fully. Problem complaints
tended to represent a failure to document unambiguously the terms
of a corrective action or to extend it fully to the complainant who
initiated the action. These problems may result from chief judges'
efforts to negotiate compromises that avoid the costs associated with
appointing a special committee and with passing the matter along
for judicial council action.
3. Special Committee Investigations
If a complaint is not dismissed under § 372(c)(3)(A) or conclud-
ed under § 372(c)(8)(B), the chief judge's only remaining option is
to appoint a special committee to investigate the allegations of the
complaint under § 372(c)(4). That section provides:
If the chiefjudge does not enter an order under paragraph (3) of
this subsection, such judge shall promptly-
(A) appoint himself and equal numbers of circuit and
district judges of the circuit to a special committee to
investigate the facts and allegations contained in the
complaint;
(B) certify the complaint and any other documents
pertaining thereto to each member of such committee;
and
(C) provide written notice to the complainant and the
judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject of the
complaint of the action taken under this paragraph. 143
Formal sanctions or other actions under the Act, as provided for
in §§ 372(c)(6)-(7), can only be ordered by the judicial council
following the report of the special committee convened under
143 § 372(c)(4).
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§ 372(c)(4). Thus, while the very existence of the Act's complaint
mechanism may facilitate informal action by the chief judge, it is
only through the special committee process that the formal
strictures of the Act can be brought into play.
The Act does not prescribe in any detail how a special commit-
tee should go about its investigation. It provides only that
Each committee appointed under paragraph (4) of this subsection
shall conduct an investigation as extensive as it considers neces-
sary, and shall expeditiously file a comprehensive written report
thereon with the judicial council of the circuit. Such report shall
present both the findings of the investigation and the committee's
recommendations for necessary and appropriate action by the
judicial council of the circuit.
144
The Act does mandate, however, some of the content of judicial
council rules for investigatory proceedings, requiring traditional due
process protections. 45 In response to this statutory endorsement
of local rule making, the Illustrative Rules do contain provisions
discussing the appointment of a special committee, the conduct of
special committee investigations and hearings, and the rights of the
judge and the complainant in an investigation. We do not attempt
to summarize these provisions here, but refer to particular provi-
sions of the Illustrative Rules in our discussion where appropri-
ate.
146
This section examines national statistics about special committee
investigations. The special committee matters encountered in the
field study are then examined more closely. Finally, Judicial
Conference review of the outcome of special committee matters is
discussed.
a. National Statistics
National data gleaned from the reports submitted by the circuits
to the AO provide a rough, numerical sense of how often special
committees are employed, and with what results. According to
those data, the 2405 complaints filed from the inception of the Act
through 1991 resulted in the appointment of forty special commit-
144 § 37 2(c)(5).
145 See § 372(c)(11) (requiring thatJudicial Council andJudicial Conference rules
contain certain basic procedural safeguards).
146 Differences in the special committee procedures will be discussed infra part
I.C.3.e., and differences in their formation will be discussed infra part I.C.3.f.
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tees. Table 13 shows the number and disposition of special
committee matters on a circuit-by-circuit basis.
47
1 7 The disposition data is incomplete and the reports of outcomes in the special
committee matters underestimate several of the important categories, such as the
number of reprimands. See supra tbl. 9; infra app.
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TABLE 13
Disposition by Judicial Councilfor Reported § 372(c)





























Total 27 5 1 1 2 4
148 In addition, we are aware of a public reprimand in the Eleventh Circuit in
October 1990, a public reprimand in the Fifth Circuit in May 1992 (after the cut-off
date for this table), and a private reprimand in the Ninth Circuit in 1982. Four of the
five reprimands reported in this table were private (one of which had been converted
from public to private by the Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit
Council Conduct and Disability Orders). The remaining reprimand was reported to
the AO as both public and private.
o 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
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Twenty-seven of these special committee proceedings eventually
resulted in judicial council dismissal of the complaint. At the
judicial council level, the AO data form does not distinguish
between dismissals based on corrective action 149 and other dis-
missals. The field study revealed, however, that at least two
dismissals by judicial councils after a special committee investigation
were based on corrective action. 150 In a third matter, a private
reprimand was accompanied by corrective action. Three proceed-
ings resulted in retirement, one instance of a voluntary retirement
and two instances in which a judge was asked to retire on grounds
of disability.151 In four instances, the data reported to the AO
did not include complete disposition information at the judicial
council level. The remaining six proceedings resulted in some form
of sanctions.
Of the six proceedings in which sanctions were imposed, there
were four private reprimands, 152 one combined public-private
reprimand, 153 and one matter in which the judicial council certi-
fied the case to the Judicial Conference of the United States
("Judicial Conference") recommending that one or more grounds
for impeachment might exist.
154
Adding the reprimands uncovered in the course of this study
that were not included in the AO database, 155 there were a total
of eight complaints that led to reprimands: five that were private,
two that were public, and one that combined public and private
features.
149 Under § 372(c)(3)(A), the chiefjudge may dismiss a complaint only if it is not
in conformity with § 372(c)(1), merits-related, or frivolous. Section 372(c)(3)(B) adds
that a chiefjudge may "conclude" a complaint if "appropriate corrective action has
been taken" or "action on the complaint is no longer necessary because of intervening
events." Thus, technically, a complaint cannot be "dismissed," but only "concluded,"
on the basis of corrective action.
150 Seesupra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-12, in which the corrective action was
an opinion issued by a court of appeals).
151 See § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii).
152 See § 372(c)(6)(B)(v).
15 See § 372(c)(6)(B)(v)-(vi).
154 See § 372(c)(7)(B). In two other instances, judicial councils certified to the
Judicial Conference that grounds for impeachment might exist, but these actions did
not result from a complaint filed under the Act.
155 See supra tbl. 9.
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b. Special Committee Investigation in the Sampled Circuits
We now turn from the limited national data available on special
committee proceedings to our findings from a sampling of eight
circuits. The eight circuits have had a total of twenty-five special
committee investigations since the inception of the Act.
1 56
Sixteen of these twenty-five investigations resulted in the
eventual dismissal of the complaint, usually on the ground that the
investigation did not reveal any factual foundation for the com-
plaint's allegations of misconduct. Other grounds for dismissal
were that the complaint was merits-related in whole or in part (five
cases); that the conduct alleged did not constitute misconduct under
the statutory definition (one case); and that the complaint was moot
since the House of Representatives had transmitted to the Senate
articles of impeachment against the judge that included the
allegations of the complaint (one case). In addition to the sixteen
dismissals, no action was taken on one complaint because articles of
impeachment had been voted against the judge on other grounds.
Of the eight investigated complaints that were not ultimately
either dismissed or left without any action taken, two were conclud-
ed on the basis that appropriate corrective action had been taken.
In one case, the corrective action took the form of language in a
court of appeals opinion that was severely critical of the judge and
that was tantamount to a public reprimand. In the other instance,
the corrective action was the judge's pledge to abstain from the
consumption of alcohol.
157
The remaining six complaints resulted in sanctions of one form
or another. In one instance, the judicial council, after a finding of
physical disability, authorized the chief judge to request that the
judge voluntarily retire, with the provision that the length-of-service
requirements of § 371(b) would not apply.158 The judge subse-
quently agreed to retire. This is the only case revealed by the field
study in which the formal procedures of the Act have been used to
bring about the retirement of a disabled judge. One might
speculate that even this situation would have been handled
informally if not for the circumstance that the judge did not meet
156 Our sampling constituted a subset of the proceedings for which national data
(as reported to the AO) was available.
1See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-8).
158 See § 371(b) (Supp. IV 1992) (stating that justices and judges may retire from
regular active service upon meeting the age and service requirements delineated in
§ 371(c)).
1993] JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 117
the length-in-service requirements of § 371(b). Only by proceeding
under the Act could those requirements be rendered inapplicable,
pursuant to § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii).1 59
In another matter that resulted in sanctions, the judicial council
certified to the Judicial Conference of the United States under
§ 372(c)(7)(B) its determination that one or more grounds for
impeachment might exist.160 Subsequently, the Judicial Confer-
ence made a similar certification to the House of Representatives
under § 372(c)(8). Ultimately, the judge was impeached and
removed from office.
The remaining four matters resulted in two public reprimands
and two private reprimands. One of the private reprimands was
directed by the Judicial Conference Committee following the
judicial council's decision to issue a public reprimand. The other
private reprimand was accompanied by corrective actions ordered
by the judicial council, which itself undertook to monitor the
operations of the clerk's office.
161
c. Substantive Evaluation
It is beyond the scope of this project to offer any substantive
evaluation of whether or not any special committee matters were
inappropriately handled or concluded. In most instances, not all of
the evidence and testimony the special committee considered was
available. Even in those instances where transcripts of testimony
were available, time constraints did not permit an exhaustive
substantive review of them. In many instances, the report of the
special committee or the evidence on which it was based was not
seen. We are in no position, therefore, to attempt to evaluate the
predominantly fact-based determinations made by special commit-
tees, or to assess the adequacy of the sanctions meted out by judicial
councils in these matters.
The information that is available reveals only one special
committee matter that arguably was precipitously dismissed.
162
In this matter, the judicial council dismissed an allegation of the
159 This section provides that the judicial council may request that a "judge
appointed to hold office during good behavior voluntarily retire, with the provision
that the length of service requirements under section 371 ... shall not apply."
§ 372(c)(6)(B)(iii).
160 See § 372(c)(7)(B).
161 See supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-12).
162 See supra part I.C.l.a.i.(B).
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complaint-that the judge had accepted free trips paid for by the
government agency that was the opposition in complainant's
lawsuit-apparently on the ground that the complainant would not
reveal the complainant's source of information, unless it was done
privately to the special committee, and outside thejudge's presence.
Since the commentary to Illustrative Rule 12 states that such a
procedure would be entirely proper,163 the dismissal of the com-
plaint on that ground is questionable. This special committee
proceeding occurred during the first year or two of the Act, long
before the Illustrative Rules were promulgated.
In contrast, the study revealed five matters in which it appears
possible that the appointment of a special committee was unneces-
sary, and that the complaint could have been dismissed by the chief
judge. In one of these matters, already discussed, the judicial
council dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complaint's
allegations-perjury in testimony regarding alleged conduct prior to
the judge's appointment to the federal bench-did not constitute
misconduct under the statutory definition. 164 The special com-
mittee had merely examined the record; it had not held a hearing
or elicited any new testimony. Apparently, the judicial council's
dismissal did not rest on any special committee finding on a factual
matter in dispute. Thus, it seems that the chief judge could have
dismissed the complaint on precisely the same basis, without the use
of a special committee. Indeed, the judicial council's dismissal
order cited as persuasive authority a chiefjudge's dismissal order in
another circuit on exactly the same grounds.
The other four matters were all complaints in which some
inquiry, or additional inquiry, by the chief judge might have
obviated the need for a special committee. However, the permissi-
ble limits of chief judge inquiry are unclear. The Act does not
expressly accord the power of limited inquiry to the chief judge.
Although this power is recognized by Illustrative Rule 4(b), the Rule
leaves ambiguous the contours and limits of the power.
165
163 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 12 commentary at 31 (stating that
the statute does not require "that the judge be permitted to attend all proceedings
of the special committee" where the committee is engaged in investigative activity
such as interviewing witnesses).
164 See supra part I.C.l.a.iii.(C).; see also § 372(c)(7)(B) (defining in broad terms
what constitutes actionable "conduct" under the Act).
165 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7 (allowing the chief judge to make a
limited inquiry to determine "(1) whether appropriate corrective action has been or
can be taken without necessity for formal investigation, (2) whether intervening events
have made action on the complaint unnecessary, and (3) whether the facts stated in
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In one of these four matters, the complainant alleged that two
district judges had attended a partisan fund-raising dinner also
attended by the President of the United States. The chief judge
requested the two judges to respond to the complaint, but one
refused to respond and the other gave a terse, unhelpful response.
A special committee was then appointed. The special committee
concluded that there was no merit to the complaint because the two
judges did not attend the dinner, but were merely in the building
to meet the President before the dinner began. The record clearly
showed that the complaint could have been disposed of without the
use of a special committee if the judges had filed responses.
In three other matters, all from one circuit, the chief judge
appointed a special committee without undertaking any factual
inquiry at all. The chiefjudge did not even request a response from
the judge complained against. In some or all of these matters, such
a response from the judge, perhaps with some additional inquiry,
could have permitted the chief judge to dismiss the complaint
without a special committee.
In one of these three complaints, the complainant, a convicted
criminal defendant, alleged, inter alia, that (1) the judge on several
occasions during complainant's trial had dined with the prosecution
team in full view of the jurors; (2) the judge and the judge's
courtroom clerk deliberately eavesdropped on the jury's delibera-
tions; (3) the judge instructed the clerk to keep the prosecutor
informed as to how the deliberations were going; and (4) when the
jury appeared deadlocked, the judge brought the jury back to the
courtroom and browbeat the jury into convicting the complainant.
Apparently, the special committee found no evidence to support any
of these allegations. The chief judge possibly could have reached
the same conclusion but instead chose not to conduct an inquiry.
In the second matter, the complainant, a litigant, alleged that (1)
the judge should have recused himself because of certain financial
interests; (2) the judge issued incorrect rulings as a result of this
bias; and (3) the judge was systematically biased against products
liability plaintiffs and lengthy trials. After the report of a special
committee, the judicial council dismissed the complaint as merits-
related. The council's order did not discuss the allegations of
systematic bias against products liability plaintiffs and lengthy trials,
the complaint are either plainly untrue or are incapable of being established through
investigation").
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but these allegations probably could have been dismissed as
frivolous for lack of any pleaded factual support. It is not clear why
the chief judge, with or without a response from the judge, could
not have dismissed the complaint on the same basis that the council
did.
In the third matter, the complainant, a convicted criminal
defendant, alleged, inter alia, that the judge (1) acted with bias and
illicit motives against the complainant; (2) attempted to influence
and intimidate thejurors against the complainant; and (3) permitted
his law clerks to engage in improper financial dealings with business
interests adverse to the complainant. The special committee
requested and received a response from the judge, got the com-
plainant to respond to written questions, and received additional
documents from the complainant. The judicial council, adopting
the special committee's report, dismissed the complaint, finding no
factual basis for any of the complaint's allegations. The chiefjudge
could have undertaken the same inquiry as the committee and
dismissed the complaint on the same basis.
As stated previously, all three of these matters occurred in the
same circuit. It appears likely that this circuit, at least at one time,
adopted a more limited view of the permissible scope of chiefjudge
inquiry than that of other circuits. In fact, at the time these three
matters occurred, this circuit had no local rule, parallel to Illustra-
tive Rule 4(b), 166 recognizing a power of limited chief judge
inquiry. Nor did this circuit then have any local counterpart to
Illustrative Rule 4(e), which states that "ordinarily a special
committee will not be appointed until the judge complained about
has been invited to respond to the complaint."167 Nonetheless,
there have been complaints to which the chief judge of this circuit
has indeed requested a response from thejudge complained against,
although the chief judge may have felt that it would be inappropri-
ate to inquire much further without appointing a special committee.
It is also worth noting that this is one of two circuits that
produced the lion's share of "problem" chief judge dismissals
noted in Part I.C. The apparent eagerness to appoint special
committees in some matters may seem incongruous in a circuit
which arguably has precipitously dismissed other complaints. A
deep reluctance to undertake much chiefjudge inquiry-resulting in
both dismissals and special committee appointments in matters
166 See id.
167 Id.
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where further inquiry seems preferable-may explain, at least in
part, both types of outcomes.
d. Dfferences in Special Committee Procedures
The field study revealed, in most instances, what general
procedures special committees had followed. It also showed that
there has been considerable experimentation within the basic limits
established by the Act and, where applicable, the Illustrative Rules.
One notable difference in the circuits' special committee
practices involves the engagement of an outside attorney-investiga-
tor to investigate the allegations of the complaint on the commit-
tee's behalf. Five of the eight circuits have never done this. In
three of these five circuits, it appears that members of the special
committee have themselves performed all investigative tasks and
conducted all hearings. In the other two circuits, court of appeals'
staff has been used in appropriate matters to interview witnesses.
The circuit executive in one of these circuits explained that the
circuit might hire independent counsel to present a matter "in a big,
complex, paper-based case," but that none of the circuit's special
committee proceedings had fit that description. The circuit
executive stated:
We don't have the experience on our staff to handle that type of
case. Judges on the committee have had the relevant prosecutorial
experience to present such a case. There are also former judges
who might be available. Investigating and presenting a case
against ajudge might also create a problem for our office in terms
of future relationships. Generally, judges don't like to be investi-
gated by their staff.
In the remaining three circuits, investigators have been hired in
most special committee proceedings. Investigators were used in
eight of the twenty-five special committee proceedings. In some of
these eight proceedings, the investigator conducted a preliminary
investigation, performing such tasks as interviewing witnesses,
developing and reviewing evidence, and presenting a report to the
committee. However, if hearings were necessary, as they were in all
but one matter, the committee itself conducted them. In other
proceedings, the investigator played a major role in the special
committee's hearings. In all but one of these matters, the investiga-
tor assumed the function of examining witnesses at the hearing on
the committee's behalf. In one matter, the special committee
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delegated to the investigator the responsibility of conducting the
entire evidentiary hearing.
168
There have also been differences in the role complainants have
been permitted to play in special committee proceedings. Illustra-
tive Rule 13 "leave[s] the complainant's role largely within the
discretion of the special committee." 169 In seven of the fifteen
special committee hearings studied, the complainant chose not to
be involved in the hearings. 170 In four matters, the complainant
testified at the hearing and/or presented written argument, but was
not permitted to examine or cross-examine witnesses. In only two
instances, both serious matters that resulted in a public and a
private reprimand, was the complainant permitted to be involved in
examining or cross-examining witnesses. In one, the complainant,
a well-known attorney who both attended and was represented by
counsel at the hearing, examined and cross-examined witnesses
through counsel. In the other, the complainants, clerk's office
employees, were permitted to be present only when testifying, but
the complainants' counsel was permitted to be present throughout
the proceedings. Although the complainants' counsel was not
permitted to examine or cross-examine witnesses, counsel was
permitted to suggest to the investigator, who conducted all of the
direct examination, additional areas of inquiry for each witness.
e. Differences in Formation of a Special Committee
Four of the eight circuits sampled have always employed an ad
hoc special committee in § 372(c) proceedings. In these circuits,
each time the chief judge has had to appoint a special committee,
the chiefjudge has named one for that particular complaint. There
has never been any standing committee that remains ready to
investigate § 372(c) complaints when necessary. Three other circuits
also presently employ ad hoc special committees, but have had a
standing special committee in the past. No information is available
168 In the 25 special committee proceedings reviewed, hearings were held in 15
of them, the majority of which lasted from between two and seven days. In nine of
the remaining 10 proceedings reviewed, thejudicial council dismissed the complaint.
169 ILLusTRAnIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 13 commentary at 31.
170 In three of these matters, the complainant was a public prosecutor. In one,
the complainants were lawyers' associations, and in another, they were federal judges.
In two instances, it was not clear what role, if any, the complainant may have played
at the hearings.
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about whether the remaining circuit has employed a standing
committee.
Among the circuits sampled, therefore, there has been a trend
toward the use of ad hoc special committees. All of the chiefjudges
to whom we spoke and who addressed the question favored the ad
hoc approach. One said, "With an ad hoc committee, you can tailor
the membership to fit the needs of that particular investigation....
The downside... is that you may have new judges each time who
are not familiar with the special committee process ... ." Accord-
ing to another chief judge, "You have to tailor the special commit-
tee to the problem at hand. If you change it in a particular case,
you're saying the standing committee isn't fit for that matter. And,
you don't want to establish an elite among judges."
f. Judicial Conference Review
The Act permits a judge or a complainant to petition the
Judicial Conference for review of a judicial council order issued
under § 372(c)(6) following the report of a special committee. The
Act provides,
A complainant, judge, or magistrate aggrieved by an action of the
judicial council under paragraph (6) of this subsection may
petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for review
thereof. The Judicial Conference, or the standing committee
established under section 331 of this title, may grant a petition
filed by a complainant, judge, or magistrate under this para-
graph.17 1
Section 331 provides, in turn,
The Conference is authorized to exercise the authority provided
in section 372(c) of this title as the Conference, or through a
standing committee. If the Conference elects to establish a
standing committee, it shall be appointed by the ChiefJustice and
all petitions for review shall be reviewed by that committee.
1 72
As of January 1, 1992, the Judicial Conference Committee to
Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders had issued
nine orders disposing of petitions for review.178 In only two of
171 § 372(c)(10).
172 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
173 It should be noted that in six of the nine decisions of the Judicial Conference
Committee, no special committee was ever convened. These were petitions for
Judicial Conference review ofjudicial council orders denying petitions for review of
chiefjudge dismissals. Section 372(c)(10) of the Act makes it clear that such judicial
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these instances has the Judicial Conference Committee disturbed
the ruling or sanction of the judicial council. In the first of these
two cases, the Judicial Conference Committee issued a public
reprimand after the circuit judicial council, in a three to three vote,
had concluded the proceeding without any sanction. In the second
matter, the Judicial Conference Committee ordered a private
reprimand where the circuit council had voted to issue a forty-two-
page public order that would have been tantamount to a public
reprimand. The complaint in that case alleged, inter alia, that the
judge had involved himself in a heated public wrangle with the
complainant, a well-known attorney, and had stated from the bench
that he would not permit the attorney to practice in his courtroom.
A former chief judge argued that the decision of the Judicial
Conference Committee to make the public reprimand private may
have been a mistake. According to this judge, "I rather imagine the
committee did not want to undermine the authority of a new judge,
at the very outset of his career, who had acted wrongly but under
some provocation. But it was seen as a cover-up." In this matter,
the local judges, with greater knowledge of the situation and of the
players involved in the complaint, preferred a more stringent
sanction than the one meted out by a distant national authority.
Thus, the matter acts as a powerful counterexample to the argu-
ments advanced by those who assume that local judges are more
lenient and protective than outside judges.
g. Summary and Conclusions
In reviewing the 469 complaints examined in the field study, we
found that the vast majority (approximately ninety percent) fell
outside the purview of the Act and were properly dismissed. A
small minority of the dismissals were problematic, largely due to a
failure to inquire into allegations that conceivably, but not probably,
could have been true. The balance of the complaints led either to
corrective action or to the appointment of a special investigative
committee. Generally, corrective actions have served to enforce the
council orders denying petitions for review are final and conclusive, and cannot be
appealed to the Judicial Conference. Only judicial council orders issued under
§ 372(c)(6), following the report of a special committee, can be appealed to the
Judicial Conference. Thus, the Judicial Conference Committee had no statutory
jurisdiction to review these orders. In two of these matters, the committee so ruled.
In the other four, all of which arose in the first years of the Act, the committee
reviewed and affirmed council orders.
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Act in a prospective manner. Special committee investigations, by
contrast, have led to a retrospective enforcement of the Act through
occasional public and private reprimands, as well as through an
impeachment.
As with the treatment of dismissals, examining corrective actions
and special committee investigations revealed that a small minority
contained problematic applications of the Act. The problems with
special committees were mostly related to the unnecessary appoint-
ment of a special committee when a more extensive chief judge
inquiry might have detected a complaint's lack of substance. In the
corrective actions, the problems related to a failure to document the
action and extend the benefit to the complainant.
Overall, our review of the complaints uncovered a serious effort
to enforce the Act by pursuing substantial allegations of misconduct
and treating summarily complaints that were devoid of substantial
allegations. Staff support in scrutinizing the record and drafting
orders responding to the allegations appears to result in well-
documented outcomes. Reluctance on the part of the chief judge
to delegate or to conduct a limited inquiry seemed to be linked with
a significant portion of the problematic matters we encountered.
D. What Information Is, or Is Not, Available in Each
Court to Permit Meaningful Public, Media, or
Congressional Oversight?
One important goal of the Act is to assure the public of a
vehicle for filing complaints against judges. In the words of one
chief judge, "The Act is useful symbolically, it reassures the public
that anyone can file a complaint at any time. That's important." In
order for this goal to be realized, the public must also be assured
that complaints will be taken seriously, and that the disciplinary
mechanism not only exists formally, but is operating satisfactorily.
This assurance requires some form of meaningful public, media,
and congressional oversight of the operation of the disciplinary
process.
This need for oversight, however, is in tension with another
important policy embodied in the Act-the goal of maintaining the
confidentiality of at least some aspects of the § 372(c) process.
"The statute and its legislative history exhibit a strong policy goal of
protecting judges from the damage that could be done by publiciz-
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ing unfounded allegations of misconduct."174 All of the chief
judges spoken to agreed that some measure of confidentiality was
important. As one said, "If every complaint is in the newspaper
every time, that would undermine public confidence in the
judiciary. Chief judges would then have to spend enormous time
refuting frivolous allegations."
1. The Act and the Rules
The Act does not address most of the tension between the goals
of oversight and confidentiality. The Act requires that "[e]ach
written order to implement any action under paragraph (6)(B) of
this subsection, which is issued by a judicial council ... shall be
made available to the public through the appropriate clerk's office
of the court of appeals for the circuit." 175 This provision requires
public availability for only those judicial council orders that follow
a special committee investigation, since only those orders are issued
under § 372(c)(6)(B). The Act itself does not require the public
availability of chief judges' orders of dismissal and judicial council
orders on petitions for review.
In contrast, the Act's confidentiality provision does not
unequivocally prohibit making those orders publicly available. The
Act states that all "papers, documents, and records of proceedings
related to investigations conducted under this subsection shall be
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any
proceeding" unless certain requirements are met.176 The refer-
ence to "investigations" is ambiguous, but can be plausibly interpret-
ed to refer only to special committee investigations and not to a
chief judge's initial inquiry into a complaint. Thus, the Act leaves
open the question whether the many orders issued without
investigation by a special committee may be disclosed.
The Illustrative Rules attempt to fill this gap. Illustrative Rule
16(a) provides that
[c]onsideration of a complaint by the chief judge, a special
committee, or the judicial council will be treated as confidential
business, and information about such consideration will not be
disclosed by any judge or employee of the judicial branch or any
174 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 17 commentary at 43.
175 § 37 2(c)(15).
176 § 372(c)(14).
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person who records or transcribes testimony except in accordance
with these rules.
1 7
Thus, as the commentary to Rule 16 states, "rule 16(a) applies the
rule of confidentiality more broadly [than the Act], covering
consideration of a complaint at any stage."
178
Illustrative Rule 17(a) resolves the matter by providing that all
orders of the chief judge and judicial council "will be made public
when final action on the complaint has been taken and is no longer
subject to review. "179 When a complaint is disposed of without
appointment of a special committee, however, "the publicly available
materials will not disclose the name of the judge complained about
without his or her consent."180 Furthermore, the name of the
complainant will not be disclosed "unless the chief judge orders
such disclosure."181 Thus, the Rules make confidential the files
in each complaint for which a special committee is not appointed,
but do require that a sanitized version of the final order of dismissal
be made publicly available. The commentary to Rule 17 explains
that these provisions were intended to accommodate "the congres-
sional intent to protect a judge from public disclosure of a com-
plaint, both while it is pending and after it has been dismissed if
that should be the outcome," with the goals of "assuring the public
that the disciplinary mechanism is operating satisfactorily ... by
making the process more open" and creating a "body of published
precedent" to guide decision-makers.
1 8 2
Rule 17 also attempts to maximize the degree of oversight that
will be possible, consistent with confidentiality concerns, by
designating the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) in Washington, D.C.,
as the public repository of § 372(c) orders. Rule 17(b) provides that
records of orders
will be made public by placing them in a publicly accessible file in
the office of the clerk of the court of appeals .... The clerk will
send copies of the publicly available materials to the Federal
Judicial Center... where such materials will also be available for
public inspection. In cases in which memoranda appear to have
177 ILLusTRATIvE RULES, supra note 7, at 39.
178 Id. at 40.
179 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
180 Id.
181 id.
182 Id. at 44.
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precedential value, the chief judge may cause them to be pub-
lished.183
Filing all public orders with the FJC would permit the convenient
public review of orders, eliminating the need to travel to fifteen
courts situated all around the country in order to perform a
thorough review.
Assessing how well the Illustrative Rules actually permit effective
oversight of the circuits' administration of the Act is beyond the
scope of this project. No data exist to suggest whether particular
persons or institutions 184 who have attempted, or might attempt,
oversight would find the amount of information that the Illustrative
Rules make public adequate. Moreover, no attempt is made to
weigh whether or not any deficiencies in the circuits' accountability
arejustified by the competing confidentiality concerns. Instead, this
Section examines only the extent to which the circuits have fully
implemented the Illustrative Rules' approach.
2. The Circuits' Practices
In practice, the effectiveness of this compromise depends largely
upon the circuits' cooperation in administering the Act to permit
the Rules' oversight goals to be realized. For that to happen, each
circuit would need to: (1) issue chief judges' orders dismissing
complaints of judicial misconduct that provide sufficient discussion
of the complaint's allegations and of the grounds for dismissal; (2)
make those orders publicly available at the office of the clerk of the
court of appeals; and (3) file those orders with the FJC. All three of
these actions are commonly understood by chief judges to be
entirely voluntary. Section 372(c)(3) of the Act does state that a
chief judge may dismiss a complaint "by written order stating his
reasons." Thus, there is a strong argument that the Act requires
chiefjudges to include reasons for their conclusions. Nevertheless,
most of the chiefjudges interviewed appeared to view the inclusion
of reasons as within the discretion of the chief judge.
As of October 1, 1993, twelve of the fifteen courts covered by
the Act had implemented all three of these prerequisites for
oversight. Today, a member of the public can perform a reasonably
effective and meaningful review of these courts' administration of
183 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
18' Such persons or institutions include the press, Congress, and the Judicial
Conference.
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the Act. This state of affairs not only helps meet the oversight
needs of the public, but may also enhance the judiciary's public
status by demonstrating that the judiciary is an institution willing to
police itself. A major benefit to the judiciary is lost if confidentiali-
ty is applied so broadly as to prevent the public from learning that
a court is doing a good job. As a chief judge in one of these courts
noted,
After a newspaper article accusing the judiciary of a cover-up in [a]
special committee matter [which resulted in a private, rather than
a public, reprimand], a local reporter wanted to look at our
§ 372(c) files. We were able to show him files of reasoned orders.
He was very surprised. I think he went away thinking this was an
honest ship.
For some of these courts, all the public orders issued since the
inception of the Act may not be available. In some cases, orders
were made public only when the court adopted the relevant
provisions of the fllustrative Rules.
185
Three courts' practices preclude this degree of oversight for a
number of different reasons. Two still cling to the practice of
issuing conclusory form orders of dismissal for many com-
plaints.18 6 The remaining circuit has adopted the illustrative
Rules, including the requirement of depositing public orders with
the FJC. This circuit, however, has modified illustrative Rule 17 to
provide that orders disposing of complaints without appointment of
a special committee shall be kept private and confidential.1 8 7
Dismissal orders are therefore not available to the public in the
clerk's office, and they are not sent to the FJC. This circuit's
dismissal orders are generally as thorough and careful as the orders
in any other circuit and would provide positive recognition for the
circuit if they were made available for public oversight. Nonethe-
less, the circuit currently has no intention of reconsidering this
185 Some circuits, upon adopting the Illustrative Rule 17(b) requirement of filing
public orders with the FJC, filed only prospectively and did not deposit prior public
orders with the FJC. Nevertheless, for these circuits, a complete collection of all
orders is available on-site at the clerk's office.
186 Both of these circuits may abandon, or at least lessen, this practice in the
future. The chiefjudge of one of these circuits intended to delegate much more of
the task of drafting dismissal orders, while the chief judge of the other circuit
recognized the importance of giving reasons for orders and intended to deviate from
the previous chiefjudge's practice of using conclusory form orders.
87 Cf. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 17(a) (providing for public access
to complaint materials once final action has been taken).
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policy. On the contrary, the two chief judges we interviewed in this
circuit vigorously defended it. One argued:
If the complaint is insubstantial, it's not in the public interest to
make information about the complaint public, even if the chief
judge's order says it's frivolous. The media does not handle these
things responsibly. A newspaper would say that Judge X has had
sixteen complaints filed against him, even though they were all
dismissed as frivolous. That concern is not fully addressed by
sanitizing orders. Sanitizing is a good idea if you're going to make
orders public. But, the press is good at figuring out who it is....
In any case, there's no reason to make the chief judges' orders
public, so why do it?
The other chief judge aired similar views:
Our circuit's practice ... protects the innocent. An efficient
judge, who won't put up with anything from lawyers, may attract
more complaints. That doesn't mean anything.... As for issuing
public, but sanitized, orders of dismissal, I don't know what
purpose that would serve. If it were sanitized, it wouldn't satisfy
the press. I haven't heard any complaints that in this circuit we're
making public too much or too little .... The public is generally
not aware of the whole procedure, so this question of making
orders public doesn't affect public confidence.
3. Summary and Recommendations
In conclusion, with some notable gaps, the circuits have
generally adopted practices that allow oversight to the extent
envisioned by the Illustrative Rules. Twelve of the fifteen courts
covered by the Act have essentially done everything the Rules
permit to make the grounds for dismissals available to potential
overseers. Although the remaining three courts have not, two of the
three have either taken steps, or expressed an intention to take
steps, to achieve greater accountability in the near future.
Given the importance of accountability, a uniform national rule
(imposed either by statute or by the Judicial Conference) may be
desirable in this area. This rule could include requirements that
each court make sanitized dismissal orders publicly available in the
clerk's office. For each of those orders, a statement of the com-
plaint and the grounds for dismissal would be provided, and each
order would be filed in a central public repository.
188
188 Before such a rule is adopted, however, judges and other interested parties
should be given the opportunity to air contrary views.
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This concludes the discussion of issues arising out of the
disposition by chief judges and judicial councils of formal com-
plaints filed under § 372(c). Judicial discipline in the federal courts,
however, is by no means limited to this formal machinery. To get
the full picture, it is also necessary to examine informal methods of
judicial discipline.
E. What Informal Actions Have ChiefJudges or Judicial
Councils Taken Regarding Matters That Fall Within
the Potential Reach of the Statute?
"In my experience, the most serious complaints never hit the complaint
process."
"There are more remedial actions taking place outside the complaint
process than following formal complaints."
These comments, made by two former chiefjudges, capture the
experience in most of the circuits visited. In every circuit, chief
judges reported informally addressing and resolving serious
allegations of judicial disability or patterns of misconduct. Some
chief judges view formal, adjudicative procedures as a last resort,
laden with disadvantages, particularly for dealing with complaints
that do not allege criminal or impeachable conduct. These chief
judges prefer a voluntary resolution to the cumbersome, formal fact-
finding process that generally only leads to a public reprimand.
The chief judges' preference for informal, corrective processes
manifested itself more fully in the absence of a formal complaint.
After a complaint had been filed, the statutory process channeled
the chief judges' responses, leaving little time or flexibility for
addressing patterns of behavior that a single incident might
represent. Options for informal investigation of charges become
limited. Informal approaches to resolving the problem, perhaps
initiated by friends of the named judge or by surrogates of the chief
judge, are displaced by the formal procedures that must be followed
in responding to the allegations in the complaint.
This study's findings corroborate and expand on those of Collins
Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive in the Seventh Circuit. In a "general
[national] survey of confidential, informal reprimands against
judicial officers," Fitzpatrick found that "[o]ver the last several years,
there have been at least nine federal judicial officers who retired
after a judicial misconduct complaint was filed or was looming in
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the background." 189 He added that, in his experience, "the most
serious judicial problems have not been initiated with a formal
complaint."
19 0
The findings of this study also concur with the results reached
by Professor Geyh in his national survey of current and former chief
judges. He asked these judges to rank eight types of disciplinary
mechanisms in terms of frequency of use and effectiveness as a
deterrent to judicial misconduct. The judges ranked informal
actions as the most frequently used. Section 372(c) proceedings
ranked fifth, behind informal actions of the chief circuit judge,
informal actions of the chief districtjudge, informal actions by peer
judges, and judicial actions (such as mandamus and judicial
review). 19 1 Informal chief judge action and § 372(c) action were
both deemed to be more effective than other options and "signifi-
cant" general deterrents to judicial misconduct. Informal action
rated slightly more effective than § 372(c) actions.
192
This Section examines the role that informal activity plays in
meeting the goals of the Act and the manner in which chief judges
have implemented that role. It explores the advantages and
disadvantages of formal versus informal approaches and summarizes
examples of the type of informal activity encountered.1 9 3
1. Role of Informal Activity
What role does informal activity play in the grand scheme of
judicial self-regulation? How does informal activity relate to
enforcing the Act? Does it displace the Act, complement it, or act
in some other way? The short answer is that informal activity and
the formal mechanisms of the Act seem to operate synergistically,
with each approach reinforcing the other. Informal activity operates
in the shadow of the Act, which looms in the background as a
disfavored but imposing alternative.
189 Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of FederalJudges: The Unreported
Informal Responses, 71 JUDATURE 282, 283 (1988).190 Id.
191 See Geyh, supra note 26, app. (Question 1).
192 Id.
193 This research was not designed to uncover all instances of informal activity.
The instances described below were discovered incidentally during discussions with
chiefjudges about formal and informal processes, as well as during discussions with
clerks and circuit executives. The following reports should be treated accordingly,
as illustrative, rather than comprehensive, examples of the process.
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The compatibility between the Act and informal processes is not
surprising. The Act was designed to facilitate self-regulation by the
judiciary. A premise underlying the judiciary's approach to the
pending legislation was that informal actions of chief judges and
judicial councils already addressed major problems regarding
misconduct. 194 In Judge Browning's words, "[i]t was an informal
process, simple and generally very effective." 19 5 Before and after
the Act, the goals have been to correct problems and to maintain
the independence and integrity of the judiciary.
One chief judge, who believes that "the informal process is a
critical part of the whole thing," says that the Act "gives you an
entree you wouldn't otherwise have when you start to poke into a
judge's personal business." While chief judges examined such
behavior before 1980, "it's easier [now] because the Act is there."
Regarding a disability situation, another chief judge said that
behind the velvet glove, there has to be an iron fist, with other
judges threatening to file complaints. [The complaint process is]
there in the background; other judges know it. In the one case
[referring to a matter in which the chiefjudge talked to a judge's
spouse about retirement after the judge resisted the suggestion]
the judge's spouse knew the Act was there and thought the worst
thing in the world would be a § 372(c) complaint at the end of the
judge's illustrious career.
How does the combined formal/informal process work? The
following is a brief sketch of the major elements of the process as
gleaned from interviews with chief judges and circuit executives.
2. Sources of Informal Complaints
In the absence of a complaint, how does a chief judge learn
about and confirm the existence of a problem? While the network
of informal information available to the chiefjudge varies as widely
as the personalities of the chiefjudges, certain institutional sources
appear to play a similar role in many circuits.
Often, the circuit executive's office channels complaints to the
chiefjudge. Four of the six circuit executives interviewed regularly
received informal complaints, generally from lawyers. The frequen-
cy of these contacts ranged from a couple a month to once a year.
194 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 121 (May 15, 1992) (testimony of
Judge James R. Browning).
195 Id.
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The substance of the complaints ranged from routine problems
regarding delay to serious problems relating to disability. Only two
circuit executives indicated that their office never got involved in
informal misconduct issues. Two former chiefjudges also reported
relying on quarterly statistical reports of each judge's caseload,
compiled in the circuit executive's office. These reports were most
useful in addressing the issue of whether an instance of delay was
part of a pattern.
In addition to the informal complaints from attorneys that are
filtered through the circuit executive's office, all of the chiefjudges
and former chief judges interviewed reported that they received
informal information directly from lawyers or from the U.S.
Attorney's office. Most chief judges recognized, as one put it, that
"it's very difficult for a practicing lawyer to file a complaint
[because] they're in constant practice before the judge." That
judge, however, also recognized that lawyer complaints "are the
complaints that tend to require some action or caution on my part.
So, the informal process of getting lawyer comments is very
important." This chief judge opens the channels of communication
with the bar by making certain that "they understand [I'm] interest-
ed in the institution of the court." Contact with the bar is crucial
because "the bar knows the most about misconduct; there must be
some way to tap into that knowledge."
Other chief judges mentioned receiving information about
judicial conduct from chief district judges, chief bankruptcy judges,
and other judges throughout the circuit. After receiving informa-
tion about a judge serving in a district court, the chiefjudge of that
court is often instrumental in confirming or rejecting the accuracy
of the report. If there is a basis to proceed, the chief district judge
may play a critical role in developing the appropriate informal
response. One chief judge received information about misconduct
from a departing chief judge; passing along such information is
probably a routine part of the transition process.
Three chief judges learned about disability situations from
colleagues on the court of appeals. These judges observed signs of
deterioration in their peers during oral argument, conferences, or
lunch. Appeals from district court actions sometimes also include
allegations of misconduct relating to the demeanor of the trial
judge. In one such instance, the lawyers argued that a district judge
should not be permitted to continue to sit in the matter because of
an age-related disability. The clerk of the court of appeals in that
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instance brought the matter to the attention of the chiefjudge, who
was not a member of the panel assigned to the case.
In two instances, criminal investigative bodies generated
information that stimulated a chief judge to investigate a matter.
One was related to a grand jury proceeding, which did not produce
an indictment but raised questions about the fitness of a non-Article
III judge; the other was related to an FBI investigation of a charge
that the victim did not want to pursue. Other sources of informal
complaints include jurors, deputy clerks and other court staff. In
half of the circuits, at least one instance of possible misconduct
came to the chiefjudge's attention via the media-once by television
and the rest through newspapers. One chief judge has a clipping
service that includes articles about federaljudges. In one instance,
the attorney for a victim of alleged misconduct contacted the chief
judge directly, and this contact led to mediation of a dispute
between the judge and the informal complainant.
3. Investigation and Inquiry
Inquiries into informal complaints frequently follow different
paths than the formal processes. First, a chief judge must screen
the information. As one chief judge put it, "lawyers who know you
will complain, but not usually about things you would act on."
Generally, a chiefjudge will seek additional information to confirm
or refute the claim before confronting thejudge. Second, confiden-
tiality concerns are dictated by common sense and fairness, not by
the strictures of a statute. And third, chief judges appear more
likely to enlist the chief district judge to assist in confirming or
rejecting the allegation. The chief district judge may have local
sources of information and contacts that are less accessible to the
chief judge of the circuit. As one chief judge of a circuit noted, the
complaint process does not give the chief judge of the district any
role to play. In the informal process, however, chief judges of the
circuit tend to treat the chief judge of the district as an ally in
responding to a potential problem.
196
196 In one instance that occurred before 1980, a chief judge responded to an
informal but serious allegation regarding demeanor by asking a well-known member
of a local metropolitan bar to conduct an informal survey amonglocal lawyers. When
the survey confirmed the informal allegation, the chiefjudge proceeded to deal with
the problem by confronting the judge.
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4. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Act
The inquiry and problem-solving aspects of the informal process
fit together. Discussing the situation with the chief judge of the
district may naturally lead the circuit chief to involve the district
chief in developing a strategy to remedy the situation. When
questions are raised regarding ajudge's physical or mental ability to
continue on the bench, the task of setting a strategy looms large.
Confronting the issue constitutes, in the words of one chief judge,
"an act of friendship and responsibility." Deciding who (for
example, the chief circuit judge, the chief districtjudge, or another
judge) should approach whom (for example, the judge, a friend, or
a family member) opens complex issues of high diplomacy. It is
hard to imagine a statutory formula that could adjust to the myriad
human relationships involved.
Although these informal transactions are more than mere
commercial exchanges, bargaining chips may nevertheless exist that
would induce a judge to resign or retire on disability, rather than
contest claims of physical or mental unfitness. Similarly, various
influences might lead ajudge to acknowledge a problem of delay or
demeanor and to take steps to correct it.
When the first signs of problems arise, the informal approach
generally involves trying to assist the judge in continuing to perform
the work of the court. In some instances, this entails altering the
mix of cases to coincide with changes in ability or temperament; in
other instances, it entails providing additional staff or other
resources to address a backlog of cases. The goal is to create
rehabilitative remedies.
In more serious instances involving questions of disability, a
dignified retirement may be the ideal resolution of the issue. Here,
the presence of the Act and the possibility that someone might file
a complaint (or that the chiefjudge might identify a complaint) may
serve to induce a voluntary retirement rather than a bitter and
protracted disability proceeding. For a senior judge, the prospect
that the chief judge of the circuit might refuse to certify the judge
as eligible to continue receiving the salary of the office presents an
equally strong reason to accede. 197 In contrast, for a nonsenior
judge, the ability of a judicial council under § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii) to
197 See § 371(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (providing thatjudges must be certified each
year by the chiefjudge in the circuit as having met the requirements set forth in the
statute).
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request voluntary retirement, without regard to the length of service
requirements, creates an incentive to invoke the formal process,
although perhaps in an uncontested manner.
In discussing voluntary retirement, chief judges and circuit
executives noted the importance of addressing issues of timing and
other factors that might affect the terms and conditions of retire-
ment. For example, the availability of chambers may be a critical
factor. More than one chiefjudge has interpreted the rules liberally
to permit a retired judge to maintain an office if space is available.
In two situations involving possible removal of a bankruptcy
judge 19 pursuant to § 152(e), the option of invoking the formal
process played a part in informal negotiations. In one instance, the
bankruptcy judge was persuaded not to apply for renewal; in
another, the circuit executive treated a serious informal complaint
as a reason for collecting information that would be relevant to
renewal.
5. Formal Versus Informal Proceedings
In almost all situations, chiefjudges remain reluctant to shift to
the formal process even after an informal complaint has been
corroborated. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
the two approaches, chief judges uniformly maintain that the
informal process has distinct advantages that far outweigh any
drawbacks. One chief judge said that "it's always better to [deal
with a situation] informally. You get the right result without
unnecessarily humiliating or degrading anyone." Similarly, another
chief judge said that identifying a complaint pursuant to the 1990
amendments "is a big step for a chief judge; you'd try to settle it
amicably first .... If you identified a complaint you'd establish an
adversarial relationship with the judge." Using the statutory power
to "identify" a complaint where none has been filed thrusts the chief
judge to the forefront as the prime mover of the process. One chief
judge articulated a general principle that seems to speak for many:
The informal process is a teaching mode, not a disciplinary mode.
I can talk to ajudge without the judge getting defensive. I can get
real corrective action, not mere grudging changes. I see the
198 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988) (providing that bankruptcy judges may only be
removed for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability, and only in
limited circumstances). We did not encounter any instances in which removal of a
magistrate judge appeared to be under consideration.
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formal process as what I must use where I have failed in the
informal process.
Related to the educational benefits of the informal process is the
flexibility that it permits in shaping a remedy. As one chief judge
stated, "the informal process is more flexible; you can make the
remedy fit the problem." For example, in one matter, a judge
appointed a committee of three judges with appropriate expertise
to review allegations of criminal misconduct. As noted above,
another chief judge had a lawyer survey other lawyers to identify
and corroborate a problem. This survey, in turn, gave shape to the
remedy.
These benefits of the informal process may explain why chief
judges have rarely used the newly created statutory power to
identify a complaint.1 9 9 Only one instance of its use was uncov-
ered in this study (although the low number may reflect the fact that
the amendment did not take effect until March 1991). In that
instance, a chief judge received a specific, but anonymous, com-
plaint from a lawyer, alleging misconduct by a district judge. The
chief judge identified the complaint and presented it to the district
judge for a response. Given the specificity of the complaint and the
seriousness of the allegations, identifying a complaint did not seem
to put the chief judge in an adversarial position. The allegation
required a response and the district judge responded by changing
a recusal policy that had failed to prevent a serious conflict of
interest.
6. Disadvantages
Using informal processes may have disadvantages. Because
there is no record of complaints and action taken, accountability is
likely to be limited. This affects the process in two primary ways.
First, the complainant may not know whether action was taken.
When the appropriate response is to seek corrective action short of
retirement, the correction may be invisible to the public and the
person or group that registered the complaint. In this instance,
justice will not be seen to be done even if the informal approach
successfully corrected the problem.20 0 Second, the public will
199 See § 372(c)(1) (amending the Act to enable chief judges to identify a
complaint without its having been filed).
200 This disadvantage can be avoided, of course, by the chief judge, who can
communicate the informal action to the complainant.
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have no idea that complaints have been presented. Any failure to
respond to serious informal complaints will remain as invisible as
the complaints themselves. Only the complainant retains the power
to overcome this disadvantage by formalizing the complaint or by
disclosing the failure of the chief judge to respond.
Although the lack of accountability is a serious disadvantage, it
seems inextricably linked to the advantages of the informal process.
If an informal informant is dissatisfied with the chief judge's
response, filing a complaint remains an option.
7. Examples
Against the backdrop of the chiefjudges' and circuit executives'
views about the informal process, capsule summaries of informal
actions follow. These examples were used by chief judges and
circuit executives to illustrate their discussions and should not be
seen as an exhaustive review of informal activity.
a. Disability Examples
The most extensively discussed and most dramatic types of
informal actions involve questions of disability. Chief judges and
former chief judges from every circuit spontaneously discussed
instances of disability that they faced during their tenure. Twenty-
five instances were uncovered.2 0 1 The details of the specific
matters do not venture beyond what one might expect. They
represent a host of physical and mental symptoms ranging from a
memory afflicted by Alzheimer's disease to an inability to speak as
201 For several reasons, this is surely a conservative estimate, representing the
absolute minimum amount ofsuch activity in those circuits during the span of service
of the chiefjudges and former chiefjudges. First, any overlap or double-counting
between matters discussed by current and former chief judges and by circuit
executives was eliminated. Second, accounts of these instances did not result from
a direct question seeking a quantitative estimate. Rather, each matter arose as an
example in the course of discussing the advantages and disadvantages of formal
versus informal processes. It is likely that some of the judges would have recounted
more situations if asked. Indeed, one former chiefjudge indicated that the total
number of informal actions, some of which must have related to disabilities, was two
to four per year. Yet, for that circuit, only one specific example of a disability was
recounted. As that chiefjudge said, "You don't keep score." Third, in three of the
eight circuits, former chief judges were not interviewed. In the other circuits,
however, it was generally the former chief judge, or, in one instance, the circuit
executive, who had the most experience with disability matters. The current chief
judges often simply had not spent sufficient time in the position to have had much
experience with disability cases.
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a result of a stroke. For the most part, they result from aging and
amount to a natural byproduct of a system in which judges have life
tenure.
The typical approach to disability matters illustrates the
advantages and disadvantages of informal versus formal systems.
Judges have crafted ways to handle the "act of friendship and
responsibility" so as to meet the needs of the situation without
imposing needless pain on a colleague. One chief judge, caught
between the denial of a problem from a distinguished colleague and
threats from other judges to file a formal complaint, met with the
judge's spouse and persuaded her to convince the judge to end his
career while his reputation remained outstanding. Finally, one
judge told a story of how a senior judge's death resolved the
problem: "I knew he couldn't do any more work, but I didn't tell
him. I knew he'd die soon. If I'd told him, he'd have died that
day." Making judgments about situations like this is the largely
untold story of responding to problems of disability and aging. The
above presents only a glimpse into the total story.
b. Delay Examples
Four of the five former chiefjudges and one current chiefjudge
mentioned that they used informal approaches to deal with
problems of delay. One chief judge reported great success in
attacking delay issues by routinely reviewing the quarterly caseload
reports for each district and circuit judge. This judge developed
and applied criteria to identify early warning signals of serious
logjams in the early stages of litigation and called the judges whose
quarterly reports suggested problems.
Another former chief judge reported that the judicial council
received reports under the Civil Justice Reform Act, identified
problems, and discussed possible solutions. In another circuit, the
circuit executive brought the names ofjudges who appeared to have
backlog problems to the attention of the chiefjudge. Together they
would send a constructive letter, offering assistance to address the
backlog.
Yet another former chief judge indicated that the statistical
reports on caseload delays supply much better information than the
occasional litigant complaint.2 02 This former chief judge ap-
202 Even so, such complaints may serve the purpose of providing an opportunity
to talk with thejudge about the situation and to explore constructive ways of dealing
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proached judges even after dismissing a complaint of delay and
explored ways to attack the underlying problem. The very act of
dismissing the complaint reinforces the informal process by
presenting the chief judge as an ally who is truly interested in
resolving the problem, not in disciplining a colleague.
Another former chief judge institutionalized the issue of delay
by creating a "sixty day list" which catalogs cases pending sixty days
after becoming decisional in the court of appeals. The list is
presented each month at the meeting of the court of appeals, and
each judge is required to explain why his or her case remains on it.
A chief judge reported addressing one district judge's chronic
problem of delay by enlisting the support of the entire district
court. He simply called the chief district judge's attention to the
problem and let the court determine how to deal with it. In this
instance, the district judges assisted in resolving the problem by
accepting the reassignment of cases from the judge's backlog.
The amount of informal activity dealing with issues of delay
appears consistent with the findings of the Geyh survey. 203 In the
Geyh survey, chiefjudges rated CivilJustice Reform Act reports and
informal chiefjudge action at the district or circuit level as the most
effective "measures for remedying judicial neglect and unjustified
delay."2°4 Both were rated approximately halfway between "some-
what effective" and "very effective" on the scale used in the
questionnaire. Section 372(c) actions, in contrast, were rated
slightly less than "somewhat effective."
20 5
c. Misconduct Examples
Informal processes are sometimes used, with apparent effective-
ness, to deal with complaints that would be cognizable under the
Act, but which come to the court's attention through informal
channels. In one instance, an informal action short-circuited a
serious public outcry. A district judge used a derogatory term to
with it. In one instance, the court took a districtjudge off the docket for a full year
to give him the opportunity to reduce the backlog.
203 See Geyh, supra note 26, app.
204 Id. (Question 13). The CivilJustice Reform Act employs various techniques
to reduce problems of cost and delay in U.S. District Courts. See CivilJustice Reform
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). These techniques include the
requirement of an expense and delay plan, advisory groups, and training programs
for court personnel. See id. §§ 477-478, 480.
205 See Geyh, supra note 26, app. (Question 13).
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refer to a minority group. An attorney who was not involved in the
litigation complained to the local newspaper about the judge's
language and sent a letter to the chiefjudge. The chiefjudge of the
circuit discussed the matter with the chief judge of the district, who
in turn discussed the matter with the district judge. The district
judge apologized to the parties and their attorneys on the record,
and the matter was resolved. In other circuits, similar language was
the subject of formal complaints that were not resolved so effective-
ly.
Three chief judges reported using informal processes to deal
effectively with reports of alcohol problems. In one instance, the
judge with the alleged problem chose senior status. Continued
certification and assignment of staff to that judge became contin-
gent upon satisfactory handling of a specific caseload. Another
chief judge delegated authority to a judge who had administrative
responsibility for the lower court. The latter judge conducted an
informal investigation and then spoke to the judge who had the
problem. The third chief judge recounted a pre-Act situation in
which a judge was drinking too much at lunch. A colleague who
was a close friend spoke to the judge and remedied the situation.
Very few instances of sexual misconduct were mentioned by
chiefjudges or circuit executives, but one chiefjudge expressed the
opinion that such matters are the "untold story" of judicial
misconduct. In two instances, however, chief judges did report
dealing with issues of sexual misconduct by a judge. In one case, a
law enforcement agency informed the chief judge about allegations
of sexual misconduct that the victim did not wish to pursue on a
criminal basis. The chiefjudge informed the victim of the existence
of the § 372(c) process, but the victim declined to come forward.
Section 372(c) at that time did not give the chiefjudge the power to
identify a complaint. 20 6 In the chief judge's opinion, the matter
may have had a deterrent effect on the judge, who was never again
accused of a similar offense, and on other judges, who learned of
the matter. In the other instance of alleged sexual misconduct, the
chiefjudge mediated a dispute between a potential complainant and
ajudge. Neither party wanted to proceed through formal processes
and the dispute was successfully resolved with the chief judge's
assistance. Testimony presented to the Commission about allega-
tions of sexual harassment of female law clerks by federal judges
206 See supra note 199.
1993] JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 143
tended to corroborate the assessment that there was an "untold
story" here.20 7 The above two instances and the testimony pre-
sented to the Commission may represent the beginning of the
telling of that story.
In the area of alleged sexual misconduct, few successful uses of
informal processes were uncovered. It is likely that increased public
attention to this problem, especially in the context of sexual
harassment of law clerks, will test the ability of chief judges to
fashion informal remedies to address the unique problems of law
clerks in temporary and highly personal positions. We also expect
that the relative visibility and formality of the § 372(c) process will
deter its use by law clerks. Separate grievance machinery may be
necessary to deal with complaints filed by judicial clerks and other
court staff.
Two chief judges reported situations that involved serious
charges of possible criminal misconduct. In one, the grand jury
failed to indict a bankruptcy judge, but the chiefjudge nevertheless
appointed an informal committee to review the grand jury records
and determine whether there were violations of the Act. In another
instance, the chief judge received an anonymous complaint that a
judge was exceeding the limits of permissible outside income. The
chief judge and the judge reviewed the complaint, and the judge
satisfied the chief judge that the allegations were untrue.
In a much less serious context, Judge John C. Godbold present-
ed the Commission with an everyday illustration of informal
corrective action. A school teacher wrote to him and said, "I
brought my class to watch the proceedings in the federal district
court and the judge sat there for half of the proceedings with his
feet on the bench and I was humiliated and embarrassed." The
chief judge sent the letter to the judge and asked, "What shall I tell
this lady?" Thejudge responded, "Tell her she's correct. I appreci-
ate it and it will never happen again." Judge Godbold indicated that
he could give "half a dozen examples like this."
20 8
207 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 26-33, 59-76, 80-81 (Jan. 29, 1993)
(testimony of Barbara Safriet, Associate Dean, Yale Law School) (discussing the extent
and nature of sexual harassment of female law clerks by judges).218 Id. at 58 (May 1, 1992) (testimony ofJudge John C. Godbold).
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8. Summary
Chief judges draw information from a variety of sources and
apply it to instances of misconduct or allegations of disability
without relying on the formalities of the complaint process.
Together with the process for recertifying senior judges, the
informal process appears to be the primary method for addressing
issues of physical or mental disability. Chief judges prefer to use
the informal process because it operates more flexibly and humane-
ly. Moreover, the possibility of invoking the formal process appears
to reinforce the efficacy of the informal process.
II. EFFECTS OF THE PROCESS
A. What Beneficial Effects Have Flowed
from the Operation of the Act?
In Part I, we described the process of administering the Act. In
the course of that description, we identified positive and negative
effects that the Act has generated. In this Part, we build on that
description to examine in a more general way the questions of how
corrective actions and other benefits affect the complainants, the
courts, and individualjudges. How widely are rulings disseminated?
To what extent does the Act encourage good conduct or deter
misconduct? We also attempt to place the administration of the Act
into the context of judicial governance.
1. Dissemination
As we have just seen in Part I.D., the Act's confidentiality
provisions consist of a directive to make public those actions taken
by judicial councils on special committee reports,2 0 9 and a state-
ment of limits on the authority of a judicial council to release
papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to special
committee investigations. 210 The Illustrative Rules have attempt-
ed to fill the statutory gaps. Rule 17(a) mandates that orders be
made available to the public, generally without disclosing thejudge's
name unless the judge consents.2 11 The rule attempts to strike a
balance between protecting the confidentiality of ajudge named in
209 See § 372(c)(15).
210 See § 3 7 2(c)(14).
211 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
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a pending or dismissed complaint and making the process more
open.
The drafters of the Illustrative Rules articulated two values in
disseminating orders to the public. Their first value is "assuring the
public that the disciplinary mechanism is operating satisfactorily,"
while the other is improving the operation of the complaint
mechanism by establishing a body of published precedent.212 Our
review suggests that an additional value should be made explicit,
namely, bringing significant orders to the attention of judges as a
guide for assessing their own conduct. This value may be implicit
in the establishment of a body of precedent.
A national overview of the dissemination of the results of
judicial misconduct complaints was obtained by searching a national
database of national and local newspapers, law papers, and
magazines. The search 213 uncovered eighteen matters for which
there were seventy-seven national and sixty-five local articles in the
newspapers or magazines included in the database. All but one of
the eighteen matters received national attention. Twelve of the
thirteen circuits were represented in the stories. Four circuits were
represented by two complaints and one circuit by three. Five of the
eighteen complaints had been filed by a single organization that
apparently sought and received extensive publicity for its fil-
ings.
2 14
In most of the stories, the Act's terms and procedures were
discussed. Several of the references were part of lengthy national
stories, such as a discussion of some of the public orders filed with
the Federal Judicial Center by the end of 1983215 and a lengthy
front page National Law Journal review of the Act and the develop-
2 12 Id. Rule commentary at 44.
213 The NEXIS search consisted of a query using the terms "judicial misconduct,"
"judicial discipline," "judicial corruption" and "federal" in the MAJPAP database.
Using the names found in the above search, a second NEXIS search was conducted,
searching by the judge's name and sometimes limiting the search either by the word
"complaint" or by something important involved in the incident. Excluded from the
eighteen matters uncovered were the Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon referrals to the
House of Representatives for consideration of impeachment.
214 The organization is the Washington Legal Foundation. For background
information, see NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, at 151-65 (May 1, 1992) (testimony
of Paul Kamenar).
2 15 See David F. Pike, At Least 4 Final Orders Filed Under Act, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19,
1983, at 26 (discussing orders submitted by the Third and Sixth Circuit councils).
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ing Illustrative Rules in 1986.216 A front page New York Times
headline in 1989 promised A Glimpse at the Secrets of Penalizing
Judges.2 17 Serious complaints under the Act presumably generate
comparable publicity on the local level.
218
Can the above information about dissemination be reconciled
with the results of the survey by William Slate and the Justice
Research Institute?219 The survey reported that the vast majority
of journalists covering the federal courts did not recognize the
Judicial Councils Reform andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 by name and that more than two-thirds were not aware of any
system that allows citizens to file complaints against federal
judges.22 0 The number of articles about the Act suggests that
journalists may gather information about complaints under the Act
on an ad hoc basis and do not retain it as part of a permanent body
of knowledge about the courts. The data also suggest that most
journalists do not routinely check for public orders under the Act
as part of their regular beat. Further analysis of the Slate Survey
data may reveal whetherjournaists' knowledge of the system differs
according to their experience in covering the federal courts.
What additional efforts do courts make to disseminate informa-
tion about the complaint process? In serious matters, particularly
the few that result in a public reprimand, the chiefjudge and circuit
executive make special efforts to disseminate the final order. For
example, in a matter in which the judicial council ordered a public
reprimand, the chief judge stimulated a story in a publication for
local lawyers "to make the public and the bar aware that there is a
216 See Eric Effron, Disciplinaty Feud Brews Among U.S.Judges, NAT'L L.J.,June 16,
1986, at 1 (discussing the Act and the development of the Illustrative Rules).
217 David Margolick, A Glimpse at the Secrets of PenalizingJudges, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 1989, at Al.
218 See NCJDR Hearings, supra note 111, exhibits 9-19 (May 1, 1992) (testimony
of Paul Kamenar plus exhibits). In testimony to the Commission, Paul Kamenar,
Executive Legal Director of the Washington Legal Foundation, submitted materials
relating to a complaint in the Fifth Circuit. Exhibits 9-19, attached to those materials,
consisted of twelve local newspaper articles, editorials, and a letter to the editor
relating to that complaint. Our NEXIS search uncovered one national law paper
article, one local newspaper article, four local law paper articles, and one local wire
service story about that complaint. None of the local stories submitted by Mr.
Kamenar appeared in the NEXIS search. Thejudge's name used with the search was
"Buchmeyer." See supra note 213.
219 See William K. Slate, II, Analysis and Report: Surveys of Knowledge and
Satisfaction of Federaljudicial Discipline and Removal Mechanisms and Processes, in 2
RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 38, at 959 [hereinafter Slate Survey).
220 See id. at 1003 (Questions 1 and 2).
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procedure and that we take complaints seriously." In another
matter, a public reprimand order was distributed to all clerks of
court and chief district judges within the circuit and posted in the
clerk's office of the court where the named magistrate judge sat. In
other situations, publicity about the complaints appears to originate
outside the judiciary, frequently from the complainant.
With one exception, dissemination to judges follows informal
channels. Circuit executives used terms like "grapevine," "casual
conversation," and "tribal communication" to describe the process.
All who addressed the issue were confident that judges were aware
of some of the more serious matters arising under the Act. In at
least two circuits, the chief judge presented statistics relating to
activity under the Act as part of the annual state of the circuit
address at the circuit's annual judicial conference. These occasions
also presented opportunities to communicate information about the
Act to lawyers who practice frequently in the federal courts.
The exception to the informal, episodic transmission of
information about the Act is the judicial council's role in the
process. Judicial council review of chief judge dismissals and
particularly of special committee reports has a side effect of
disseminating information about complaints. Judicial councils
comprise an average of fourteen judges, almost half of whom are
required to be district judges. The judicial council review process
disseminates information to at least those judges and, perhaps in an
anonymous form, to judges throughout the circuit.
One circuit's effort to disseminate information about the Act
warrants special attention. The circuit executive's staff prepared a
report categorizing and summarizing the complaints that had been
filed in the previous six months. The report tallied the types of
complainants, the disposition of the complaints, the extent of the
chief judge's inquiry, and the types of allegations. Examples of
corrective actions taken were presented in brief summaries.
Examples of characteristic charges were also summarized in
categories like "incompetence," "undue delay," and "lack of
demeanor/bias/prejudice." One apparent difficulty is that apart
from a few references to corrective actions, frivolous complaints are
intermingled with more serious charges. This may accurately
represent the mix of complaints, but communicates little to the
judges about the type of allegations that the chief judge took
seriously. Omitting complaints that were dismissed for frivolous-
ness might highlight matters that warrant attention.
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Some circuits also disseminate information in statistical form as
part of the Annual Report. Such a report may include a brief
description of the Act, the circuit's procedures, and a statistical
summary of the year's activity.221 Nationally, the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports on the administra-
tion of the Act on a regular basis. A typical report describes the
structure of the Act and presents statistics by circuit on the number
of filings, the nature of complaint allegations, and the actions taken
on those complaints.
222
Lawyers may become aware of the Act and a circuit's adminis-
tration of it through publicity, informal communications withjudges
or other lawyers, attendance at circuit judicial conferences, and
national or local reports. Regular practitioners in the federal courts
frequently have served as clerks to federal judges and may have
learned about the Act during their employment in the judicial
branch. Further dissemination occurs through service on federal
court rules committees which have a role in reviewing the Illustra-
tive Rules and updating them. The Act also comes to the attention
of practitioners when draft local rules are published for com-
ment223 and when final rules are distributed.
Most of the chief judges indicated in their interviews that
lawyers are aware of the opportunity to file complaints and to
discuss problem situations with the chief judge. In one circuit,
which has had few complaints of substance, the chief judge said,
"We haven't tried to publicize ... [the Act], nor should we." This
chief judge indicated that lawyers with serious complaints will find
and utilize the Act, while publicizing the Act will encourage litigants
to use the process in lieu of filing appeals. Given the high percent-
age of frivolous, merits-related complaints in all circuits, one might
reasonably hesitate at the prospect of encouraging more complaints.
Several chief judges indicated that lawyers are aware of the
process but are afraid to use it for fear of antagonizing the judiciary.
In interviews for another report to the Commission, lawyers from
the Public Integrity Section of the Department ofJustice expressed
misgivings about filing complaints. 224 Professor Todd Peterson
221 See, e.g., UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIr, 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT 25-26 (1991).
222 See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 115-18 (1991).
223 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1988) (providing that a rule "shall be prescribed only
after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment").
22S ee Todd D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and
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reported that "the attorneys were incredulous at the suggestion that
a Department attorney would risk souring relations between the
Department and a federal judge by making a complaint under the
1980 Act."225 The absence of complaints from federal attorneys
coincided with reports from the same interviewees that federal
judges sometimes exhibit signs of an "arrogant and arbitrary
exercise of authority" that includes "sexism and racism in the
treatment of attorneys." 226 Given the power and influence of the
Department of Justice, one can imagine that the average practitio-
ner would be at least as timid in risking their personal reputation or
that of their law firm.
In summary, most circuits report that dissemination to the
public, the bar, and the bench is episodic and generally responsive
to a specific need such as communicating a public reprimand,
amending local rules, or issuing an annual report. Whether there
is any purpose to be served by increased efforts to disseminate
information to the public or the bar appears questionable. It does
seem, however, that the most serious complaints have been filed by
public interest organizations, including members of the bar acting
through an organization. Encouraging bar groups to serve as filters
and conduits for serious complaints warrants careful consideration.
Dissemination of information to judges in circuits other than the
one named in the complaint has also been episodic and informal.
Relying on "tribal communications" invites errors in transmitting
the lessons of the most serious matters. Systematic attention to
corrective measures that have resulted from the complaint process
could only improve the benefits that flow from efforts to enforce
the Act by making it easier for judges to assess and modify their
own behavior.
There are potential benefits-such as facilitating the develop-
ment of a common law-that are likely to arise from greater
dissemination to the judiciary of information on the § 372(c)
process. If these benefits are considered significant, the Judicial
Conference of the United States might consider undertaking an
effort to analyze and disseminate information from public orders
now technically available under Rule 17 of the Illustrative Rules.
Greater dissemination of precedents under the Act will aid chief
judges and judicial councils in their decision-making and might
Removal of FederalJudges, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 38, at 243, 353.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 354.
150 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:25
reduce the number of "problem" dispositions. Protecting the
confidentiality and privacy interests of judges and complainants in
appropriate instances can be accomplished by sanitizing the orders
to delete identifying references. Orders submitted to the FJC
generally have been sanitized in this way.
Against the backdrop of this review of dissemination efforts, we
may now examine the benefits of the Act in relation to individual
complainants, the courts, and the public.
2. Benefits to Complainants
In Part I.C.2.a., it was reported that complainants received a
tangible benefit in more than three out of four matters in which
corrective action was cited as a reason for concluding the complaint
process. In most of these matters, the action took the form of a
ruling on a matter that had been the subject of a delay complaint,
an apology for an intemperate remark, or a correction of the
record. The summaries of corrective actions in Part I.C.2. supply
a number of examples. Whether such benefits give complainants
sufficient incentive to invoke the Act remains an open question.
It was also noted that a significant number of corrective actions
afforded no benefits to the complainants. Their complaints were
related to final decisions that could not be remedied easily. The
forward-looking nature of corrective actions, perhaps combined with
a named judge's unwillingness to concede wrongdoing in a
particular situation, can easily lead to a corrective action that does
not benefit the party who initiated the review. Whether the absence
of benefits in such matters will discourage potential complainants
from invoking the Act also remains an open question.
227
Nevertheless, drawing a rough composite of a typical complain-
ant may aid in discussing benefits to complainants. As Part I.C.
illustrated, most complainants appear to be dissatisfied litigants
attempting to obtain an alternative redress. Frequently, they seem
to be using the complaint process as a low-cost avenue to appeal.
Because the rate of success on appeal for pro se litigants is very low,
the prospect of an unsuccessful complaint may not deter the filing.
In interviews, court staff repeatedly acknowledged that their
227 These questions about incentives or disincentives to invoking the Act are
difficult to answer satisfactorily. Little is known about complainants and what they
seek. This research was not designed to address those issues.
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explanations of the complaint process and its exclusion of merits-
related matters did not deter litigants from filing such complaints.
The vast majority of these complainants are doomed to be
frustrated. To the extent that such complaints happen to illustrate
a pattern of delay, complainants may receive some satisfaction in
the form of a ruling. Their claims, however, are usually inextricably
bound up with the merits. Therefore, they are likely to be in-
formed, sometimes summarily, that the Act is simply not the proper
vehicle for their grievance. Complainants face the ironic situation
that because they seek the equivalent of an appeal, they are not in
the proper forum and their appellate-type issues go unaddressed.
Their complaints serve neither to evaluate judicial conduct nor to
review the record for potential error. These complaints seem
misplaced from the perspective of both the complainants and the
courts.
The only benefit these complainants receive is the opportunity
to articulate a complaint about a trial judge's action and to get a
response. These responses are generally accompanied with narrow,
statutory reasons for the decision. At least for a moment, the
complainant has captured the attention of the chief judge of the
circuit. This marginal benefit is at the expense of imposing a
burden on the chief judge and the court's staff (and, in some
instances, the judicial council of the circuit), forcing them to review
hosts of complaints directly related to the merits. By itself, the
benefit to individual litigants who seek to bypass the appeals process
does not seem to justify the burden the Act imposes on the courts.
Less typical but more successful complainants include public
interest groups of both "liberal" and "conservative" orientations.
Their motives and goals extend beyond the outcome of a given
complaint and perhaps even the redress of a specific grievance.
Issues selected by these groups are traditionally less likely to be tied
to the merits of specific litigation even when the subject of the
complaint arises from litigation. "Liberal" groups, for example,
have filed complaints when a judge has reportedly made public
statements that stereotype or otherwise disparage a group based on
race, gender, sexual preference, or the equivalent.22 8 "Conserva-
228 See, e.g., supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-7) (referring to complaints by
public-interest organizations in response to a judge's statement that a female
defendant must have been using drugs to have lived in a predominantly black city
with her male companion); supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-13) (describing
complaints about ajudge who ordered a female attorney to use her married name in
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ive" groups have singled outjudges who appear to have engaged in
partisan speech or partisan activity that conflicts with the ideology
of the complaining group. 2 29  These complaints resemble test-
case litigation and seem designed and motivated, at least in part, to
make an example of the named judge in order to deter similar
conduct. Generally, they have resulted in corrective actions.
Complaints filed by public interest groups appear to reflect
mixed motives. On the one hand, these groups seem to seek an
official pronouncement that their political or ideological perspective
is supported by restraints onjudicial conduct. Sometimes, however,
in reading the complaints and petitions for review, one detects a
punitive purpose, one that cannot be satisfied by an acknowledg-
ment of improper conduct and a promise to correct it in the future.
In some matters, public-interest groups file petitions for review that
challenge the corrective action and make plain their desire for a
clear finding of misconduct and a public reprimand.
The complaint process seems ill-suited to the more punitive
demands of public-interest complainants. By emphasizing prospec-
tive corrective action as opposed to retrospective punishment, the
Act seems destined to frustrate some public-interest court watchers.
Judges perceive the corrective processes of the Act as designed to
educate, not punish. Voluntary corrective action partakes of
understanding and compromise, not rigid judgments of guilt or
innocence.
Does the above discussion indicate that the Act is ill-suited to a
test-case approach? We see no basic incompatibility between the
goals of specifically deterring misconduct (that is, specific to a single
judge) and correcting examples of misconduct in a forward looking
manner. The educational effects sought through the corrective
action mechanism are deterrent effects by another name. Dissemi-
nation of outcomes is likely to promote general education of the
bench and deterrence simultaneously. As presently administered in
some courts, concerns for confidentiality inhibit the ability to
provide these benefits. In other courts, a different balance has been
proceedings before him). For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see generally
supra part I.C.2.
229 See, e.g., supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing cases CA-5 & CA-6); supra part I.C.2.d.
(discussing cases CA-17 and CA-18) (concerning complaints against judges who,
respectively, publicly advocated a partisan political position on a highly contested
local issue, solicited lawyers to join a national bar group, praised at sentencing the
political movement associated with the defendants' activities, and had an ex parte
contact with a public official who was a defendant in a civil rights complaint).
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struck between confidentiality and dissemination, and arguably it is
in those courts that corrective actions and reprimands have
widespread educational effects for other judges.
In summary, the Act has provided limited benefits for both
litigant and public-interest complainants. To the extent that the
latter seek to extend the educational effects of the Act to other
judges, the system seems capable of responding to their interests.
To the extent that the complainants seek punitive actions against
judges for misconduct that falls short of "high crimes and misde-
meanors," their goals extend beyond the limits of what can
reasonably be expected of a self-regulatory mechanism designed to
address the conduct of judges appointed for life.
3. Benefits to the Courts and the Public
As was observed in Part I.E., the Act supports informal commu-
nications between the chief judge and other judges about issues of
conduct. One chief judge asserted: "The statute gives you an
entree you wouldn't otherwise have, when you start to poke into a
judge's personal business. I guess you could have done that
before-the chief judges did it before 1980-but now it's easier
because the Act is there." The increased communication facilitates
the use of informal actions for many of the serious cases involving
judicial conduct and disability. It probably cannot be known to
what extent these informal activities would have taken place without
the Act. Experienced chief judges' statements that the Act has
facilitated thejudiciary's regulation of the conduct ofjudges should
be acknowledged. These benefits are linked to the presence of the
Act, the structure established for review, the empowerment of the
chief judge and the judicial councils, and the balance struck
between accountability and judicial independence under the Act.
In considering changes in the Act, these strengths should be
recognized and any changes should avoid radically altering the
balance.
A major benefit to both the public and the judiciary is that the
Act presents a system of judicial accountability.23 0 One expects
such a system to benefit the courts by rendering the power and
authority of federal judges more acceptable to the public. Judicial
orders are more likely to be respected and followed when judicial
institutions generate respect. Without accountability, the aberra-
23 See infra part II.B.2.
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tional actions of a few judges contaminate the reputation of all. In
the plain words of one chief judge: "If the boat is leaky, you're on
it." Another expressed similar sentiments equally tersely: "No one
wants to serve with crooks."
23 1
In addition to the benefits explored above, important adminis-
trative benefits also arise as a byproduct of the Act's implementa-
tion. For example, the § 372(c) process of examining the record in
the underlying litigation often reveals defective record keeping
procedures. One circuit executive summarized this benefit:
Sometimes our phone calls inquiring about the record have
identified glitches that have been corrected. For example, in one
matter a litigant complained that he had filed a notice of appeal
in a timely manner only to have it rejected because the clerk's
office had not yet entered a final judgment.
As a result of the inquiry, the internal issue of the clerk's timing in
entering final orders came to the circuit executive's attention and
the clerk remedied the practice. Because a clerk's practices are not
covered by the Act, the complaint may be dismissed. Nevertheless,
the information received in the process enabled the circuit executive
and hence the court to correct the matter to the benefit of all.
232
4. Benefits to the Legislative Branch
a. Referrals
Congress often receives complaints about the conduct of federal
judges. The Act creates a mechanism that allows courts to address
these complaints in the first instance. A chiefjudge who was active
in the discussions leading to adoption of the Act recalled that "it all
started because Congress was getting complaints from constituents
251 Cf. Warren S. Grimes, The Role of the U.S. House of Representatives in the
Proceedings to Impeach and Remove FederalJudges, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 38,
at 39, 75 (quotingJudge Charles Wiggins' testimony thatJudge Claiborne's conduct
"embarrassed" him and brought "into disrepute the judiciary as a whole").
232 Another example of derivative administrative benefits cited by clerks or circuit
executives included the discovery that a deputy clerk had crossed out an entry on a
docket sheet. The chiefjudge or circuit executive brought the impropriety of that
procedure to the clerk's attention.
The review benefit should not, however, be overstated. One would expect that
only glaring errors will be detected through this process. A manager could easily
establish an equivalent system by randomly selecting cases from the court's docket
and carefully reviewing the record keeping, looking directly for important features.
In administering the Act, the review serves multiple purposes. The examination of
practices is only tangential to the main purpose.
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and had nothing to do with them. Now Congress can tell constitu-
ents 'there's a system, go through that.'"
In an appendix to Warren Grimes's report to the Commission,
Peter Hutt documented that members of the House of Representa-
tives, primarily the chairs of the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Subcommittee on the Courts, received 56 complaints during the
Ninety-eighth Congress (1983-84) and 125 complaints during the
100th Congress (1987-88).23s In his judgment, the vast majority
(94%) did not raise "a genuine issue pertinent to judicial disci-
pline."
234
The Act provides a suitable mechanism for screening the
complaints and responding to those that appear to raise a genuine
or arguable claim ofjudicial misconduct. As Mr. Hutt recommends,
the relevant committee "should forward these complaints to the
appropriate judicial councils, which were established precisely to
undertake such investigations." 2 5 This should be done because
the House Subcommittee on Courts is "not well equipped to
undertake such investigations."2 36 Public filing of chief judge and
judicial council orders with the clerk of the court in the circuit or
national court and with the Federal Judicial Center affords an
opportunity for the congressional committee to monitor the
outcome of the referral.
The presence of the Act and the structure for enforcing it
permits Congress to refer complaints to the chief judge and the
judicial councils and expect that those complaints will be handled
promptly and fairly. The process enables Congress to respond to
each complaint with an appropriate referral and to select those
complaints that warrant continuing attention or monitoring. If
consideration of impeachment is warranted, the committee can
await the outcome of the judicial branch process and use the
product of thejudiciary's investigation as a starting point for its own
processes.
233 Peter B. Hutt, Complaints Aboufqudges Received by Congress: What the Complaints
Allege and How Congress Responds, reprinted in Grimes, supra note 231, app. C, at 99.
234 Id. exhibits 2-3.
215 Id. at 106.
236 Id.
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b. Impeachment Investigation
Proceedings under the Act may benefit Congress by providing
it with the fruits of the judiciary's investigation. In the Alcee
Hastings impeachment, the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit
conducted a lengthy investigation. The special committee held forty
days of hearings and issued a four-volume report that was 381 pages
long, accompanied by a two-volume appendix of exhibits. In
addressing the bribery count in the § 372(c) complaint, the special
committee produced evidence that was based on a painstaking,
detailed investigation. For example, they reviewed the records of
a bankrupt telephone company and old airline travel records. The
committee report recommended that the council take no action on
five other counts of the complaint. In contrast, the House held nine
days of hearings over a two year period. 23 7 Presumably, the
recommendations in the report served to guide the House in
preparing, evaluating, and trying the charges.
Judicial branch investigations under the Act provide the
immediate benefit of relieving pressure on the House to engage in
initial investigations and fact-finding hearings regarding specific
complaints, a process that is outside of the House's normal course
of operation. 23 8 Historically, the House has conducted its own
impeachment investigations. However, in recent years this practice
has generally ceased. Professor Warren Grimes concluded that "the
existence of a workable internal discipline system will remove the
need for many House impeachment investigations of non-criminal
behavior."
23 9
c. Certifying Questions to the House
In the Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon impeachments, the Act
provided a path for the judicial councils of the respective circuits to
forward their certification of possible grounds for impeachment to
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. and for that body to certify such
grounds to the House of. Representatives. In the Claiborne and
Nixon proceedings, the criminal convictions and files amassed by
the Department of Justice provided the major sources of informa-
tion for the House managers.
2 40
27 See Grimes, supra note 231, at 52.
238 For a comparison of the demands of an adjudicatory-type hearing with the
more traditional congressional oversight and legislative hearings, see id. at 56-57.
239 Id. at 73.
240 See id. at 54 (stating that, in the Nixon, Claiborne, and Hastings matters, "the
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In the Claiborne and Nixon matters, however, the Act had
additional potentially beneficial effects. The process of considering
and certifying the question of whether an Article IIIjudge may have
engaged in conduct "which might constitute one or more grounds
for impeachment under Article II of the Constitution"241 had the
effect of placing the judiciary on record regarding those two
matters. In implementing the § 372(c) process, both the judicial
council of the circuit and the Judicial Conference of the United
States have an opportunity to review the matter and determine
whether a particular prosecution and proposed impeachment might
adversely affect the independence of the judiciary or for some other
reason might be contrary to the interests of justice. This provides
the judiciary with a further check on both the prosecutorial
functions and the impeachment process.
The opportunity to act officially on questions of impeachment
that arise from criminal prosecutions can be burdensome for the
judiciary. Because action by the judiciary in certifying a question of
impeachment to the House will be seen as approving the impeach-
ment investigation in the matter at hand, each matter requires
consideration commensurate with the seriousness of the conse-
quences. In the case of a conviction that has been affirmed on
appeal, the pressure to act promptly can impose a considerable
strain on the process. In the Claiborne matter, for example, the
public demanded prompt action because the judge had been
sentenced and imprisoned while still drawing a salary and retaining
his position as federal district judge. Under extreme pressure to
resolve the matter promptly, investigating charges of prosecutorial
misconduct 242 may have been beyond the resources available to
the four district and five circuit judges on the Judicial Council of
the Ninth Circuit.
Judicial review of a conviction and certification of an issue for
consideration of impeachment aids the legislative branch in moving
House's primary investigatory task consisted of gathering and analyzing the full
record... from prior proceedings").
241 § 372(c)(7)(B)(i).
242 The Supreme Court of Nevada later assessed such claims in a 78-page opinion
dealing with Claiborne's status as a member of the Nevada bar. The court concluded
that "[q]uestionable investigative and prosecutorial motivations, as well as anomalous
and arguably unfair practices and procedures, pervade the record of this matter from
its inception," declined to "impose additional punishment upon respondent Claiborne
by way of professional discipline," and dismissed the disciplinary proceedings against
him. State Bar v. Claiborne, 756 P.2d 464, 540-41 (Nev. 1988).
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forward with a controversial impeachment. Having the official
support of the judicial branch assures Congress that there will be no
official judicial challenge to follow. Conversely, judicial refusal to
certify a question that the House wishes to consider clearly
demarcates the lines of conflict.
5. Benefits to the Executive Branch
a. Referrals
The Act may also benefit the executive branch by providing the
option of referring to the judiciary matters not deemed to warrant
criminal prosecution, thereby relieving the pressure to criminalize
matters ofjudicial ethics and misconduct. The field study disclosed
a handful of instances in which the Department of Justice referred
a matter to the chief judge of a circuit, either through a complaint
under the Act or informally, after the Department or a grand jury
decided not to pursue criminal charges against a judge. According
to one interviewee at the Public Integrity Section of the Department
of Justice, such referrals occur approximately once or twice a
year.
243
Two matters illustrate the benefits (and burdens) of the referral
process. One formal complaint involved an uncorroborated
allegation by an informant that a magistrate judge had intervened
with a district judge on behalf of a defendant. A special committee
investigated the complaint thoroughly before finding a lack of
credible evidence to support the allegation and a plausible reason
for the informant's mistaken impression. Another matter dealt with
an allegation of misconduct by a bankruptcyjudge. The chiefjudge
appointed an informal committee to review grandjury materials and
decide whether to file a complaint under the Act. Obtaining the
grand jury materials required litigation and a court order. This
matter was pending at the time of the field study.
In both instances the executive branch was able to save its scarce
prosecutorial resources. Whether the correlative burden onjudicial
resources is justified raises another question. It seems important to
note that both matters involved situations in which the prosecutor
had decided not to pursue criminal charges. On this point, one
chief judge said: "Just because you're not indicted doesn't mean
you should be ajudge."
243 See Peterson, supra note 224, at 352-53.
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In the matter of the alleged intervention to "fix" a case, the lack
of credible evidence precluded a prosecution. At the same time, if
the informant's story had a patina of truth-that the magistrate
judge somehow gave the informant the impression that the case had
been "fixed-the referral could have benefitted both the executive
and the judicial branches. A judicial investigation might teach
judges how to avoid the impression of improper intervention.
In situations involving criminal behavior, referral to the judicial
branch could be a misallocation of resources. The executive branch
seems best suited to resolve questions of criminal conduct. Indeed,
referral of criminal misconduct matters by chief judges to prosecu-
tors seems more apt. The borderline may be vague in the abstract
but clear in a given factual context. In any case, referrals give chief
judges the flexibility to decide whether to proceed.
b. As Complainants
At the very least, the Act affords executive branch attorneys and
officials an opportunity to raise complaints of judicial misconduct.
As frequent litigators in the federal courts, executive branch
attorneys often might be expected to be aware of patterns ofjudicial
misconduct and disability, and thus might be an expected source of
meritorious complaints. In practice, however, this benefit may not
have been fully realized. Professor Peterson found that attorneys in
the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice were
reluctant to file complaints against federal judges. These attorneys
expressed fear of harming the Department's relationship with
federal judges.
244
B. What Negative Effects Has the Administration of the Act
Imposed on the Courts?
1. Introduction
The previous subsection presented a discussion of the advanta-
geous effects of the Act for all participants and potential beneficia-
ries. The research done here and other research submitted to the
Commission made it relatively easy to identify benefits to complain-
ants and the executive and legislative branches of government.
However, identifying the burdens of the process on individuals and
244 See id. at 353.
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institutions outside the judicial branch, and on the executive and
legislative branches of government, exceeds the .scope of available
data. Therefore, this subsection's concentration is limited to the
negative effects that the complaint process may have on judges,
court staff, and the judicial branch as a whole.
In Part I.B., the burdens that routine administration of the Act
imposes on chief judges was assessed. It was argued that current
chief judges did not think that routine administration of the Act
imposed an undue burden on their time. In this section, however,
the burdens are documented in more detail to include the routine
burdens on the judicial council of the circuit and on the staff of the
court. Finally, this section examines the extraordinary hardships
that special committees and impeachment issues have generated for




Current chief judges are more likely than their predecessors to
delegate the time-consuming tasks of reviewing the record and
drafting an order responding to each allegation in the complaint.
Yet, even those current and former chiefjudges who delegated little
or none of the drafting did not report a major burden. The chief
judge of a circuit with an average number of complaints estimated
reviewing one complaint a week. The judge spent approximately a
half hour reading the complaint and dictating a brief, but not
standardized, order. Another chief judge spends "no more than an
hour to review a complaint in the first instance. It takes more time
if you have to inquire into it, less time if it's clear what the
complainant is saying."
246
Chiefjudges, of course, spend more time on other aspects of the
process. In the early years of the Act's operation, drafting local
rules and establishing an internal structure for handling complaints,
appointing special committees, and managing confidentiality
245 For additional discussion of the burdens imposed on chiefjudges, see supra
part I.A.5.
246 Assuming a one hour norm for a chief judge's review of a complaint and
applying this figure to the 1990 and 1991 AO data on filings, see infra app., tbl. A-1,
we estimate that approximately 300 chiefjudge hours per year were spent on the
review portion of the process, an average of about twenty-five hours per chiefjudge
per year.
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consumed the time of policy makers such as the chiefjudge, judicial
council members, clerks, and circuit executives. For example, one
chiefjudge experimented with appointing ad hoc informal screening
committees, usually composed of a district judge and a court of
appeals judge, to inquire into the merits of complaints that seemed
to have some substance. This judge concluded that the practice was
not worth the drain on court resources. Devising and testing this
experimental approach, however, illustrates the burden that
implementing new systems may impose on the courts. A former
chiefjudge described a major burden in "figuring out the forms and
procedures, including inter-office procedures, chiefjudge meetings,
and many things for the Judicial Conference of the U.S., including
work on the impeachment matters."
Now that practices have become more standard in the circuits,
the time spent on creating and changing the process seems to have
lessened. Amendments to local rules remain an intermittent and
apparently manageable task.
b. Judicial Councils
Similar to the routine review of complaints by chief judges,
judicial council review of petitions tends to be seen by chiefjudges
as a process that "takes some time" but is "not a substantial
burden." Generally, a chiefjudge will have served as a member of
the circuit's judicial council before becoming chief judge and will
have seen the process from the perspective of a council member.
The typical process2 47 for judicial council review is for the
clerk or circuit executive to compile a file consisting of at least the
complaint, the chief judge's order, and the petition for review. In
addition, in some situations, the file might include a response from
the named judge, relevant portions of the record in the underlying
litigation, and a memorandum from a staff attorney. This file is
copied and distributed to all members of the council together with
a ballot form that lists all the options. Unless one or two members
of the council (the number varies by circuit) request discussion at
a council meeting by checking a box and returning the ballot by
mail, the ballots determine the outcome. Generally, mail ballots
determine the matter unanimously. Sometimes, but rarely, the
matter will be set for discussion by the council. For example, in a
247 For a more detailed discussion of judidal council reviews, see supra part
I.C.l.e.
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circuit with an average number of petitions for review, the chief
judge could recall only one that had been placed on the discussion
agenda of the judicial council. As seen in Part I, the field study
revealed only two occasions when the judicial council voted to reject
the chief judge's order dismissing a complaint without special
committee investigation.248 Moreover, the judicial council has
undertaken further factual inquiry several times before affirming a
chief judge's dismissal of a complaint.
249
Dealing with meritless complaints sparks a more intense feeling
or perception of burden than does the experience of sitting on a
special committee or reviewing a special committee report. As one
judge described a time-consuming special committee matter, "that
was a legitimate complaint, so it was okay." In contrast, judicial
council review tended to be seen as "a nuisance." One chief judge
reported spending about an hour reviewing each petition. His
assessment was that "it's not that burdensome, but it's an hour on
something meritless."
2 50
As the above comments suggest, review by the full judicial
council may be an unnecessary burden. The primary reasons for
having some form of review are, in the words of a chief judge,
because "the chief could exercise poor judgment" and because "the
review process conveys a greater sense of fairness." Serving these
functions, however, may not require review by an average of
fourteen judges per circuit. In only two matters in the field study
did the judicial council alter the chief judge's action. The vast
majority of the petitions reviewed resulted in unanimous affirmance
of the chief judge's order without discussion. A marginal benefit
can be found in those two cases, as well as from the exposure of
other judges on the judicial council to the substance of complaints
filed and of chief judge actions. But these benefits are truly
marginal.
248 See supra part I.C.l.e.
249 See supra part I.C.l.e.
250 Documenting the burden onjudicial council members entails multiplying the
burden of each petition for review by the number of members on thejudicial council
and the number of petitions within each circuit. In Part I it was estimated that at
least 662 complaints involved a petition for review, amounting to approximately five
per circuit per year. See supra part I.C.1.e. As for the number ofjudges on judicial
councils as of December, 1992, the sizes of the twelve circuit councils ranged from
nine to twenty-one judges, with a median size of thirteen and an average size of
fourteen judges, including the chiefjudge. The average size of the councils in the
eight circuits in the field study was 13.75.
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Because petitions almost always involve dismissed complaints (a
few might involve corrective action or mootness issues), the benefit
of exposing council members to the complaints is minimal; indeed
looking at only dismissed complaints or special committee matters
may give judges on the council a distorted view of the process.
Such an effect is especially likely to occur in a circuit in which the
chief judge uses the corrective action mechanism regularly.251 By
looking primarily at dismissals and special committee matters,
council members may become insufficiently aware of complaints
that fall between the extremes of warranting dismissal or full-scale
investigation.
As noted, a key benefit of judicial council review is that the
actions of the chiefjudge are subject to a second look by peers who
were not involved in the initial decision. The same benefit-or even
a greater benefit-could probably be attained, however, by having a
standing or rotating three-judge panel review the dismissal orders,
much as a court of appeals finds panel review sufficient for most
appeals. With responsibility focused upon a small number of
judges, the panel might take the responsibility more seriously than
if it were diffused among thirteen or fifteen members of ajudicial
council. In keeping with recent statutory changes augmenting the
representation of district judges on the judicial councils, the




Administration of the Act commands considerable resources to
support the chief judge and the judicial council and to keep their
burdens to a minimum. A full range of staff from the court
infrastructure delivers supporting services. These services range
from screening complaints for form, docketing them, checking the
record in underlying cases and related complaints, researching legal
issues, drafting memoranda of alternative actions, drafting orders
with reasons for decision, investigating factual allegations, identify-
ing witnesses, staffing special committees, arranging for hearings,
251 None of the circuits studied appear to have any procedure to bring corrective
actions to the council's attention.
252 For a more detailed discussion, see infra part IMl.D. (suggestion 9).
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and perhaps even drafting portions of special committee re-
ports.
25 3
These tasks demand experienced staff who can be trusted to
handle confidential matters with sensitivity. Employees who carry
out these functions range from clerical staff in the clerk or circuit
executive's office (at levels of JS-7 to _10)254 to circuit executives
themselves (senior executive level).255  No special funding is
provided for the portion of these positions devoted to administra-
tion of the Act. In all of the circuits, assigned staff devote part of
their time to administration of the Act in addition to their other
duties. To protect the confidentiality of the proceedings, clerical
support and legal work are generally limited to one or two individu-
als.
For purposes of detailing the administrative burdens, it is
difficult to identify a typical circuit. Each circuit divides the labor
uniquely to conform to its administrative structure. In a circuit that
allocated a large amount of its resources to the process, an attorney
at a JS-14 level devoted about two-thirds of the time to judicial
discipline matters. In that circuit, the circuit executive spent about
10% of full-time on the Act, and that a secretary in the circuit
executive's office spent an unspecified but substantial amount of
time. A secretary in the clerk's office spent 5 to 10% of full-time,
and the chief deputy clerk spent 1%.256
3. Special Committee Matters
The major burden of administering the Act for the chief judge,
the judicial council, and the circuit's staff relates to the appoint-
ment, leadership, and support of special committees. These
committees investigate allegations that were not dismissed or
concluded on a finding of corrective action or intervening events.
For the most part, chief judges did not describe their activity on
25 See supra part I.A.
254 The salary grade "JS" is the federal judicial branch's equivalent to the "GS"
grade used in the executive branch.
25 Also carrying on these functions are law clerks or staff attorneys (JS-12 to -15),
chief deputy clerks or assistant circuit executives (JS-14 or -15), and clerks of court (JS-
16 to -18).
256 A circuit in the mid-range on the burden spectrum devoted 20% of full-time
of a chief deputy clerk and a secretary, 15% of full-time of a staff attorney or
administrative law clerk, and a negligible amount of the circuit executive's time to the
Act. At the low end of the burden range, a clerk and secretary spent less than 1% of
full-time on the process, and a law clerk spent about the same proportion of time.
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these special committees as a burden, but rather as a necessary part
of their duties.
Interviews with chief judges and supporting staff in the eight
sampled circuits revealed that the burdens of special committee
proceedings have varied very widely from circuit to circuit from
1980 to 1992. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the
number of special committee matters in these circuits has varied
widely as well. 257 Three of the eight circuits sampled have had
only one special committee proceeding each, and a fourth circuit
has had only two. In the other four circuits, by contrast, two have
had four proceedings each, and the other two circuits have had six
proceedings each.
In seven of the circuits, special committee proceedings were
deemed to have imposed either a minor or a substantial burden on
judges' time. In the remaining circuit, by contrast, the chief judge
portrayed the burden as formidable. This reflected that particular
circuit's unique experience under the Act. The circuit not only has
had six special committee matters, but also has had the most
serious, high-profile and time-consuming proceeding in any of the
eight circuits. This proceeding ultimately led to the impeachment
and removal of the judge complained against.
The chief judge estimated that this major special committee
proceeding
took at least 2,500 hours of my time. It took literally over a year
of my judicial life. There were 60-hour weeks with nothing but
that case. [This judge wrote the special committee's report]. As
for the other judges on the special committee, it took at least 700
to 800 hours of the time of each of them and one or more may
have spent as much time as I did. I'd guess that the members of
the judicial council not on the special committee spent between 30
and 80 hours each considering and reviewing the matter. Also,
there was a lot of post-judicial council stuff to do in that case, I
haven't included that, for example, counsel for the House of
Representatives needed to talk to the investigator, etc.
27 This is not to say that there is a precise correlation between the number of
special committee matters addressed and the burden incurred. In fact, while one
former chief judge, whose circuit had four special committee matters, said that
"special committees are too infrequent to impose a real burden," another chiefjudge,
whose circuit has had only one special committee proceeding, stated that that
proceeding consumed "a lot of time,... [and] did have a negative effect on doing the
work of the court."
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The field study did not reveal any other special committee matters
that required anywhere near this amount of judicial resources.
258
This chief judge reported personally spending approximately
3450 to 3700 hours-virtually two full years of work-on three special
committee matters. This could hardly present a more stark contrast
from those circuits where special committee proceedings were
described as "too infrequent to impose a real burden."
The study did not reveal anything in this circuit's special
committee procedures that differed dramatically from other circuits'
procedures, and that might be expected to require a greater
expenditure ofjudge time. On the contrary, this circuit made more
frequent use of outside attorney/investigators than any other
circuit, which might have been expected to help reduce the judges'
time commitment. Apparently, this circuit has simply been cursed
by happenstance with unusually difficult complaints that required
very burdensome investigations.
2 59
Special committee proceedings have imposed other costs on the
courts, besides the investment of judge time. There is the time
spent by court staff; the funds expended for outside attorney
investigators and for reimbursement of attorneys' fees paid by
judges who were the subjects of complaints; and occasional special
administrative expenses for hearing facilities.
In all of the circuits for which information was available, the
circuit executives and their staff expended a significant amount of
time assisting the special committees. In general, interviews with
court staff revealed that the burdens of special committee proceed-
ings for staff were proportionate with the burdens of those same
proceedings for judges serving on the committees.
260
258 This chiefjudge also wrote the special committee's report for two other less
burdensome special committee proceedings. He estimated his time spent at 750 to
1000 hours on one, a sum which itself dwarfs any estimate from any other chief
judge. On the other matter, this chiefjudge estimates that he spent about 200 hours.
Three of the six special committee matters in this circuit arose within a
relatively short period of time against the same judge. Another was a complicated
matter filed by an attorney who skillfully pieced together plausible, but at bottom
unfounded, allegations. Moreover, the one major investigation involved a unique set
of circumstances-allegations of bribery leveled against a judge who had been
acquitted of the same charges in a criminal proceeding-that required intensive, full-
scale investigation and hearings.
260 For three of the eight circuits, the study revealed no information about the
amount of staff time expended in connection with special committee matters. In each
of these circuits, the only special committees ever convened-one in two of the
circuits, two in the other-were convened before the tenure of the staff members that
were interviewed.
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Because of gaps in the data about staff time expended, the
relative burdens borne by judges and by staff in the various circuits
cannot be compared with any certainty. The data that was obtained,
however, does not seem to point to any relative diminution ofjudge
time as staff time increases. Instead, the data suggests that as staff
time increases, judge time increases in similar proportions. These
circuits' delegation practices in special committee proceedings do
not appear to differ radically from each other. Judges and staff
simply play different roles, each role producing its own burdens.
The sums paid to outside attorney investigators in a number of
special committee matters are another significant cost of the
process. According to information provided by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, outside investigators had been
paid by the judiciary in eleven matters as of January 1, 1993.261
The total sum paid to these investigators was $1,066,211. Most of
this sum was paid to the investigator in the one mammoth special
committee proceeding mentioned above. This investigator
apparently devoted several years of work to the task.
Another cost of the process is reimbursement for the attorneys'
fees paid by judges who were the subjects of complaints. The 1990
amendments to the Act explicitly empower the judicial council to
In one circuit, only one of the circuit's four special committees took place within
the memory of the circuit executive. The circuit executive reported that an outside
attorney investigator was used in this matter and that the circuit executive's office did
not play a substantive role, but it did play a procedural and organizational role.
Although the circuit executive did not specifically estimate the amount of time spent
by his office on the matter, the lack of a substantive role would suggest that it was not
huge. The clerk's office's personnel were essentially not involved.
The circuit executive of another circuit reported that the total time spent by the
circuit executive on one recent special committee matter was approximately two days.
This circuit executive did not estimate time spent on any of the circuit's other special
committee matters, except to note that the amount of circuit executive involvement
varies considerably with the preferences of the chair of the special committee.
In a circuit which has had only one special committee, the circuit executive
estimated that he spent three to four weeks of his time on the matter over the course
of almost a year. A staff attorney in that circuit, who is generally responsible for
§ 372(c) matters, estimated having spent approximately three months on the matter.
In the remaining circuit-the one that reported massive expenditures ofjudge
time on special committees-the circuit executive estimated an expenditure of eighty
to one hundred hours on the largest matter, and gave no estimate for other special
committee proceedings. The clerk of the court of appeals, who was the courtroom
deputy for special committee hearings, estimated spending 560 hours on the largest
matter, and 165 hours and fifty-five hours, respectively, on the next two most serious
matters.
261 Telephone Interview with Jean Coates, Office of the General Counsel,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Feb. 1993).
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recommend that a judge be reimbursed for attorneys' fees where,
after a special committee investigation, the complaint has been
finally dismissed under § 372(c)(6)(C). The Act now states:
Upon the request of a judge or magistrate whose conduct is the
subject of a complaint under this subsection, the judicial council
may, if the complaint has been finally dismissed under paragraph
(6)(C), recommend that the Director of the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts award reimbursement, from funds appropriated
to the Federal judiciary, for those reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, incurred by that judge or magistrate during the
investigation which would not have been incurred but for the
requirements of this subsection.
262
The Illustrative Rules have been modified so that Illustrative Rule
14(h) now incorporates this provision.
2 68
Even before the 1990 statutory amendments, the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts construed applicable statutes to permit
reimbursement forjudges' attorneys' fees upon recommendation of
the judicial council.2 6 Pursuant to that interpretation, five judges
were reimbursed by the Administrative Office for their attorneys'
fees.265 According to the Administrative Office, the total sum
paid for these five judges' attorneys' fees was $168,635.266
It is interesting to note that in only two of these five instances-
involving payment of approximately $26,000 in judges' attorneys'
fees-was the complaint ultimately dismissed by the judicial council
following a special committee investigation and report. The other
three matters, in which a total of approximately $143,000 was paid,
resulted in one corrective action, one private reprimand, and one
sanction that combined a private reprimand with corrective
actions. 267 Thus, under the new statutory provision, reimburse-




2 63 See ILLUSTRATwE RULES, supra note 7.
264 See id. Rule 14 commentary at 36 (redlined version of 1986 rules).
265 Telephone Interview with Jean Coates, supra note 261.
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 Furthermore, in interviews during the field study, staffin one circuit noted the
need for special expenditures on the courtroom space that a special committee used
for extensive hearings in one proceeding. Since the special committee conducted
hearings on weekends as well as on workdays, it cost about $10,000 each weekend to
heat or cool the space where the hearings were held.
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The data was not extensive enough to permit a precise aggrega-
tion and averaging of the costs of special committee proceedings in
the eight sampled circuits. It can only be reported with certainty
that these costs, although varying widely from circuit to circuit, are,
on the whole, substantial.
It is possible, however, to arrive at a base total for the expendi-
ture of judge time by adding up the chief judges' numerical
estimates of judge time spent on special committee matters. Such
specific estimates were given for only five of the twenty-five special
committees convened in these eight circuits; no judge time
estimates for any of the other twenty special committees have been
added to this figure. The one exceptional matter can be treated as
an outlier. It consumed an estimated 6270 hours of judge time,
including judicial council review. The remaining four matters
commanded an estimated 2070 hours of judge time. This estimate
represents a conservative minimum that was spent on special
committee matters in the eight circuits studied.
Since this figure of 2070 hours omits twenty of the twenty-five
special committees, the actual total is certainly higher. On the other
hand, since this figure reflects relatively serious matters and since
nine of the twenty uncounted matters were dismissed without
hearings, the actual total is certainly nowhere near five times higher
than the data suggests. One can only speculate as to the appropri-
ate multiplier of the base figure of 2070 hours, which represents an
average of twenty-five hours per circuit per year during the life of
the Act.
2 69
4. Other Administrative Burdens
a. Vexatious Complainants
Another source of burden for the courts arises in the form of
the complainant who files repetitious, multiple complaints. The
burden on routine administration of the process has already been
accounted for in the above discussion. AO data collected since
February 1984 indicate that 597 (29%) of 2061 complaints were filed
by complainants who had previously filed.270 Because the identity
269 A similar calculation of the base total hours of staff time spent on special
committees was not attempted due to the inconclusive nature of the data.
270 This figure was extracted directly from a data base compiled by the FJC using
AO records. See infra app.
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of the complainant is not reported to the AO, there is no way of
knowing how many complaints were filed by the same complainants.
One circuit executive described the problem of repeat complain-
ants, and the circuit's resolution, this way:
In one case, a pro se litigant filed numerous frivolous and
repetitious complaints over a period of years. The complaints
were snowballing to include complaints about handling the
complaints, threatening to lead to the recusal of the entire circuit's
judges. [The council] ... voted to hold the complaints in a
separate file, available for public inspection and not to circulate or
process them as complaints if the chief judge finds them to be
repetitious or outside the ambit of [§] 372(c).
Only two of the eight circuits reported that they had taken no
action about vexatious complainants. Two circuits reported issuing
judicial council orders against an individual, prohibiting the filing
of multiple, repetitious complaints. One other circuit was consider-
ing such an order against an individual and two other circuits had
issued orders banning an individual from refiling the same
complaint against the samejudge. Another circuit issued a warning
against further repetitious filings by a given complainant, which
successfully deterred that individual.
On the basis of the above discussion, it cannot be said that the
vexatious complainant creates an additional burden by filing
multiple complaints. Actions taken byjudicial councils stemmed the
burden. Such complaints are included in statistical tables and there
is no indication that each takes more or less time than a typical
complaint. As discussed in the following section, the burdens arise
when a circuit is forced to create special procedures to deal with the
problem.
b. Recusal Issues
When a vexatious complainant names all of the judges who are
eligible to act as chiefjudge or when a complainant names so many
judges that the judicial council of the circuit is unable to muster a
quorum to vote on a petition for review, problems follow. Illustra-
tive Rule 18(b) states a rigid recusal policy: "Ajudge whose conduct
is the subject of a complaint will be disqualified from participating
in any consideration of the complaint . ... "271 The commentary
states that the Rules' drafters considered a number of options and
271 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
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decided that "the appearance of justice is best served by adherence
to traditional principles that matters should be decided by disinter-
ested judges."
272
Only one of the eight circuits in the field study reported that it
had experienced no problems of this sort. Three circuits reported
recusal problems that required them to resort to the intercircuit
assignment system. Three other circuits faced situations in which
they had only one judge available to act as chief judge and to
conduct the initial review of a complaint. In two of those situations,
the complainant had named all of the circuit judges but a new
appointee was confirmed in the interim and thatjudge acted on the
complaint. The other circuit reported a quorum problem, but in
the end it was able to gather a quorum of three to meet as ajudicial
council.
Table 14 shows the number of instances reported in the field
study in which an acting chief judge issued the initial order
regarding a complaint. The number of instances in which all judges
are recused would be a subset of this number.
TABLE 14
Orders Issued by Acting ChiefJudges, Field Study (N=445)
Circuit
A B C D E F G H Total
Number 4 0 6 2 11 1 5 4 33
% of All Orders 33% 0% 19% 2% 15% 2% 9% 6% 7%
The absolute number of recusals and the percentage of recusals
indicate that this problem does not occur frequently. However,
each instance of complete recusal and resort to intercircuit
assignments represents a significant burden on the judiciary.
How do the chief judges and judicial councils handle such
matters? When all eligible judges are named in a complaint and,
following illustrative Rule 18(b), 278 are recused, the chief judges
have used the intercircuit assignment process on the advice of the
General Counsel of the Administrative Office. This requires
272 Id. Rule 18 commentary at 48.
273 ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
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completing a form request to the ChiefJustice of the United States,
who generally designates the chief judge of a neighboring circuit to
serve as an acting chief judge for purposes of ruling on the
complaint. In one such case, the papers were sent to the chief
judge of a neighboring circuit and he dismissed the complaint as
frivolous, but wrote an order addressing all of the major allegations.
If a complaint is not dismissible on its face, conducting an inquiry
from a neighboring circuit might entail locating the record of the
underlying case in the other circuit, locating other complaints filed
by the same person, making an inquiry of the named judge,
interviewing a third-party witness, or even appointing a special
committee to conduct an investigation and hearing. No complaints
that required such an inquiry were found in the field study.
After one circuit initiated an intercircuit assignment, the
complainant filed a subsequent pleading seeking to expand the
complaint and a petition for review to include all of the judges and
magistrates of the neighboring circuit. Apparently (according to the
complainant), they had become part of the expanding conspiracy
against the complainant. Shortly after that filing, the complainant
again attempted to expand the original complaint to name all of the
justices of the Supreme Court and all of the judges of the D.C. and
Federal Circuits. At that point, the circuit in which the complaint
had been originally filed decided that it was futile to continue to use
the intercircuit assignment process. The judicial council of that
circuit invoked a "rule of necessity"2 74 to permit judges' discre-
tion not to recuse themselves despite the mandatory language in
their local rule. In the context of that complaint, the "rule of
necessity" appears to have been invoked only after it became
apparent that use of the intercircuit process would only lead to
further complaints against judges of other circuits and courts.
Another circuit has recently applied the rule of necessity in less
extreme circumstances. In ruling on a petition for review of the
dismissal of a complaint that named most of the members of the
judicial council, the council noted that the remaining members of
the council did not constitute a quorum and therefore could not
decide the matter themselves. The council emphasized, further-
more, that there existed no statute expressly authorizing the
designation of another body (such as the judicial council of another
circuit) to rule on a petition for review in such circumstances.
274 See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980).
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Accordingly, the council concluded that the rule of necessity
justified participation by members of the council who were named
in the complaint in ruling on the petition for review.
Long-term solutions to the recusal problems have entailed the
revision of local rules. One circuit adopted a rule of necessity by
local rule.275 This rule modifies the quorum requirement in
multiple recusal situations.
Attempts at a national solution to the multiple recusal problem
should probably focus on modifying Illustrative Rule 18276 to
include some version of the rule of necessity. Since such a modified
Illustrative Rule would not, of course, be binding on any circuit,
each circuit could, if it chose, alter the rule according to local needs
and quorum requirements. At the same time, the existence of a
national statement by the federal judiciary that invocation of the
rule of necessity is justified may serve to encourage its use.
5. Judicial Independence
How do chief judges view the impact of the Act on judicial
independence? Eight current and five former chief judges were
asked variations of this question. 77 The short answer is that
none of the chief judges found that the Act had any effect on
judicial independence. No one cited an instance in whichjudicial
independence was seriously implicated, and none felt that the
current structure or administration of the Act posed a threat to the
independence of the judiciary as a whole or to any specific judge in
any proceeding they had encountered.
78
One might reasonably ask whether chief judges, who, after all,
are the primary officials who wield regulatory power under the Act,
are the best sources of information regarding these issues. Research
into the attitudes, thoughts, and experiences of district and circuit
275 See Rules of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit Governing Complaints
AgainstJudicial Officers Under 28 U.S.C. § 372 (c) at 36-37 (Rule 18(b)) (allowing the
council to refer complaints to the Judicial Conference of the United States or to the
judicial council of another circuit in the event that the complaint is against a majority
of the members of the judicial council of the Second Circuit).
276 See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7.
2 7 The judges were asked: "What, if any, aspects ofjudicial independence have
been affected in any way by the § 372(c) process?", and "Do you think there is a risk
that the Act and its processes could compromise some aspect ofjudicial indepen-
dence?" They were also asked, "What impact have the recent criminal prosecutions
and impeachments of federal judges had on judicial independence?"
278 Two chiefjudges did express slight misgivings about one impeachment.
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judges (the regulatees) might better test whether the values
underlying Article I of the Constitution are in danger.
79
In the field study chief judges expressed a high value and
concern for judicial independence. Responses to these questions
reflected the serious thought given to the concept of judicial
independence and its application to various aspects of a judge's
activities. In response to the general questions listed above, most
of the judges focused on independence in decision-making, which
they distinguished from absolute freedom to behave as one pleases
in the courtroom or elsewhere. One chief judge summarized the
idea this way: "The overbearing, rude judge is no more indepen-
dent than decent judges.... No one is being picked on for the
merits of decisions." Another chief judge observed that "the Act
doesn't affect independence of decision-making, but judges do
watch their conduct more." A third judge said that "the most
important part of judicial independence is that when a judge
decides [a case], personally, he doesn't have much to gain or lose."
These judges saw the process of excluding complaints directly
related to the merits of the underlying litigation as a linchpin for
protecting judicial independence. As one judge said, "If I as chief
judge, in a disciplinary context, poked into the merits-related rulings
in cases, that would impact onjudicial independence.... Of course,
you can't look at a judge's rulings, but it's wrong to say you can't
look at anything else."
Several judges raised and answered the question of whether
another type of disciplinary process, for example a national court or
a citizen tribunal, might impinge on judicial independence. These
judges clearly believed that vesting decisions in the chief judge and
circuit council were critical to preserving judicial independence. In
one chiefjudge's view, "If responsibility for discipline were given to
an outside agency with a bureaucracy and a lot of power, there
could be an impact onjudicial independence." Another chiefjudge
said, "The Nunn-DeConcini bill [which proposed the creation of a
national discipline court within the judicial branch] would have
been a terrible mistake. As soon as the disciplinary power goes
outside the circuit to some national body, you may begin to
279 This question would be an interesting research project on its own, but it
exceeds the scope of this project. A survey conducted for the Commission by William
Slate produced an interesting datum on this point. Asked whether "discipline
proceedings ever interfered in any way with [their]judicial independence," 294 of 801
(98%) federal appellate, district, bankruptcy, and magistrate judges responded in the
negative. Slate, supra note 219, at 998 (Question 16).
1993] JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 175
implicate judicial independence." In the view of this chief judge,
"You could compromise judicial independence if you bring in
outside officials, even outsidejudges." One chiefjudge summed up
the issue of local control succinctly: "Nunn-DeConcini 280 ...
would take power away from people who know what's going on and
have the ability to act tactfully and give power to those who don't."
The key to the idea of local control seems to be found in the
Act's emphasis on correction of misconduct, which depends on the
relationship of the chief judge to judges within the circuit.2 81 As
a former chiefjudge asserted, the "chiefjudge is in the best position
to understand the problems within the circuit. I always met with
district judges, magistrate judges, and bankruptcy judges to keep
abreast of problems. So, when complaints came in, I knew who they
were talking about." The concern seems to be that the administra-
tion of complaints from outside the circuit would become formal,
literal, and bureaucratic-a situation that the existing forms of
administration appear to have avoided.
Finally, responses to the question about the effect of impeach-
ments on judicial independence revealed a consensus that there has
been no effect. Two judges expressed mild concern about the
Hastings impeachment because he had been acquitted in the
criminal proceeding, but those judges seemed satisfied that the
decisions were reached fairly on the basis of substantial evidence of
guilt. With the exception of these two judges, the unanimous
sentiment was embodied in the following statement that the three
impeachments and the pending criminal prosecutions "had no effect
on judicial independence. They were such clear cases, they had no
effect." One chief judge refined the point: "I don't think there's
been any impact on judicial decision-making. Certainly ajudge will
be less liable to take a bribe, but that's fine." Thus, any effect of the
impeachments was a deterrent effect and did not implicate
independent decision-making.
None of the matters that were examined in the field study
represented a serious threat to independent decision-making. Three
matters, however, did raise the issue, and in two of them, the action
taken could be described as troublesome. In all three of these
matters, judges faced complaints about statements made in the
course of sentencing defendants. In the "untroublesome" matter,
280 S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
281 See supra part I.C.2.
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the judge was accused of showing leniency toward defendants who
had been convicted of damaging military property. In the course of
imposing a sentence that the complainants found to be too lenient,
the judge expressed approval of the defendants' motives and acts
and disapproval of the conduct of the corporate defense contractor
whose property had been damaged. In dismissing the complaints
as directly related to the merits of the sentencing decision, the chief
judge held that "the trialjudge's comments fall outside the scope of
the Act" because the "comments were made during a sentencing
proceeding in his capacity as ajudicial officer, and they were related
to the merits and reasons for the sentence imposed."28 2 In words
that might apply to the two "troublesome" cases discussed below,
the chief judge asserted that "[a] trial judge should not fear that
because of comments he or she makes from the bench, which in
good faith the judge feels are related to the proceeding before the
court, he or she ultimately may be subject to disciplinary sanction
by the Judicial Council."283
In a similar type of matter, complainants alleged that a district
judge had expressed approval of the "sanctuary movement" in
sentencing defendants for violating the immigration laws.284 The
chief judge indicated in his order that he had reviewed the
transcript and discussed the complaint informally with the district
judge, after which the chief judge dismissed the complaint on the
grounds of corrective action. In his order the chief judge seemed
to agree with the premise that it would be improper for the district
judge to express approval of criminal activities engaged in by the
sanctuary movement. However, the chief judge found that the
district judge had not expressed approval, and that, regardless, the
district judge's response to the complaint, and his promise to avoid
use of the ambiguous term "sanctuary movement," constituted
corrective action.
285
In the third matter, a judge expressed the view during sentenc-
ing proceedings that the defendant, a white woman, may have been
282 In re Lauer, 788 F.2d 135, 137 (8th Cir.Jud. Council 1985). The court held
that "[tihejudicial Conduct and Disability Act should not be invoked so as to chill the
independence of a trial judge in ajudicial proceeding." Id. at 138.
283 Id.
284 See supra part I.C.2.d. (discussing case CA-17). The "sanctuary movement"
provides shelter and other support, including sanctuary in churches, to immigrants
who entered the United States without proper papers to avoid political repression in
their homelands.
285 For a more detailed discussion, see supra part I.C.2.d. (discussing case CA-17).
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"under the hypnotic spell" of a black male co-defendant and that
drugs must have been involved because the activity had taken place
in a ghetto location. The chief judge discussed the matter with the
district judge, who explained that he had been searching for a
rationale for avoiding a harsh result under the sentencing guide-
lines. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds of corrective
action after the judge agreed that his statements were troubling and
that he would avoid such statements in the future.
286
No discipline was imposed in any of these cases. Nor was there
any pressure in the cases to modify the sentences themselves.
Nevertheless, the termination of two complaints on the basis of
corrective action possibly gave the misimpression that the judge
could be held accountable, apart from appellate review, for
expressing reasons for imposing a particular sentence. In each of
these three cases the judge's expression of personal opinions and
values related directly to the issue of what sentence to impose.
Certainly, one can see the value in using these cases for educational
purposes in order to expose the judge to the effect of his or her
expression of controversial personal views. At the same time, one
should not lose sight of the fact that the process can create
consequences for judges who state reasons for a judicial decision.
The latter two matters seem to border on invading judicial indepen-
dence in decision-making.
While neither of these two judges appeared to object, or to
assert judicial independence or its statutory surrogate, merits-
relatedness, as a reason for the chief judge to dismiss the com-
plaints, the context of the complaints may have imposed pressure
on them to agree to take corrective action. In both of these
matters, considerable publicity accompanied the complaints,
perhaps because the judges were out of step with public opinion.
The publicity may have generated pressure on the chief judges to
take corrective action and bring the proceedings to prompt
conclusions. Of course, it is not known what motivated these two
named judges to agree to corrective action. Perhaps the judges
themselves believed that the views they had expressed were not, in
fact, central to the legal rationale that they had applied in the cases.
Including these two matters, the field study revealed no matter
that can be considered to have directly interfered with or seriously
threatened independent judicial decision-making.
286 For a more detailed discussion, see supra part I.C.2.c. (discussing case CA-7).
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6. Effects on Court Morale and Collegiality
Three of the chief judges were asked whether a court suffers
when its members sit in judgment of each other. The negative
impact seems to be minimal.2 87 Most judgments are made by the
chief judge and, as shown earlier, most complaints that lead to
special committee investigations and judicial council judgments are
against district, magistrate, and bankruptcy judges. Districtjudges
sit on judicial councils, but it is not likely that more than one judge
would be from the same district as the named judge. Recusal could
cure any discomfiture that existed. Moreover, even if ajudge from
the same district as a named judge does sit in judgment on ajudicial
council matter, the effect on collegiality will generally be limited
because judges at the trial level rarely have occasion to sit collegial-
ly.
7. Harms to the Judicial Branch Relating to Confidentiality
Provisions of the Act and the Illustrative Rules combine with the
restraints of judicial ethics to create a dilemma for judges and
courts in responding to publicly voiced complaints of misconduct
under the Act. The Act provides that "all papers, documents, and
records.., related to [special committee] investigations ... shall be
confidential."288 In most circuits there is no explicit provision in
the local rules that a complaint will be kept confidential merely
because it is filed. As a practical matter a complainant can call a
press conference (as many have), disclose the contents of the
287 One chiefjudge observed that "[i]f it's a meritorious complaint, anytime you
sit in judgment on your peers, it is discomfiting. It does not add to collegiality." This
judge recalled that there were such problems involving serious misconduct matters
(at the court of appeals level) thatwere informally handled without a complaint under
the Act, but there was "no lasting effect." Another chiefjudge noted that a district
judge who had been reprimanded "was angry at the judicial council members for a
while. But, he shouldn't have done it [that is, engaged in misconduct]."
Another chiefjudge noted a "tension with appellate judges looking at complaints
against other appellate judges," but felt that the tension had dissipated with
experience under the Act and that "mostjudges now are sophisticated enough not to
be bothered by complaints... unless they know it's serious." Serious complaints,
however, occur so infrequently that tensions created by the judgments of peers are
likely to be rare. Finally, another chiefjudge indicated that "all the semi-serious
issues we've had have not involved judges on the court of appeals." If such a conflict
arose, this judge would want to consider alternatives to avoid judging among peers.
Recusals for collegiality concerns could cause a serious problem, but after more than
a decade under the Act, the issue remains hypothetical.
288 § 372(c)(14).
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complaint, and discuss the allegations and the process. This has
occurred with such frequency that most chief judges raised the issue
in response to our general inquiries about the purposes of confiden-
tiality. One particular organization that has filed many complaints
in various circuits appears to use publicity about the filing of such
complaints as a modus operandi. Other complainants have also
aired their complaints publicly without waiting for the process to
unfold.
Chiefjudges and their staffs operate under different constraints
than complainants. As the persons responsible for deciding whether
to proceed, chiefjudges, at a minimum, may be criticized for acting
injudiciously, and perhaps even for acting unethically by comment-
ing on a pending complaint. As noted above, if the chief judge
appoints a special committee, the Act dictates that the council and
staff treat the proceedings as confidential.
28 9
The current state of affairs is that, in the words of one chief
judge, "[i]f there's a serious allegation, the reality is that confidenti-
ality is unlikely." Unlike the situation in litigation, with parties
generally able to respond to "trial by media," publicity is one-sided
when a complaint is made against a judge. Another chief judge
recounted such an instance: "It was frustrating for me. Here was
[the complainant] merrily issuing press releases, and I felt I couldn't
respond."
The named judge may not be the sole victim of this process; the
judiciary and the complaint process may also be implicated. When
the media contacts the court for comment, the answer generally
must be "no comment." Indeed in most jurisdictions, including
those whose final orders are fully available to the public, staff will
not even acknowledge the filing of a specific complaint against a
specific judge. The appearance to the public may be that the
judiciary is protecting a judge who has engaged in misconduct.
Ironically, however, the intent is the opposite-to protect the
reputation of ajudge who has probably not engaged in misconduct
under the Act.
The protection of a named judge from such prejudgment
publicity is a major concern of chief judges. One chief judge
presented the following hypothetical situation to illustrate this
concern:
289 See id.
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A complaint alleges that a judge was drunk on the bench. If the
complaint were public, it would be a big headline. By the time the
chief judge investigated and found out that the charge was not
true, or that the judge actually was drowsy from medication or
something, the judge's reputation would be ruined.
We have seen that the Act imposes substantial negative effects
on the courts in the form of burdens on resources in handling
routine as well as serious matters. Chiefjudges have also reported
limited negative effects on collegial relations and judicial indepen-
dence. In addition, we found two instances in the field study that
appeared to implicate judicial independence. Judges sometimes
face one-sided publicity without a fair opportunity to defend their
conduct in the media.
III. ASSESSMENTS: WHAT WORKS? WHAT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT?
A. What Are the Relationships Between the Positive
Effects and the Negative Effects?
In this section, we address questions that combine our descrip-
tions of the positive and negative effects that courts have experi-
enced in administering the Act. At what stage of the process do the
positive effects occur and who produces them? Are the negative
effects, especially the burdens on court staff and resources,
necessary to achieve the beneficial effects? Addressing these
questions involves examining how to achieve the benefits and
looking at how courts have approached, and might approach, the
demands involved in administering the Act.
The positive effects fall into four categories: (1) informal and
corrective actions taken to modify judicial conduct in serious
contexts that do not involve criminal or impeachable conduct; (2)
informal actions taken to resolve serious disability matters; (3)
investigations into serious allegations of misconduct, including
criminal charges and impeachable offenses; and (4) a structure that
complainants can use to file complaints relating to judicial conduct
and obtain a response to their concerns.
The functions served in items one and two are traditional chief
judge functions. The burdens of self-regulation imposed by dealing
with day-to-day problems that require feedback and correction seem
linked to the prestige and role of the chief judge as the chief
administrative judge of the circuit and as a respected, experienced
member of the bench. Any delegation of responsibility-for
example, to a chief district judge or a close friend of ajudge facing
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disability questions-would have to be under the direction and
control of the chief judge. The burdens associated with investigat-
ing problems and creating a plan for responding may be shared with
otherjudges. Ultimately, however, the chiefjudge bears the burden
and power of the office to lead and manage the process. In
interviews, chiefjudges recognized and accepted this responsibility,
not as a burden, but as a necessary and valuable activity.
290
Issues relating to investigation of serious complaints also seem
related to the authority and prestige of the chief judge. Ultimately,
peer review demands judicial involvement under the leadership of
the chief judge. Some aspects of serving on special investigative
committees, however, might be made less burdensome by sharing
the roles involved in those committees. For example, burdens could
be eased by assigning tasks of assembling witnesses and examining
exhibits, hiring an investigator, scheduling a hearing, organizing
legal research, and drafting a report. Using staff, including the
clerk and circuit executive, to develop information and options may
lessen the burden. Sharing these roles with judges, as opposed to
staff, merely shifts the burden from the chief judge to other judges
who have full caseloads of their own. Inevitably, serious matters of
misconduct or disability will place greater demands on already
scarce judicial resources.
For reasons that we have not seen articulated, most special
committees to date, with at least one major exception, have been
composed of five judges. Experience suggests that many matters
that require investigation do not require the perspectives of five
judges. Indeed, in many instances a simple investigation by the
chief judge or a designate could resolve the matter. The five-judge
panel is a cumbersome entity that seems likely to institutionalize a
burden that may exceed the benefit achieved in some matters. For
example, one of the complaints singled out as a problem matter in
Part I.C. involved a judge who was accused of using a pejorative
term to refer to a group of third parties. The chiefjudge ruled that
the term was not necessarily pejorative and that its use was related
to the merits. If the chiefjudge had any doubts about the issues, he
may nevertheless have hesitated to create a committee of five judges
to address them. Making it clear that other alternatives, such as the
appointment of a committee of three judges or a limited inquiry by
290 See supra part l.B.3.
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the chiefjudge, are available might avoid problems associated with
a cumbersome special committee process.
The fourth function-having a structure to review and respond
to complaints-presents the greatest opportunity for separation of
the positive effects from the negative. The functions served at the
filing stage are to review and screen the complaints and to respond
to each complaint according to its merit. The process seems ripe
for a "track system" whereby matters that demand the attention of
the chief judge are isolated from other matters. 291 Cases with
serious allegations-candidates for corrective action, informal
actions regarding disability, or full investigation-should be brought
immediately to the chiefjudge's attention. Further actions in those
matters should be delegable, but only at the chief judge's express
direction. Experienced staff will quickly learn the type of informa-
tion the chief judge needs before embarking on a corrective
strategy, such as a verification of the record, and can assemble such
support. Complaints that on their face fail to raise even an arguable
claim of disability or misconduct need not even be brought to the
chief judge's attention until a memorandum and draft order have
been prepared by the staff.
Having such a dual-track system (or a multiple-track system)
depends on being able to delegate the initial review of complaints
and the drafting of orders. Experience in several circuits indicates
that such delegation can take place without interfering with either
the corrective functions of the Act or the need for a prompt
response. The average disposition times in circuits that delegate
extensively is within the normal range of disposition times in the
other circuits. Whether confidentiality concerns would be implicat-
ed may be a matter for individual decision within a circuit. Our
study shows that different circuits assign different values to the
degree of confidentiality required by the Act and by judges within
the circuits. 292 By employing a dual-track system, a court can
reserve the chief judge's time for matters that warrant the chief
judge's direction and leadership. Use of staff resources to prepare
291 In another context, Congress has mandated that advisory groups appointed
under the CivilJustice Reform Act consider adopting a track system as part of a cost
and delay reduction plan. See CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5091-92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp.
IV 1992)) (providing that each U.S. district court shall consider "systemic, differential
treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of individualized and case specific
management" in its cost and delay reduction plans).
29 See supra part I.D.2.
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the routine cases would reduce the burden on judicial time in some
circuits.
B. Do the Positive Effects Outweigh the Negative
Effects or Vice Versa?
We asked the eight current and five former chief judges who
participated in the field study to provide an overall assessment of
the benefits and burdens of the Act. We posed this question: "Do
the positive effects of the Act outweigh the negative effects or vice
versa?" Six of the eight current chief judges and four of the five
former chief judges indicated that the positive effects of the Act
outweigh its negative effects.
What positive and negative effects did these judges identify in
their overall assessments of their experiences under the Act? The
positive effects were concentrated in three areas: (1) reinforcing the
chief judge's traditional role as overseer of judicial conduct in the
circuit; (2) assuring that the public has an opportunity to complain
about judicial conduct; and (3) assigning the process to judges
familiar with local conditions. The negative effects reported were
related exclusively to the lack of merit in most complaints and the
burden the Act imposes on court resources.
1. Chief Judge as Overseer
Prior to the Act, some chief judges were active in striving to
improve judicial conduct. These judges presumably relied on the
prestige of their office and experience to persuade other judges to
conform to ethical and professional norms of conduct. One chief
judge whose tenure spanned the passage of the Act volunteered this
assessment of the benefits and burdens of the Act:
In trying to bring about corrective action, I was glad we had the
Act. It's hard to talk to a judge about his deficiencies. If you do
it in response to a complaint, you're seen as on the judge's side,
you have an objective reason to talk to the judge. Corrective
action then helps the judge and helps the system.
Other judges recognized that the Act facilitated their interac-
tions with judges about delicate issues relating to conduct. Three
judges characterized the benefit as stimulating negotiations with
another judge, each using their own metaphors for the process.
293
2" The judges' comments were as follows: "The Act was a bargaining chip the
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These reports verify that these chief judges view one of the benefits
described-the creation of a structure with a long shadow that
facilitates informal responses-as a central and positive feature of
the Act.294 One chief judge summarizes this feature well: "There
are real problems. The Act is a very good vehicle for advising
everyone how to handle them. Before the Act you had to scurry
around to figure out what to do."
2. Opportunity for Public to Complain
For several of the judges, the assurance that the public has an
opportunity to complain is the Act's most important feature. These
judges underscored the symbolic value of the Act.295 Even the
two chief judges and the one former chief judge who thought that
the burdens of the Act outweighed the benefits recognized the
benefit of having a system of public complaints. One judge
commented:
If the public thinks of the Act as a weapon that gives them more
confidence in the judiciary, then I'd say yes, the positive outweighs
the negative. But the complaints are all meritless, they generate
a lot of paper and the expenditure of a lot of time and energy, to
almost no purpose.
Similar sentiments were expressed by the other two judges.
29 6
chiefjudge could use, hanging in the background. The presence of the complaint
process, not necessarily its use, is the best therapy."; "The Act is important in giving
the chiefjudge the big stick while speaking softly. The chiefjudge can use the Act
as a negotiating weapon in informal situations."; "You always need a shotgun behind
the door. You need someone looking over your shoulder, everyone does."
One of thejudges who found the negative effects of the Act to predominate also
identified this feature as a positive benefit: "If I call a judge about a particular
problem raised in a complaint, I can say 'I will dismiss the complaint if you say you
won't do it anymore.' That's a benefit."
294 See supra part I.E.
25 The judges' comments included: "The Act gave complainants a place to go,
and there are few serious complaints. The greatest benefit of the Act is just having
a system."; "The Act is useful symbolically. It reassures the public that anyone can
file a complaint at any time. That's important."; "The Act is a vehicle for someone
to make a complaint about crazy demeanor of a trialjudge. Even if the complaint is
dismissed as merits-related, it could have a dampening effect on the judge. The
downside is that there is no deterrent against complainants filing complaints."
296 The otherjudges' remarks included: "A few complaints are from citizens who
genuinely don't understand the legal process; it's good to have an opportunity to
explain it to them and help them understand it."; and "The Act is more important
in perception than reality-the public knows they have a place to complain. It soothes
the public."
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3. Decentralized Self-Regulation
Six of the thirteen chiefjudges volunteered the opinion that the
assignment of responsibility for enforcement of the Act to the
circuit level was a key positive feature of the Act. Several of the
remaining judges touted this feature at other points in the inter-
view. One of the six capsulized the benefits of local control in these
words:
Nunn-Deconcini 97 would be time-consuming and would weaken
the authority of the chief judge. It would take power away from
people who know what's going on and have the ability to act
tactfully and give power to those who don't. You would have an
endless series of confrontations between the judiciary and outside
bureaucrats.
2 98
In sum, the vast majority of chief judges think that the Act
strengthens their ability to administer a system of peer review within
each circuit and that it serves the public as an outlet for its
complaints. Chiefjudges who find the Act's effects to be predomi-
nantly negative primarily cite its tendency to generate frivolous and
merits-related complaints. Even those judges, however, recognize
the benefits of the Act and the system of decentralized self-regula-
tion that underlies it.
C. ChiefJudges' Suggestions for Change
The following are excerpts from chief judges' responses to the
interview question, "What suggestions do you have for improve-
ments in the Act and the Illustrative Rules?"29 9 To facilitate cross-
referencing, the chief judges' suggestions have been organized by
reproducing relevant headings and subheadings from this report
17 S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
298 Other chiefjudges supplied additional comments: "When I calljudges, they
know me. I'm not threatening."; "[The Act] opens up the process so that the chief
judge can carry out the chiefjudge's responsibility for discipline. When the judicial
councils were set up in earlier decades, this was the idea."; "It would be a mistake to
have a national commission, for a lot of reasons. That would even be inconvenient
geographically, among other things."; "The Act offers a chiefjudge an opportunity
to close gaps, which an outsider couldn't do. You have to rely on judges, on peer
review."
299 There has been no attempt to catalogue all other suggestions made by chief
judges in the course of their responses to other interview questions. Many of these
other suggestions have been discussed or incorporated elsewhere in this report.
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and placing each suggestion under the subheading that most closely
approximates the subject of the suggestion.
Who Does What About Complaints
30 0
As long as the chief judge has the responsibility, the chief
judge has to spend a lot of time on 372(c) orders and satisfy
himself with them. It is not necessary that this be confined to the
chief judge. With Criminal Justice Act vouchers now, the chief
judge can delegate the responsibility to anotherjudge. I suggested
at the JCUS that, just like Criminal Justice Act vouchers, the chief
judge should be able to delegate 372(c) orders to another
judge.30 ' The chief judge's job is very time consuming; anything
that can be delegated should be. There's no reason the chief
judge must be involved in every one of these complaints. The
chiefjudge should be able to decide whether a complaint must be
looked at more carefully. The chief judge should hang on to
anything that's close or controversial, but most are not; the chief
judge could delegate those. Some chiefjudges disagree, they feel
the chiefjudge must hold on to it.
It has been suggested that the filing of 372(c) complaints with
the clerk confuses the litigant into thinking that the complaint is
like an appeal. Perhaps they could file it with the chiefjudge. But
that would remove the insulation from the chief judge, with the
clerk serving as a buffer. You'd have crazies calling the chief
judge's chambers. So, it's better to leave it as it is.
Who Does What About Complaints-Initial Screening
°2
Finally, I note that under the Illustrative Rules the clerk can
send back a complaint not in the proper form.303 There is a
potential conflict between that rule and the 1991 amendment to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 that clerks shouldn't decline to accept filings for
impropriety of form.30 4 Of course it's not technically a conflict,
3oo See supra part lA.
301 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3), (e)(3) (1988) (noting that chiefjudge of the circuit
has authority to waive statutory maximum attorney's fee awards for indigent criminal
defense and may delegate such authority to an active circuit judge).
112 See supra part IA.1.
... See ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 7, Rule 3(d). Rule 3(d) states that if a
complaint does not meet the requirements of rule 2 (how to file a complaint), the
clerk "will normally not accept the complaint for filing and will advise the complain-
ant of the appropriate procedures."
304 Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 provides in relevant part that
"[t]he clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose
solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any
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Rule 5 doesn't cover a 372 situation. But it shows a different
approach.
Dismissals of Complaints-The Frequency of and Bases for Dismissals
30 5
We need to broaden those bases for dismissal. I'd like to give
the chiefjudge more blanket discretion to get rid of non-substan-
tive complaints more easily. I would feel better about the Act if
there were added a blanket discretionary phrase, like permitting




Another point is, there are so many frivolous complaints. You
may want to consider imposing sanctions on complainants, to
provide some deterrent to the constant merits-related complaints.
I don't know exactly what kind of deterrent. I don't necessarily
advocate sanctions, but I want to identify this as an issue the
Commission should think about.
My solution to the problem of all the frivolous complaints is
that since 99+% are actually attempts at an appeal, the complainant
ought to have to pay a filing fee, similar to the filing fee on
appeal. You can make the filing fee refundable if the chiefjudge
sees any merit in the complaint, or finds it to be nonfrivolous.
Have the money go to the U.S. Treasury. These complainants put
the judiciary to an expense, they file what is in effect an appeal
without a filing fee. It may take the chiefjudge two hours to work
on it, plus there'll be a petition for review so all judges on the
judicial council have to read it, that may be twelve hours there,
plus staff and secretary time. It costs money. A complainant with
no legitimate complaint shouldn't be able to put the taxpayers to
such an expense. Some may think this would discourage com-
plaints, and it probably would, but it would probably discourage
only the meritless ones. The most frivolous ones generally make
the most serious charges, but are conclusory.
Dismissals of Complaints-Complaints of Delay
3 0 7
The greatest problem in the judicial system today is delay. I
have some concern whether delay is really within the scope of the
local rules or practices." FED. R. CIrv. P. 5
3o5 See supra part I.C.1.a.
306 See supra part I.C.l.a.i.
307 See supra part I.C.l.a.ii.(D).
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Act, or should be dealt with by mandamus instead. I've vacillated
on that. Often we deny the mandamus, but we suggest that the
petitioner can refile it in ninety days if the judge hasn't acted.
With complaints of delay under the Act, I call the judge, or
inquire by letter, and the judge then decides on a timely basis. I
never turned any of those over to the judicial council. I think the
Judicial Conference of the US should direct that all cases shall be
decided in ninety days. All cases that are not, without some legal
reason, shall be turned over to the judicial council for review and
action to deal with the delay. The judicial council would act on
these delay problems as a body. If district judges were faced with
the idea that the judicial council will automatically get any case not
decided in ninety days, that would be a great deterrent. That
would be much better than a cumbersome complaint process.
We need clarification, perhaps in a case format, on undue
delay in a particular case where complainant could file a manda-
mus, versus a serious pattern of delay. In one case, we took a
judge's docket away for a year. There were grumblings from the
other judges, they got extra cases. But it did work, the judge got
the old opinions out. It's not lazyjudges, but a perfectionist mind-
set; and older judges are not ready to change, it's ingrained in
them. Thesejudges have no sense of urgency, they view each case
as an intellectual puzzle they have to solve, divorced from the real
litigants. This is an obvious problem in the appeals court, but
surprisingly the district court has the same problem, even though
district judges see people every day. Fortunately, these judges are
a minority. There is the Civil Justice Reform Act to -help, but
really intractable cases are not solved. Litigants deserve a decision
in a reasonable amount of time.
I know mandamus is not a real remedy for delay. There are
lots of systems to track delay, perhaps 372(c) could be another




I would hate to see the Act get any more intrusive than it is.
One must understand that this system is not to try or punish
judges, but to improve them. You act not to accuse a judge, but
only where conduct interferes with the business of the court. You
don't save a judge by accusing him, but by working with him.
Some disagreed, said it should be accusatory, you convict a judge
of being a badjudge. When the Act was enacted, we won the day,
308 See supra part I.C.2.
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to make it an improvement process. That's proven its worth. I'd
hate to see the Commission get away from that. Using some kind
of outside overseer would be like using a sledgehammer to do a
ball-peen hammer's job. There's no need for that in this circuit.
The great majority of work is by informal counseling and correc-






It would be helpful to have articulated guidelines to cover the
situation where an issue raised by a non-frivolous complaint is also
the subject of a pending appeal. Should the judicial council stay
its hand in the § 372 matter pending disposition of the appeal, or
not? The point is, there can be matters raised on appeal that are
appropriate subjects for discipline. An allegation that a judge's
decision was the result of a bribe could come up in both contexts.
You'd need an investigating committee for that; it could be acting
at the same time as the appeal. Who acts first? Do they act in
tandem? This needs to be worked out, whether by the Commis-
sion or the Judicial Conference Committee. Suppose ajudge gave
an appearance of impropriety. An appeals court could knock a
judge out for that, and it could also be a discipline case. I was on
an investigating committee looking into a complaint that a judge
had been spoken to on behalf of a particular defendant. The
committee heard testimony from an informant. Arguably, such a
complaint should go ahead immediately. The relevant facts are
extra-record, and wouldn't be developed on appeal. In the recusal
case, by contrast, it's all on the record, there's little need for a
separate factual investigation. In that case the complaint could
wait for years, it wouldn't matter, it would affect only that case.
But in a bribery situation, the council must proceed promptly. It
would be nice for the rules to provide articulated guidelines to say,
in deciding whether the two should proceed in tandem or the
appeal should go first, the council should consider the following
factors. When should council or special committee action be
deferred pending a determination on the merits, and when not?
There is no guidance on this now.
A special committee essentially functions like a grand jury. If
in a grand jury proceeding a witness obstructs justice, they commit
a federal offense, they can be indicted. You can have a contempt
proceeding. The law has teeth in it to prevent the obstruction of
the grandjury process. But in a 372(c) proceeding, if complainant
309 See supra part I.C.3.
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won't answer a special committee question, or complainant abuses
the process, the judicial council has little power. The special
committee and the council have no more power than the grand
jury to sit as a court. We need a mechanism for handling
obstruction of justice in special committee proceedings. The
obstruction statute is limited to proceedings in courts, so it doesn't
cover special committee proceedings. I'd favor a statutory change
on that, to allow prosecution of complainant for obstruction of
justice in a 372(c) proceeding. Whether to actually pursue
complainant criminally, and thereby publicize the name of the
judge and hurt the judge's reputation, would be a discretionary
call for the prosecutor. That is a common kind of decision for
prosecutors. There are nuts out there, harassing judges, and you
can't control them. Perhaps it's not a bad idea to impose costs or
sanctions on such complainants. But the judicial council is not a
court, and has no present authority to do that. Prisoners are not
the problem, it's non-prisoner pro se's. You need a mechanism to
deal with this problem. Again, we should extend the obstruction
of justice statute to this, make it the same as obstructing a grand
jury proceeding, and provide a remedy for obstructing or
impeding a 372(c) proceeding. Then, you could give complainants
a sheet in advance, warning them about obstruction, that they
could be prosecuted. By and large,judges complained against will
cooperate in these matters, although problems may arise [in a rare
situation]. If the judge, or complainant, wants to cause trouble,
they can. The question is whether changes are necessary to deal
with the one in a thousand case, when the changes could affect
other things. It all goes back to the particular personalities
involved.
Also, there should be no permanent standing special commit-
tee permitted. There is no policy consideration in favor of that,
and there are a lot of them on the other side. Our special
committees have all been five judges, a good size, but discretion
is fine for the number. I can see a three-judge special committee,
if the complaint is not too complicated, but does state a claim.
Having five judges gives you more perspectives. You don't need
more explicit rules on the participation of complainant and the
judge in special committee proceedings. You need to be flexible.
Oversight-The Act and the Rules (Confidentiality)3 10
Where ajudicial council acts on or dismisses a complaint, and
you have a long special committee report, some things in the
310 See supra part I.D.1.
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report could do harm, but some things would be helpful. The
judicial council should have discretion to release all or part of the
report, as it sees fit, without the judge's prior permission.
I'd like to make it clear in the Rules that either complainant
or the judge has the right to respond publicly once confidentiality
is breached by the other side.
The Illustrative Rules are an abomination, and need to be
rewritten. You should allow complaints against only one judge at
a time. You should remove sending copies of the complaint to the
chiefjudge of the district or bankruptcy court, as appropriate. If
the complaint is confidential, then the chief judge of the district
court shouldn't know about it.
Informal Actions-Sources of Informal Complaints
3 1
I wish there were a vehicle by which lawyers could better air
their grievances, without the concern or fear of retaliation.
Perhaps bar associations can help with this. They could be a
conduit by which to do it. Lawyers go to bar committees, and the
committee as a whole files the complaint. This would keep the
individual lawyer confidential [unless the factual circumstances of
the complaint are sufficient to reveal the lawyer's identity to the
judge, as may often be the case].
Maybe there ought to be more efforts at bar meetings to
explain that this procedure exists. Lawyers ought to know how
informal it can be, they can just call the chiefjudge or clerk if they
want.
Beneficial Effects of the Act-Dissemination
3 12
[I would suggest] publishing orders, in order to pass informa-
tion through the system. Circuits which do not give adequate
reasons in their dismissal orders should be required to do so. The
circuits which do not make their orders public should do so. All
circuits should adopt the Illustrative Rules; the Fifth Circuit
apparently is about to, which leaves just the Claims Court. I see
no local values at play to prevent that.
We need some kind of clearinghouse about general 37 2(c)
practices, how to handle things. Some judges are uncomfortable
about that, they feel it would violate confidentiality. But the ABA
Code would have sanitized cases in point. We could do the same
thing, it would be very useful to the chiefjudge. Occasionally one
311 See supra part I.E.2.
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must skip a case altogether, because there's no way to disguise it.
But most cases can be successfully sanitized, they would provide
examples that could be used.
Negative Effects-Other Administrative Burdens: Vexatious Complainants,
Recusal Issues
3 13
Also, there is the situation where all appellate judges are
complained against. Perhaps the rule of necessity should be,
nationally, put into the Illustrative Rules.
The only time I thought the Act was self-defeating was when
a complainant filed a complaint against all circuit judges. It was
clearly without merit, but we had to send it to another circuit. We
need some kind of rule of necessity broader than the usual one, to
avoid the need to do that.
Assessments-Do the Positive Effects Outweigh the
Negative EffeCts?3
14
The Act should be repealed.
Abolish the Act. I know it won't be done.
D. Summary of Suggestions for Change
The following is a list of all the suggestions for change advanced
in this Article. This list is intended to be an exhaustive one,
including not only changes endorsed in this Article, but any change
that was identified as having some possible merit. The list embraces
suggested changes to the Act, the Illustrative Rules, and circuits'
practices. Many, probably most, of the suggestions originated from
ideas expressed in the field study by chief judges, clerks, or circuit
executives. All suggested changes that were put forward by chief
judges in response to specific requests for suggestions have not
been included. Those ideas are already quoted above. They are
omitted below only to avoid unnecessary repetition; the omission
does not suggest approval or disapproval of any of the chiefjudges'
suggestions.
1. The Act should be amended to expressly recognize the power
of the chief judge to conduct a limited inquiry into the factual
support for a complaint's allegations, and to create a correspond-
ing fourth ground for dismissal: a limited inquiry by the chiefjudge
313 See supra part ILB.4.a.-b.
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demonstrated that the allegations lacked any factual founda-
tion.
315
2. Chief judges should be encouraged to delegate to qualified
staff tasks associated with the initial review of a complaint and with
the preparation of a draft order to dismiss a dearly unmeritorious
complaint. Such delegation could be part of a dual-track or
multiple-track system in which potentially meritorious complaints
are quickly brought to the chief judge's attention, but nonmeritori-
ous complaints are passed to the chief judge only after review by
staff.
3 16
3. Chiefjudges should be encouraged, or required, to provide
in each order of dismissal a statement of the allegations of the
complaint and the reasons, not simply the conclusions, supporting
dismissal. A uniform national rule, imposed either by statute or by
the Judicial Conference of the United States, may be desirable to
implement this change.
3 17
4. When concluding proceedings because corrective action has
been taken, chief judges should be encouraged to document
unambiguously in the order of dismissal the specific conduct that
was corrected, and to extend the remedy, as fully as possible, to the
complainant who raised the matter.
3 18
5. A uniform national rule, imposed either by statute or by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, may be desirable. This
rule would require that each circuit make publicly available, in the
office of the clerk of the court of appeals, all chief judge dismissal
orders, and that each circuit be required to file these orders in a
central public repository (presumably, the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter).
3 19
6. Bar groups should be encouraged to serve as filters and
conduits for serious complaints.
3 20
7. Efforts should be made to improve on the currently episodic
and informal dissemination of information about complaints and
the resolution of complaints to judges throughout the circuit.
These efforts should focus on complaints having at least some
substance or some instructive relevance for other judges, including
3 15 See supra part I.C.l.a.i.(C).
316 See supra parts I.A.I., I.A.5., HI.A.
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all complaints resulting in sanctions or corrective actions. The
purpose of such dissemination-which must be in a sanitized form-
would be to bring significant orders to the attention of judges as a
guide to assessing their own conduct.
3 21
8. The judiciary should disseminate information about the
resolution of complaints to an even wider audience through
publication of public orders. This would augment the body of
published precedent under the Act, thereby facilitating the
development of a common law and helping judges to assess their
own conduct. The orders could be sanitized to remove information
that would identify the judge or complainant.
3 22
9. The Act should be amended to permit petitions for review to
be determined by a standing or rotating three-judge panel of the
judicial council, rather than by the entire council. In keeping with
recent statutory changes augmenting the representation of district
judges on the judicial councils, the amendment should require that
at least one panel member be a district judge.
3 23
10. The Illustrative Rules should be amended to permit the
invocation of a rule of necessity. Such a rule would modify the
automatic disqualification feature of Illustrative Rule 18(b) and
would permit the chief judge or judicial council to consider a
complaint or petition for review where multiple recusals otherwise
would leave no judge available to act as chief judge, or would make
it impossible to muster a quorum of the judicial council.3
24
11. Chiefjudges should be encouraged to conduct the limited
inquiry permitted by Rule 4(b) of the Illustrative Rules3 25 to avoid
impaneling special committees to investigate complaints that could
be shown quickly to be unfounded. If a special committee is
necessary, three-judge rather than fivejudge committees should be
employed more frequently. Such measures would minimize the
investigatory burdens on judges.
3 26
12. The Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference
Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability
Orders, in consultation with the Federal Judicial Center, should
review the system for collecting and reporting statistical information
about complaints and their outcomes to determine what changes
321 See supra part II.A.1.
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323 See supra part II.B.2.b.
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would improve the ability of the judicial branch, Congress, and the
public to oversee administration of the Act. At a minimum, we
recommend that judicial councils and national courts assign the
completion of statistical forms to the staff member who has primary
responsibility for assisting the chief judge in administering the Act.
This individual is likely to understand the Act's terms and proces-
ses.
3 27
327 See infra app.
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APPENDIX-AO DATA BACKGROUND, LIMITS, AND TABLES
Data on Filings Reported to the Administrative Office:
Background, Data Limits, and Tables
This Appendix presents additional data on reports to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), summarizes
the strengths and weaknesses of those data, and recommends
changes.
The AO collects data on complaints filed under 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c) for the purpose of meeting the reporting requirements that
the Act imposes on the Director of the AO in 28 U.S.C. § 604(h).
Section 604(h) requires the Director to "include in his annual report
filed with the Congress under this section a summary of the number
of complaints filed with each judicial council under section 372(c)
of this title, indicating the general nature of such complaints and
the disposition of those complaints in which action has been
taken."328 To gather data to meet this requirement, the AO has
created Form AO 372, a copy of which is attached to this Appendix,
and a nine-page "Statistics Manual" instructing the courts on how to
complete the form.
The instructions seek reporting information at two stages: when
the complaint is filed and when it is concluded. Ideally, this means
that an AO 372 form will be sent to the AO immediately after the
complaint is filed, with information identifying the circuit, date
filed, complaint number, type of complainant, and number and type
of judicial official complained about. A photocopy of that form is
to be kept by the circuit or national court for completing the
termination information. After the complaint is terminated by chief
judge action that is not the subject of a petition for review or after
judicial council action on a petition for review or a special commit-
tee report, a second report must be filed. Information about the
disposition of the complaint is entered on the bottom portion of the
photocopy of the AO 372 form, which is then sent to the AO.
Data were entered from all of the reports on file at the AO to
create the data set used in this report. The tables that follow in this
Appendix, plus the tables in the report that refer to "reported
§ 372(c) filings" and indicate the AO reports as a source, are
128 28 U.S.C. § 604(h)(2) (1988).
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derived from these records. In one instance, missing records in the
data set were identified for recent years by comparing the filing of
final orders with the FJC with the filing of termination information
with the AO. A problem was found with the data of one circuit.
Fortunately, most of the information for that circuit could be
reconstructed by reading the final orders of the chief judge and
judicial council. A close correspondence between the number of
chief judge orders in 1990 and 1991 in a sample of circuits and the
number of AO records in those years from those circuits was
observed.
The experience of working with the data suggests some of its
limits. These fall into three major areas: missing or unlinked
disposition data; misclassification of the type of complainant; and
misclassification of the type of complaint. A discussion of each type
of discrepancy follows.
1. Disposition Data
One hundred and thirty-three complaints were recorded as
being filed with incomplete disposition information. Table A-2
documents the missing or unknown data by circuit. It is possible
that a major cause of this gap is the two-step reporting system
described above. For the complaint that the chief judge dismisses
and that does not have further review, this system probably works
well. For the complaint that has more than two stages, such as one
with judicial council review or one that has a special committee, it
may be more difficult for court staff to identify the proper time to
submit the closing AO 372 form. It appears that a number of these
forms are filed prematurely, either before judicial council action on
a petition for review or before a special committee issues its report.
It also appears that a number are not filed at all. The result is that
disposition data are incomplete and it cannot be said with confi-
dence that there have been a definite number of dismissals,
petitions for review, special committee appointments, or, perhaps
most importantly, disciplinary sanctions imposed by the judicial
council. From the knowledge gained during visits to eight circuits
in order to conduct the field study, and a general awareness of
highly publicized actions in some circuits, it is safe to assert that a
number of disciplinary matters were not included in the AO data.
Based on the understanding gained of the pitfalls of the two-step
process, it is suspected that activity at the judicial council level is
overrepresented in the "incomplete" column in Table A-2. It should
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also be noted that the information for forty chief judge orders and
fourjudicial council orders is incomplete. The stages of the missing
data for the other 89 missing complaints is unknown.
2. Classification of Complainants
The data revealed that complainants were often identified in
inconsistent ways. For example, the AO 372 form calls for a
selection among "prison inmate," "attorney," "litigant," "officer of
the court," "public official," or "other _ ." The "other" space
was frequently filled with information that would fit one of the
specific categories, such as "litigant" or "prisoner." The errors in
classification of the complainant that were discovered in the field
study led to a limitation of the analysis of the complainants to two
groups: attorneys and all other complainants. Originally, the
differences in outcomes revealed in the data were to have been
analyzed for litigants and nonlitigants, but this was ultimately
impossible given the lack of confidence in the underlying data.
3. Classification of Type of Complaint
Complaints and orders were examined in the files of eight
circuits. Attempts were made to classify the allegations of the
complaints according to the ten categories listed on the AO 372
form. We disagreed with the classification reported to the AO in a
significant, but as yet undetermined, percentage of those com-
plaints. Because of this level of disagreement, the AO data on "type
of allegations" was not used. Table 5 reports only the field study
data that were derived from a subset of arguably meritorious
allegations in the field study complaints. This results in an absence
of complete and reliable data regarding the type of allegation in the
full set of complaints.
Observations on the reasons for the misclassifications may be
helpful. The field study revealed that the court personnel who were
most knowledgeable about the § 372(c) process, and who had
responsibility for reviewing complaints, were generally not at all
involved in recording data on the AO 372 form. In each circuit,
staff attorneys, clerks of court and their chief deputies, circuit
executives and their assistants, or some combination of the above
had responsibility for reading the complaints and sometimes for
drafting orders. Inquiries were made in at least one-half of the
circuits about who filled out the AO 372 form. Invariably the
primary contact, the person most knowledgeable about the process,
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had no responsibility for filling out the AO 372 form and generally
had no input into the report. In some instances, the primary
contact person was not even aware that a statistical report form
existed. In those circuits, the person who filed the report was
generally a secretary or a deputy clerk with primarily clerical
responsibility for the § 372(c) process. In other words, the person
with the least training and the least responsibility for the process
was asked to make complex judgments about the type of allegations
in the complaints and the type of complainant.
It is recommended that each circuit assign primary responsibility
for recording the data on the AO 372 form to the individual
primarily responsible for assisting the chief judge in reviewing
complaints and preparing draft orders. Additionally, the AO should
monitor the circuits' and national courts' compliance with the
reporting standards for the § 372(c) process.
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TABLE A-1
Total Number of Reported § 372(c) Filings for All Circuits and National Courts,
Calendar Years 1980-1991, Presented by Statistical Year (N=2405)
329
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329 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office. The Third Circuit indicates to us that their records
show 204 complaints filed during the period.
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TABLE A-2
Type of Disposition (ChiefJudge) for All Reported § 372(c) Filings,
by Circuit and National Court, 1980-1991 (N=2405)33 0
CHIEF JUDGE ORDERS
Corn- Correc-
Circuit plaint tive Action No Related Not in Incom-
or With- Action Longer to Confor- Combi- plete
Court drawn Taken Necessary Frivolous Merits mance nation Data
1st 0 1 0 35 36 4 28 0
2d 6 2 0 27 58 18 208 1
3d 0 5 0 13 131 0 37 3
4th 3 1 0 35 100 53 16 7
5th 0 9 0 14 99 3 49 13
6th 1 3 1 27 111 22 31 0
7th 0 4 0 12 57 15 23 0
8th 0 11 2 8 152 3 1 2
9th 0 22 0 34 146 45 135 6
10th 4 1 1 6 27 18 55 0
l1th 2 13 0 5 147 6 18 7
D.C. 0 1 0 5 16 9 18 1
Fed. 0 0 0 4 8 1 0 0
Int'lTrd 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0Trade
Cl. Ct. 0 0 0 2 9 0 2 0
Total 16 73 4 227 1097 198 621 40
330 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office. The Third Circuit indicates to us that their records
show 204 complaints filed during the period.
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TABLE A-2 (cont'd)
Type of Disposition (Judicial Council or Other) for All
Reported § 372(c) Filings, by Circuit and National
Court, 1980-1991 (N=2405)33'
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ORDERS OTHER
Voluntary
Volun- Retire-
Circuit Judge Judge Missing tary ment/
or Cen- Im- J.C. Retire- Certified Complaint
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Total 5 1 4 1 2 27 89 16
331 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office. The Third Circuit indicates to us that their records
show 204 complaints filed during the period.
1 0 0 3
0 0 0 0
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TABLE A-3
Type of Complainant for All Reported § 372(c) Filings, All Circuit
and National Courts, 1980-1991 (N2389)
33 2
Circuit or Attorney Non-Attorney Total
Court
1st Cir. 11 94 105
2d Cir. 29 295 324
3d Cir. 4 201 205
4th Cir. 5 218 223
5th Cir. 19 171 190
6th Cir. 15 209 224
7th Cir. 7 110 117
8th Cir. 9 180 189
9th Cir. 18 382 400
10th Cir. 6 115 121
11th Cir. 8 200 208
D.C. Cir. 2 53 55
Fed. Cir. 1 13 14
Int'l Trade 0 1 1
Cl. Ct. 1 12 13
Total 135 2254 2389
332 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office. Sixteen withdrawn complaints are excluded.
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TABLE A-4
Cross-tabulation of Complainant Types and Dispositions,
All Reported § 372(c) Filings, 1980-1991 (N=2272)333
Disposition
1. Complaint Withdrawn
2. Action not necessary
3. Corrective Action
4. Frivolous
5. Related to Merits
6. Not in Conformance













































333 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office. One hundred thirty-three reported filings had incom-
plete disposition or complainant data and thus were not included in this table.
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TABLE A-5
Types ofjudges Complained Against in Reported § 372(c) Matters,




Circuit or Bank- Cl. Cir- Dis- Magis- Int'l Other Combi- sing
Court ruptcy Ct. cuit trict trate Trade Specific nation Data Total
1st Cir. 11 0 7 33 4 0 1 48 1 105
2d Cir. 19 0 41 185 16 0 1 64 4 830
3d Cir. 8 0 32 130 34 0 0 1 0 205
4th Cir. 10 1 4 148 27 0 3 33 0 226
5th Cir. 20 0 11 85 19 0 1 54 0 190
6th Cir. 12 0 14 137 24 0 3 35 0 225
7th Cir. 15 0 5 66 7 0 3 21 0 117
8th Cir. 7 0 10 130 32 0 1 9 0 189
9th Cir. 36 0 13 187 52 0 13 97 2 400
10th Cir. 18 0 1 73 17 0 1 14 1 125
I1th Cir. 7 0 12 121 16 0 2 48 4 210
D.C. Cir. 1 0 4 31 1 0 0 17 1 55
Fed. Cir. 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 4 0 14
Int' 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Trade
Cl. Ct. 0 9 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 13
Total 164 10 163 1326 249 1 32 447 13 2405
-34 Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office.
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TABLE A-6
Cross-Tabulation of § 372(c) Filings Involving Corrective Action,
Discipline Imposed, or Retirement by Type of Complainant and
Type ofJudge Filed Against, All Circuits and












































... Information obtained from § 372(c) forms filed by circuits and national courts
with the Administrative Office.
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SAMPLE AO 372 FoRM
A g REPORT ON COMPLAINT UNDER TITLE 28 U.S.C. SECTION 372(c)
(Rompidle iins 1, 2,3,4, 5, 6, 7, and 11 when complaint is filed.)
(2) Date Filed ® Complant types
Circuit ~~ ~ (W)CopltteNmbrn
(® CEcuit Mo. Day . ® Complit Nm O OnosLerof theChiefJudge
(go to Item 7)
( Complinant($) ( ill in appropriate number of complainants, do not check.)
- Prison inmate - Officer of the court
- Attorney - Public official
Litigant - Other (specify)
@ 0 Check if any complainant has previously filed a complaint. L
(E) Number and type of judicial officers complained about. (Fill in appropriate number of officers, do not check.) N
G
- Circuit Judges - Claims Court judges
District judges - Bankruptcy judges
Coot of International Trade judges - Magistrate judges
@ Date Terminated M. Dy W
(3 Natore of Complaint (Check as many boxes as apply.)
a. 0 Mental disability g. 0 Bribery or corruption
b. 0 Physical disability h. 0 Undue decisional delay
c. 0 Demeanor i. 0 Incompetencelneglect
d. [ Abuseofjudicialpower j. 0 Other(specify)
e. 0 Prejudicefbia
f. 0 Conflict of interet
@ Disposition (Check all appropriate h es.)
A. By compla;lnat:
0 Complaint withdrawn before Chief judge acts (Check only if this terminates the entire complaint.)
B. By Ch ef Judge (Check as many boxes as apply for each complaint.)
Dismissal Under 372(c)(3XA):
1. 0 Not in conformance with tatute 2. 0 Directly related to merits 3. 0 Frivolous T
E
4. 0 Appropriate coreive action taken under372(c)(3)(B). R
5. 0 Action no longer necessary because of intervening events (28 USC 372(c)(3)(B)). M
6. 0 Appointedspecialinvestgativecmmmitteeunder372(c4XA). Indicate allegatibon(s) from item9 above) I
investigated N
A
C. By ldiclalCouncil w Referral by investigative committee 0 TPetition for review under(372(cX10)) 0 granted I
(Unlem petition for review was desied 0 denied (Go to item 11) 0
check as many of the following boxes (1-12) as apply.) N
No disciplinary action taken Disciplinary action
(1) 0 Dismissed by judicial Council (3) 0 Directed Chief District judge to take action
(2) 0 Complaint withdrawn (Check only if this terminates (Magistrate judges only)
the entire complaint.) (4) 0 Certified disability
(5) 0 Requested voluntary retirement
(6) 0 Suspended assignment of new cases
(7) 0 Privately censored
(8) 0 Publicly censured
(9) 0 Other (specify)
Referral to Judicial Conference under 372(c)M7( A) and (B)
(10) 0 Discretionary (11) 0 Mandatory (possibility of impeachment) (12) 0 Mandatory (not resolvable by council)
S coName of Per Telephone Number (include FPS or Area Code):
Mal completed fn to., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistics Division
Washington, D.C. 20544. Attention: ARB-jC

